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rejecting conclusory assertion that Giles should be applied retroactively to his case and warranted relief, and noting that under court's Rules, "A movant [seeking postconviction relief] must support his or her assertions with `concrete allegations of actual prejudice, or risk summary dismissal.' * * * Defendant's motion is completely conclusory, and Defendant has failed to support his claim with facts."
Summary of this case from Salerno v. StateOpinion
I.D. No. 0311009491A.
Submitted: September 10, 2008.
Decided: November 10, 2008.
Upon Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Brian J. Robertson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Michael D. Chambers, Albion, Pennsylvania, Pro Se.
ORDER
This 10th day of November, 2008, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Following a trial (where Defendant represented himself) concluding on September 26, 2006, a jury convicted Defendant of one count of Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, one count of Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and one count of Possession of a Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance. Defendant was subsequently adjudicated a habitual criminal offender, and on January 15, 2007, this Court sentenced Defendant to 25 years of minimum mandatory incarceration. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.
2. On June 2, 2008, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was summarily dismissed on August 25, 2008.
State v. Chambers, 2008 WL 4137988 (Del.Super.) (summarily dismissing Defendant's motion for postconviction relief as conclusory). In Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief he asserted three grounds for relief:
Ground one: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Before proceeding pro se, Appellant ask [sic] for his counsel at the time, Edmund Hillis to call certain witnesses for his defense before trial started, and without the cooperation of counsel, appellant couldn't prepare properly to represent himself.
Ground two: Newly Discovered Evidence. Although at trial, the State's claim was that Mrs. Auden's testimony was without merit. [sic] Evidence of State's claim to probable cause came from Mrs. Pruden's statements. Not confidential informant as they claimed but failed to reveal. [sic]
Ground three: Appellant, Movant asserts that the judge should've allowed Frank's Hearing. Under Franks, a defendant who makes a substantial showing that, a statement in a warrant affidavit, necessary to a finding of probable cause, was made [with] either intentional or reckless disregard for the truth is entitled to a hearing to prove his claim! Confidential informant stated that Mr. Chambers and Mr. White were storing "large quantities of heroine [sic]"! And probation officers found ["]24 bags of crack" and a gun.
3. On March 5, 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's September 26, 2006 judgment.
State v. Chambers, 945 A.2d 593 (Del. 2008) (holding that (1) Defendant's claim for violation of his right to a speedy trial was untimely asserted, (2) Defendant's claim that this Court should have granted his motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence was "meritless," and (3) Defendant's claim of a Batson violation was untimely asserted).
4. Defendant filed a second motion for postconviction relief on September 10, 2008. Defendant has asserted two grounds for relief. The following constitutes the entirety of the substantive portion of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief:
Ground one: Under Franks v. Delaware a defendant who makes a substantial showing that a statement in a warrant affidavit, necessary to a finding of probable cause, was made [with] either intentional or reckless disregard for the truth is entitled to a hearing to prove his claim! Confidential Informant[']s statements about what would be found at residence shows reckless disregard for the truth.
Ground two: Violation of 5th Amendment Right, Confrontation Clause, Right to Confront Accusers. New rule decided on June 25, [20]08 forfeiture by wrong doing was not exception requirement because it was not established at time of founding of Bill of Rights or in American Jurisprudence since that time. And this instant matter, again the issue of confrontation as it was recently described and made clear in Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 976 (2008) and its retroactive application found in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 228; 109 S.Ct. 1060 (Constitutional Law)[.] The petitioner speaks.
5. Superior Court Rule 61(b)(2) provides in part that a "motion [for postconviction relief] . . . shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." Pursuant to Rule 61(d)(4), this Court may summarily dismiss a motion for postconviction relief "if it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief." A movant must support his or her assertions with "concrete allegations of actual prejudice, or risk summary dismissal."
State v. Childress, 2000 WL 1610766, at *1 (Del.Super.). See also, e.g., State v. Miller 2007 WL 3287943 (Del.Super.).
6. It plainly appears from the motion that Defendant has not shown entitlement to relief. Defendant's motion is completely conclusory, and Defendant has failed to support his claims with facts. For these reasons Defendant's motion warrants summary dismissal.
7. For the reasons stated, Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.