Opinion
ID No. 9905015253.
Submitted: January 18, 2000.
Decided: January 28, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress — DENIED
Marie O'Connor Graham, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 45 The Green, Dover, DE 19901
Paul S. Swierzbinski, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, 530 S. State Street, Suite 108, Dover, DE 19901
Counsel:
Defendant Warren H. Chapman is charged with six counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 775, one count of Rape in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 773, two counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 531, one count of Attempted Rape First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 531, four counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 768, and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, 11 Del. C. § 778. Chapman filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and after an evidentiary hearing the Court denied part of the motion and reserved decision on the admissibility of a statement made by the defendant en route to prison in default of bail on these charges.
The issue left before the Court is the admissibility of Chapman's statement in response to Trooper Bowers' question, "Why did you do this?" Chapman responded that he did not know, that he was abusing alcohol, that he always knew she would tell, but did not think it would be this soon. The question and the statement occurred between 2:15 a.m. and 2:40 a.m. on May 21, 1999 in a police cruiser while Chapman was being transported to the Delaware Correctional Center in default of bail. About four and one-half hours earlier the defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights and waived them at Troop 3. He gave a voluntary statement that concluded about three hours earlier in which he acknowledged having the 10 year old victim perform oral sex, but denied other alleged sexual contact and intercourse with her. The interruption in the continuity of the questioning of Chapman was to process the arrest warrant and have bail set. The same officer who gave the warning earlier and accepted the waiver asked the question. The processing of the arrest warrant was the only intervening occurrence.
In context, Chapman's statement related only to his earlier admission. I am satisfied Chapman was fully aware of his Miranda rights and that he had no reason to believe the same officer would not respect his invocation of them. At no time did Chapman invoke any of the rights that had been explained to him. Under the totality of circumstances, the statement was voluntarily made after a valid waiver of Miranda rights and it is not subject to suppression simply because the Miranda warnings were not repeated.
The State has so argued here and is estopped from contending otherwise at trial.
In reaching this conclusion I have considered and applied the five-part test within DeJesus v. State, Del. Supr., 655 A.2d 1180 (1995). The time lapse between the last Miranda warning and Chapman's statement was four and one-half hours. The only interruption was to process the warrant and set bail. While the location was different, Chapman continued to be in the custody of the same officer. The same officer who gave the warnings also did the interrogation. There was no significant difference between the statements with the latter one being only an explanation of why Chapman did what he had admitted. I also note that comparable or longer time lapses have not required a repetition of Miranda warnings. See cases cited in Ledda v. Stare, Del. Supr., 564 A.2d 1125, 1130 (1989).
DeJesus held the following:
This Court has adopted a five-part test to determine whether police are obligated to repeat once-administered Miranda warnings. These factors include:
(1) the time lapse between the last Miranda warnings and the accused's statements;
(2) interruptions in the continuity of the interrogation;
(3) whether there was a change of location between the place where the last Miranda warnings were given and the place where the accused's statement was made;
(4) whether the same officer who gave the warnings is also conducting the interrogation resulting in the accused's statement; and
(5) whether there is a significant difference between statement elicited during the interrogation being challenged and other preceding statements.
For all these reasons, defendant's motion to suppress his statement on May 21, 1999, is denied .
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
Henry duPont Ridgely