Opinion
Case No. 0212008011.
Submitted: April 7, 2005.
April 21, 2005.
Motion for Post Conviction Relief
Pedro E. Cintra, Sussex Correctional Institution.
Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire.
Melanie Withers, Esquire, Department of Justice.
Dear Mr. Cintra and Counsel:
Defendant filed his motion for post-conviction relief on August 11, 2004. The Court has had the opportunity to study the case law submitted by the parties as well as the evidence proffered on April 7, 2005. This is the Court's decision GRANTING the defendant's post-conviction motion. I find that the Defendant lacked effective assistance of counsel based upon his trial counsel's failure to seek the suppression of his statements to the police. The guilty verdicts are vacated and this case is to be promptly scheduled for a new trial.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
To demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Defendant must establish that his counsel committed error at the trial level, based upon an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the error resulted in a material prejudice to the Defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
In this case, the Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Motion to Suppress based upon a Miranda violation. Consideration of whether or not the Defendant made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent is a fact intensive inquiry since it is based upon a totality of the circumstances standard. The effectiveness of the waiver must be reviewed by considering "the circumstances including the behavior of the interrogators, the conduct of the defendant, his age, his intellect, his experience, and all other pertinent factors."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1980).
Id.
In this case, the Defendant was interviewed approximately three hours after the police received a call that he had assaulted his wife using a machete. The trial evidence established that the Defendant, his wife and a friend had spent the night drinking a considerable quantity of alcohol. The officer reported that before he was taken for questioning, several hours after the arrest, the Defendant appeared to be sleeping in his holding cell. At trial, the police candidly acknowledged that the Defendant was "highly intoxicated" at the time of the interview.
Voluntary intoxication does not "per se invalidate an otherwise proper waiver of rights." The Court must consider, under the totality of the circumstances, whether the Defendant had sufficient capacity to understand his rights and to make a voluntary and knowing decision to waive those rights. In Howard v. State, the Supreme Court found that a criminal defendant effectively waived his right against self-incrimination, despite his intoxication, because he gave a detailed statement, communicated that he understood the Miranda warnings and acknowledged that he understood what was happening to him. However, the facts in this case do not support such a finding.
Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Del. 1983).
Id.
Id.
The Defendant is Cuban and speaks with a heavy accent. The officer reported that, at times, it was difficult to understand the Defendant. For this reason, the officer would repeat what he believed the Defendant had said and request confirmation from the Defendant. At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified similarly. His attorney was able to communicate adequately with his client in English, even though it was difficult. His attorney made the decision that, at trial, an interpreter should be present to ensure that the Defendant understood what was taking place. An interpreter was also present at the April 7, 2005 evidentiary hearing.
The tape recording of the interview demonstrates that the Defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights. However, the officer did not ask the Defendant if he understood those rights or whether he wished to waive them and talk with the officer. After informing the Defendant of his rights, the officer immediately asked the Defendant what occurred that evening and the Defendant gave an incriminating response.
The State acknowledges this omission, but argues that a knowing and intelligent waiver can be inferred from the circumstances and the fact that the Defendant knew his rights but nevertheless answered the officers' questions.
I agree that, under the right fact pattern, a knowing and intelligent waiver may be inferred, but in this case such an inference cannot be made. The Defendant was "highly intoxicated." He was awakened at approximately 4:45 a.m. after a night of heavy drinking. English is not his native language. Under these circumstances, a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be inferred from the Defendant's responses to the officers' questions.
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that he listened to the taped statement of his client, but failed to identify or raise the Defendant's lack of waiver of his Miranda rights. Knowing how intoxicated his client was, combined with the failure to address the waiver of Miranda, counsel acknowledges he should have filed a Motion to Suppress the statement. I agree. I also find that had the suppression motion been filed, it would have been granted.
The Defendant's wife was a very reluctant witness. She did not wish to testify or provide any information that would incriminate her husband. The State's case relied substantially upon the Defendant's statement. I cannot find that the use of his statement was harmless to his eventual conviction. Therefore, the Defendant has established the necessary prejudice under Strickland. His attorney was ineffective for not filing a Motion to Suppress his statement and that error by counsel had a causal relationship to the guilty verdict.
The Defendant's remaining allegations in his Motion for Post-Conviction relief are not addressed in this decision since the Defendant has established sufficient evidence to warrant a new trial.
Defendant's motion for post-conviction relief is granted. The conviction is vacated. The Defendant shall be promptly scheduled for a new trial.