Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0130
03-15-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Kyle Anthony Clark, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Casey D. Ball, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20212919001 The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Casey D. Ball, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee
James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Vasquez and Judge Gard concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
EPPICH, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 Kyle Clark appeals from his conviction and sentence for illegal voting. He contends the trial court misinterpreted A.R.S. § 161016(1) and therefore erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. See State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, ¶ 69 (2022). In 2020, Clark was being held at the Pima County Adult Detention Center (the "jail") on unrelated criminal charges. Around March of that year, the jail began working with the Pima County Recorder's Office to facilitate inmate voting in the upcoming November election. As part of that program, inmates received digital notifications on their "inmate tablets" about the opportunity to vote. The notifications included an informational flyer and advised inmates to complete and submit a paper request form if they wished to register to vote. Around the same time of the digital notifications, posters were put up around the jail describing the criteria for voting. It was also verbally relayed to inmates that they should fill out a request form if they wanted to vote.
¶3 In September, Clark completed the request form, and jail staff provided him with the necessary voter registration materials, which he completed. Then, in October, Clark was given his ballot and a private room in the jail to vote. Clark voted, and jail staff delivered his ballot to on-site representatives from the recorder's office. Clark's ballot was ultimately counted in the election. At the time Clark voted, he had at least two felony convictions, and his civil rights had not been restored.
¶4 Clark was charged with false registration and illegal voting on the basis that his prior felon status had rendered him ineligible. After the state presented its evidence at trial, Clark moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 on both counts. The trial court granted the motion as to false registration but denied it as to illegal voting. The court reasoned that false registration requires the state to prove the defendant knew he was not entitled to register and that the state had presented no substantial evidence that Clark knew of his ineligibility. As to illegal voting, the court reasoned that knowledge of one's ineligibility is not an element. That count was submitted to the jury, which returned a guilty verdict. The court subsequently sentenced Clark to 3.5 years' imprisonment.
¶5 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Discussion
¶6 Clark argues that the trial court erred by denying his Rule 20 motion "based on the erroneous assumption that the illegal voting statute was similar to a strict liability offense." Clark admits he "was a convicted felon who was not entitled to vote," but he contends there was no evidence to show he knew he was not entitled to vote, an element he claims must be proven under § 16-1016(1). We review both the denial of a Rule 20 motion and issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011) (Rule 20 motion); State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, ¶ 7 (2023) (statutory interpretation).
¶7 In interpreting a statute, we give words "their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, ¶ 10 (quoting State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz. 539, ¶ 7 (2018)). If the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to secondary methods of statutory interpretation. State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, ¶ 6 (2003). Furthermore, in construing a statute, "we apply a practical and commonsensical construction." State v. Alawy, 198 Ariz. 363, ¶ 8 (App. 2000); see also State v. Pledger, 236 Ariz. 469, ¶ 8 (App. 2015).
¶8 A person is guilty of illegal voting if he or she, "[n]ot being entitled to vote, knowingly votes." § 16-1016(1). The plain language of § 16-1016(1) is clear and unambiguous regarding the culpable mental state required. The statute separates the two elements of the offense with a comma, and the culpable mental state, "knowing," comes only after the ineligibility element. This structure plainly indicates that "knowingly" applies only to the act of voting. To conclude otherwise would require us to manipulate the plain language, which we will not do. See Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, ¶ 15 (App. 2009) ("Courts will not read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself ...."); cf. State v. Holmes, 250 Ariz. 311, ¶ 16 (App. 2020) (statute prohibiting "knowingly . . . [p]ossessing a deadly weapon . . . if such person is a prohibited possessor," A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), does not require defendant to know he was prohibited possessor). Furthermore, because this structure clearly delineates the applicability of the culpable mental state, we reject Clark's argument that A.R.S. § 13-202(A) supports his interpretation. See § 13-202(A) (if statute provides culpable mental state "without distinguishing among the elements . . . the prescribed mental state shall apply to each such element unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears").
¶9 Even assuming the plain language is ambiguous, the statute's context further supports our interpretation. The structure of § 16-1016(1) directly contrasts with the statute criminalizing false registration, which applies the culpable mental state to both elements: "A person who knowingly causes . . . himself to be registered as an elector . . . knowing that he is not entitled to such registration . . . is guilty of a class 6 felony." A.R.S. § 16-182(A) (emphasis added); see also State v. Sorensen, 255 Ariz. 316, ¶ 8 (App. 2023) (in interpreting meaning, we may also examine "statutes that are in pari materia-of the same subject or general purpose-for guidance" (quoting Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, ¶ 7 (2017)). Furthermore, § 16-1016 identifies twelve different acts, and § 16-1016(1) is the only subsection to begin with something other than the culpable mental state. See § 16-1016(2)-(12); see also Sorensen, 255 Ariz. 316, ¶ 8 ("[W]hen the electorate adopts 'restrictive language in one section of the statute but not in the other section,' we presume 'it intended the restriction to apply only where it was designated.'" (quoting Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, ¶ 16 (2021)).
¶10 Clark's offered interpretation is also incompatible with A.R.S. § 1-215(17)(b), which provides a definition under the general rules of statutory construction that "knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission" is not required under a "knowingly" culpable mental state. See State v. Bowsher, 225 Ariz. 586, ¶ 14 (2010) (we aim to harmonize statutes); A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b) ("knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission" also unnecessary under criminal code). For instance, our supreme court has previously determined that "knowingly taking contraband into a correctional facility," A.R.S. § 13-2505(A)(1), does not require proof of one's knowledge that an item is considered "contraband" and that such an interpretation is consistent with statutes "generally declaring that knowledge of unlawfulness is not an element of crimes and that ignorance of the law is not a defense," State v. Francis, 243 Ariz. 434, ¶¶ 7, 9-10 (2018); see also A.R.S. §§ 1-215(17)(b), 13-105(10)(b), 13-204(B) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility."). Here, because § 16-1016(1) does not indicate otherwise, we cannot conclude the state was required to prove that Clark knew he was prohibited from voting. See A.R.S. §§ 16-121(A) (person qualified to vote if qualified to register to vote and properly registered to vote); 16-101(A)(5) (person not qualified to register to vote if "convicted of treason or a felony, unless restored to civil rights").
¶11 As the state acknowledges, Arizona courts have occasionally read a culpable mental state into otherwise silent statutes. See State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 489 (1985) (despite no mens rea language, driving without a license requires the state show "the driver knew or should have known that the license has been suspended"); State v. Nelson, 251 Ariz. 420, ¶¶ 7, 10, 13, 18 (App. 2021) (aggravated DUI for impaired driving while required to have an interlock device installed on vehicle required proof of knowledge of that restriction). Those cases, however, are distinguishable because both involve the defendant's knowledge of some restriction specific to that defendant. See Williams, 144 Ariz. at 489; Nelson, 251 Ariz. 420, ¶ 16. Here, Clark testified that, until this instance, he had not voted in approximately twenty years "[b]ecause [he] was a felon." Thus, his argument cannot be that he lacked knowledge of some circumstance only applicable to him-like the imposition of driving restrictions in Williams or Nelson-but that he erroneously thought the law had changed in a way that would have made him an eligible voter. As discussed above, "[i]gnorance or mistake as to a matter of law does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility." § 13-204(B).
¶12 Clark concedes he "was a convicted felon who was not entitled to vote." Clark does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether he knowingly voted. Because we conclude these are the only two elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under § 16-1016(1), the trial court did not err in denying Clark's Rule 20 motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Disposition
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.