Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0232
09-15-2020
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. RAMON CABELLO CARO, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Michael T. O'Toole, Chief Counsel By Jillian B. Francis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee Robert A. Kerry, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20171190001
The Honorable Christopher C. Browning, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Michael T. O'Toole, Chief Counsel
By Jillian B. Francis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellee Robert A. Kerry, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Eppich concurred. VÁSQUEZ, Chief Judge:
¶1 After two jury trials, Ramon Caro was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault causing serious physical injury, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and aggravated driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .20 or more. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is 10.5 years, to be followed by concurrent periods of probation totaling five years. On appeal, Caro argues the court erred by denying his motion to suppress, improperly admitting other-act evidence, and denying his request for a Willits instruction as well as his motion for a judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P. For the following reasons, we affirm.
During Caro's first trial, the jury found him guilty of the DUI and aggravated assault counts, but was unable to reach a verdict on the manslaughter charge. The trial court declared a mistrial as to that count.
State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964).
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to affirming Caro's convictions. See State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). Early in the morning on January 21, 2017, Pima County Deputy Sheriff Jeff Knerr was dispatched to a collision involving a vehicle and a bicycle in Pima County on Flowing Wells Road and Wetmore Road. When he arrived, Knerr saw a man, later identified as D.M., lying face down on top of a bike. D.M. had a pulse and was breathing, but was not verbally responsive and exhaled blood with each breath.
¶3 A witness to the collision identified Caro as the driver of the vehicle and when Knerr asked Caro what had happened, Caro responded that "he was unsure" but "might have possibly struck a pedestrian." Another deputy, Ryan Goss, encountered a "language barrier" when he spoke with Caro. He testified that he could not recall specifically if he placed Caro in his patrol vehicle to wait for Deputy Jorge Rodriguez to arrive "because [Rodriguez] spoke Spanish, or if he was just the traffic investigator." When Rodriguez arrived and opened the door to the patrol vehicle, he and Goss smelled "a strong odor of intoxicants" and Rodriguez noticed Caro had "[r]ed, watery eyes." Caro agreed to provide a breath sample that confirmed the presence of alcohol. Rodriguez then obtained a search warrant to conduct blood draws for three samples, to be drawn in one-hour increments. When Caro was moved from the passenger's side of the patrol vehicle to the driver's side, the deputies noticed small pieces of glass on his clothing and on the back seat, likely from the shattered windshield of Caro's vehicle.
¶4 An ambulance transported D.M. to University Medical Center (UMC), where he was treated for a "significant traumatic injury," including admission to the intensive care unit. D.M. remained at UMC until February 2017, when he died from complications arising from the injuries he had sustained in the collision one month earlier.
¶5 A grand jury indicted Caro for manslaughter, DUI, aggravated DUI, and two counts of aggravated assault. He was convicted and sentenced as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Motion to Suppress
¶6 Caro argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his initial detention was illegal. Specifically, he maintains that when he was placed in the back of a patrol vehicle for almost an hour while awaiting the arrival of a Spanish-speaking deputy, "he was detained [and] seized, in violation of his rights under the United States and Arizona [C]onstitutions." He thus claims that "all the evidence of impairment, the deputies' observations and the blood draws, were a result of [his] unlawful detention and should have been suppressed."
¶7 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion but review constitutional and purely legal issues de novo, State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4 (App. 2007), including whether the duration of an investigative detention was reasonable, State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, ¶ 19 (App. 2007). "In reviewing a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's factual findings." State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 8 (App. 2008).
¶8 At the suppression hearing, Knerr testified that he had been the first to arrive on scene shortly after 7:00 a.m. and that Caro had stated that "he possibly had struck a pedestrian." Although Knerr stated he did not have any difficulty communicating with Caro, Deputy Georgina Houston testified that when she spoke with Caro "he was more Spanish speaking" and indicated by gesture or in Spanish that he spoke a little bit of English. Houston then requested a Spanish-speaking deputy, and Rodriguez arrived thereafter. Goss testified that he had placed Caro in his patrol vehicle and had done his "best to advise [Caro] that he[ was] not under arrest, but he was being detained as [the deputies] investigated the collision" because, as Goss understood, Caro "mostly sp[oke] Spanish."
At the time of the incident, Houston's last name was Patino. She later clarified that her last name had changed to Houston by the time of the hearing, and we thus refer to her throughout the draft as such.
¶9 Rodriguez testified that shortly after he had arrived on scene at 7:55 a.m., he went to Goss's patrol vehicle to speak with Caro who was in the backseat. Rodriguez explained that after opening the door he noticed Caro had "red, watery, bloodshot eyes" and Rodriguez smelled "a strong odor of intoxicants coming from him, as well as slurred, mumbled speech." Rodriguez communicated with Caro entirely in Spanish and requested Caro to undergo a field sobriety test, but Caro "asked [him] if it would be easier [to do] a blood draw." Rodriguez had Caro sign a consent form, drew his blood around 8:20 a.m., and then conducted a preliminary breath test (PBT). The PBT showed a BAC of .216 and Rodriguez placed Caro under arrest at 8:30 a.m.
¶10 After taking the matter under advisement, as relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the trial court denied Caro's motion to suppress, concluding that the length of the detention was reasonable under the circumstances and not for the purpose of delay. The court noted that it did not find the deputies' testimony regarding Caro's understanding of English contradictory because Goss, Houston, and Rodriguez had "more interaction with [Caro]" and "[t]he fact that [Caro] may or may not have spoken English goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of . . . Knerr's testimony" and "it is for the trier of fact to determine who or what to believe regarding [Caro's] ability to speak and understand English." Additionally, the court found the deputies "had several different issues that had to be immediately addressed" once they arrived on scene including "to assist the victim, direct traffic, and . . . secure the scene to preserve evidence" as well as wait for a Spanish-speaking officer that "was necessary to speak to [Caro]."
The trial court also denied Caro's motion to suppress his statements made to Knerr, finding they were the result of a consensual encounter. However, the court granted the motion as to the statements made to "Houston, Goss, and Rodriguez, as well as to the initial blood draw that was taken per [his] consent," concluding that those "interactions with [Caro] were in the nature of a custodial interrogation." Below, in addition to challenging his statements to Knerr, Caro also argued the deputies had no right to detain him in the first place. But because he does not meaningfully raise, much less argue, these issues on appeal, we find them waived. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7) (opening briefs must present argument containing contentions of appellant with citations to authorities and record); see also State v. Cons, 208 Ariz. 409, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (argument waived when neither developed properly nor supported by authority in opening brief). --------
¶11 "The ultimate question is whether the police engaged in unreasonable delay during the investigation to gain an advantage over the subject." State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, ¶ 20 (2016). In Maciel, our supreme court concluded that an investigative detention where officers were "responding to a dispatch for a suspected burglary" that was approximately an hour long was not unreasonable under the circumstances because "[s]uch an investigation might reasonably require a slightly longer investigative detention than a typical traffic or Terry stop" and "officers acted reasonably and efficiently in the unfolding burglary investigation." Id. ¶¶ 23, 25; see also State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 143 (1997) (explaining forty-five-minute investigative detention was reasonable because lawful traffic stop revealed defendant's "arms and legs were smeared with blood" and was reasonable for officer to investigate cause).
¶12 In this case, we agree with the trial court's determination that the investigative detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and not for the purpose of delay. See State v. Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, ¶ 14 (2012); State v. Kinney, 225 Ariz. 550, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). Because Knerr had reasonable suspicion to believe that Caro had been involved in a collision involving serious physical injury, Caro was properly detained for the purposes of the investigation. See Kinney, 225 Ariz. 550, ¶ 14. Once Houston determined Caro primarily spoke Spanish, the investigative detention was prolonged no longer than necessary so that a Spanish-speaking deputy could arrive at the scene to effectively communicate with Caro. See Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, ¶ 14. The duration was neither unreasonable nor for the purpose of gaining an advantage. See Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, ¶ 20. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Caro's motion to suppress on the basis of the delay in waiting for a Spanish-speaking deputy to arrive on the scene. See Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4.
¶13 Caro also contends "the trial court erred when it ruled the search warrant was legal despite the errors in the supporting affidavit about what the witnesses [had] said." In denying Caro's motion, the court explained that although the initial blood draw "via Caro's consent" was inadmissible, the three blood draws pursuant to the search warrant were admissible because there was "independent probable cause to uphold the search warrant." Specifically, the court noted Caro's admission to Knerr "that he might have st[r]uck someone and that the vehicle was his" as well as Rodriguez's observations of impairment. We will not reverse a court's ruling on a motion to suppress absent clear and manifest error. State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 57 (1995).
¶14 "The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires a search warrant be issued only upon probable cause." See Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV); see also State v. Peltz, 242 Ariz. 23, ¶ 35 (App. 2017) ("A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense." (quoting State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 30 (2000))). And a detached, disinterested magistrate must determine the existence of probable cause after considering an officer's sworn statements. Frimmel, 236 Ariz. 232, ¶ 26. A defendant may, however, challenge a search warrant based upon false or incomplete information. Id. (citing State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 558 (1991)); see also State v. Warren, 121 Ariz. 306, 309 (App. 1978) (warrants are presumed valid and "defendant has the burden of proving that it was not valid"). A defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit if he can make "a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false statement in the supporting affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause." Frimmel, 236 Ariz. 232, ¶ 27.
¶15 In this case, Caro argues "Rodriguez was relying on the rankest hearsay without indicia of reliability when he told the judge in his telephonic affidavit that other motorists had identified . . . Caro as the driver of the damaged vehicle." Caro recognizes that an officer's affidavit for a search warrant may be based on information obtained from another officer who in turn received the information from another source. See State v. Watling, 104 Ariz. 354, 356 (1969). He nevertheless claims the information was unreliable because Knerr had failed to get the name of the witness who identified Caro as the driver of the vehicle. But Caro does not question that Knerr actually received the information, and the fact that Knerr failed to record the name of the witness does not render the underlying information unreliable. Information supplied by a citizen who voluntarily comes forward to aid law enforcement officers is presumed to be reliable. State v. Diffenderfer, 120 Ariz. 404, 406 (App. 1978); see also State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 108 Ariz. 356, 364 (1972) ("Where an ordinary citizen volunteers information which he has come upon in the ordinary course of his affairs, completely free of any possible gain from furnishing the information, reliability is enhanced.").
¶16 It was Caro's burden to show that the search warrant was invalid. See Warren, 121 Ariz. at 309. But he has failed to show that Rodriguez had made a false statement, much less one that was made "knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth." See Frimmel, 236 Ariz. 232, ¶ 27. Rodriguez explained to the magistrate that there was "probable and reasonable cause to believe" alcohol was present in Caro's blood and bodily fluids, that he had observed an "[o]dor of alcohol," that Caro's "[e]yes were red and watery," and that his "[s]peech was slurred . . . and mumbled." He also explained to the magistrate that "witnesses [had] observed [Caro] in actual physical control of [the] vehicle" and he had been "identified as the driver by . . . Deputy Sheriffs as well as the suspect's own admissions, and other motorists." We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Caro's motion to suppress the blood draws taken pursuant to the search warrant. See Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 4.
Other-Act Evidence
¶17 Caro also argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his "2003 misdemeanor DUI conviction and his attendance at a [Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)] victim impact panel." We review the admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evid., for abuse of discretion. State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, ¶ 20 (1999).
¶18 Before trial, the state moved to introduce other-act evidence of Caro's 2003 DUI conviction and his participation in a MADD victim impact panel because it was "relevant and show[ed Caro's] knowledge of the risk he posed to others when driving while intoxicated." It argued that Caro's "prior knowledge about the risks of drinking and driving is clearly relevant" and "falls squarely within [Rule] 404(b)'s exceptions" because the state was tasked with proving Caro had "acted recklessly" and must show that Caro had been "aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result would occur or that a particular circumstance existed." Caro argued the other-act evidence should be precluded because the state had failed to disclose any information that showed the facts of the prior conviction were "relevant to those in this case," and suggested that the "prolonged period of time between offenses" warranted preclusion. The trial court granted the state's motion to introduce the other-act evidence, reasoning that it was relevant as it "bears on the mental state of [Caro], which the State will likely need to establish." The court also noted that although the "evidence inherently involves prejudice to [Caro]," "such prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of establishing the required mental state of [Caro]."
¶19 Generally, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). Yet, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id.
¶20 Before admitting other-act evidence, a trial court must determine that a defendant committed the other acts "by clear and convincing evidence," that the evidence is relevant, offered for its proper purpose, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, ¶ 69 (2012). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Ariz. R. Evid. 401(a). Relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Ariz. R. Evid. 403; see also State v. Butler, 230 Ariz. 465, ¶ 33 (App. 2012) ("[U]nfair prejudice 'means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,' such as emotion, sympathy or horror." (quoting State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993))).
¶21 Notably, "[a]n assertion that a prior act is too different or too remote in time from the charged offense goes 'to the weight of the evidence, not whether the evidence is relevant and admissible.'" State v. Fernane, 185 Ariz. 222, 225 (App. 1995) (quoting State v. Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 435-36 (1990)); cf. State v. Jean, 239 Ariz. 495, ¶ 8 (App. 2016) (concluding other-act evidence committed eleven years prior "not too remote"), vacated in part on other grounds, 243 Ariz. 331, ¶ 48 (2018); State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 92 n.5 (App. 1994) (reasoning other-act evidence from twenty years prior relevant and potentially admissible); State v. Weatherbee, 158 Ariz. 303, 304 (App. 1988) (explaining victim could testify to other-act evidence that occurred twenty-two years prior to trial).
¶22 In this case, evidence of Caro's 2003 DUI conviction and participation at the MADD victim impact panel was relevant and not too remote in time to warrant preclusion. The other-act evidence was probative as to the issue of Caro's knowledge about the risks of driving under the influence. Specifically, the jury reasonably could have inferred Caro's knowledge from the fact that he had been previously charged with "extreme" DUI and accepted a plea that stipulated he had "dr[iven] or [been] in actual physical control of a motor vehicle" with "a BAC of .176." Caro's "mental state" regarding the dangers of driving while intoxicated was further established by his participation in the MADD victim impact panel. The MADD programs manager testified that the panel had discussed "the impaired driving problem" in Arizona, "the different DUI's that [one] can get and penalties that go with them," and the panel had "end[ed] with stories from victims and or offenders of impaired driving." Although the other-act evidence related to events that occurred fourteen years prior to Caro's arrest in this case, remoteness generally does not affect its admissibility, see Fernane, 185 Ariz. at 225, which is within the trial court's discretion to determine, see State v. Korte, 115 Ariz. 517, 520 (App. 1977) ("[C]ourt traditionally has been given substantial latitude in determining what is stale and what is not."), and there are no specific time restraints the court must adhere to, cf. Jean, 239 Ariz. 495, ¶ 8; Salazar, 181 Ariz. at 92 n.5; Weatherbee, 158 Ariz. at 304. Accordingly, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in admitting Caro's 2003 DUI conviction and his participation in a MADD victim impact panel at trial. See Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, ¶ 20.
¶23 And even assuming error occurred, we are satisfied it would be harmless in light of the record before us. "Error is harmless if the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 39 (2004). Further, an error may be harmless in light of an overwhelming amount of evidence that supports a defendant's guilt. Id. ¶ 64.
¶24 At trial, the state presented evidence that a witness had "pointed [Caro] out" to the deputy. When Caro was questioned by Knerr, he admitted "he might have possibly struck a pedestrian," and subsequently pointed to the white van that he had been driving that morning, which had "heavy damage" to the front, windshield, and bumper. Caro also had shards of glass on himself as well as within the patrol vehicle where he was later sitting, suggesting the windshield had recently been broken. A deputy testified that Caro had "red, watery eyes" and deputies detected "a strong odor of intoxicants" from Caro. Moreover, a toxicology report revealed that Caro's BAC was .241, .229, and .216 within three and one-half hours after he had been driving on the morning of the incident. We therefore conclude there was overwhelming evidence of Caro's guilt presented to the jury, and we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was not affected by the admission of other-act evidence. See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 39.
Willits Instruction
¶25 Caro contends the trial court erred by refusing his request for a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964), "regarding the failure to perform an internal autopsy on the victim." "We review the court's ruling for an abuse of discretion." State v. Williamson, 236 Ariz. 550, ¶ 32 (App. 2015).
¶26 In support of his request for a Willits instruction below, Caro argued that "if an internal investigation into [D.M.'s] body had been completed" then "we would be more certain . . . [of] the acute event . . . that occurred [the day of D.M.'s death]." He asserted that it had been "a decision by the State" to forego an internal investigation, and further explained that he was prejudiced because the absence of the internal investigation combined with a lack of information on the acute event "inhibit[ed]" his ability to argue beyond a reasonable doubt. The state countered that the doctors' testimony had been "abundantly clear, that but for the injuries sustained in the crash on January 21[] . . . [D.M.] would[ not] have been in the hospital" or "susceptible to the acute event" on the day of D.M.'s death. It further clarified that the internal investigation was neither "material . . . [n]or had any sort of tendency to exonerate [Caro], let alone how, if that was even to be considered a failure to preserve, how that would have resulted in prejudice to [Caro]." The trial court denied Caro's request.
¶27 "[I]f the state fails to preserve evidence that is potentially exonerating, the accused might be entitled to an instruction informing the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the state's action." Williamson, 236 Ariz. 550, ¶ 33 (alteration in Williamson) (quoting State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, ¶ 1 (2014)). Further, to be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must show: "(1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice." State v. Smith, 158 Ariz. 222, 227 (1988). A defendant, however, is not entitled to a Willits instruction simply because "a more exhaustive investigation could have been made." State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 33 (1995). And, "the state does not have a duty to seek out or preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for the defendant when they have developed sufficient evidence against him." State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, ¶ 37 (App. 2002); see also State v. Walters, 155 Ariz. 548, 551 (App. 1987) (state must preserve evidence that is "obvious, material and reasonably within its grasp").
¶28 Caro was not entitled to a Willits instruction simply because "a more exhaustive investigation could have been made," see Murray, 184 Ariz. at 33, as the medical examiner explained that an internal investigation was not necessary to determine cause of death, and the trauma surgeon clarified that it would not have been uncommon for the medical examiner "to say blunt injury and not do a full autopsy." Specifically, the trauma surgeon testified "a long-term hospital stay carr[ies] its own risks," listing some medical conditions that could have contributed to D.M.'s death, and that he "fe[lt] confident that [D.M.] died of complications of his injuries" based on a review of the medical records. Similarly, the medical examiner testified that it is standard practice to only conduct an external examination when the decedent "who, like in this case, has been hospitalized" and "the medical records are sufficient to be comfortable in certifying the death without the internal exam." Caro has failed to explain how an internal investigation was both material and would have had the tendency to exonerate him as both doctors explained the external investigation and medical records supported that D.M. had died due to "complications of blunt force injuries due to being a bicyclist struck by a motor vehicle." See Smith, 158 Ariz. at 227. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Caro's request for a Willits instruction. See Williamson, 236 Ariz. 550, ¶ 32.
Rule 20 Motion
¶29 Caro argues "the trial court erred when it denied [his] Rule 20 motion" for acquittal on the manslaughter charge because "[b]ased on the facts of this case" no juror could have "concluded that there was no reasonable doubt about whether the victim died as a result of the accident or of his pre-existing conditions or treatment in the hospital caused his death."
¶30 We review de novo a trial court's denial of a Rule 20 motion. State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, ¶ 168 (2016). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling and determine whether, based on the evidence presented, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16 (2011) (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)). "[T]he controlling question is solely whether the record contains 'substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.'" Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)). "Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Rivera, 226 Ariz. 325, ¶ 3 (App. 2011) (quoting State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290 (1996)). Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial. State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 7 (App. 2005).
¶31 At the conclusion of the state's case, Caro moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20. He argued that the jury could not determine the cause of death by a reasonable doubt "when the acute event wasn't identified" especially after "one of the treating physicians . . . sa[id] that the cause of death was aspiration that led to hypoxia." The state argued that whether D.M. died from "hypoxia, stroke, aneurysm, pulmonary embolism" was immaterial because "those things would [not] have happened but for the fact that [D.M.] was catastrophically injured . . . when he was hit from behind by . . . Caro." The state clarified that "you can talk about the acute event all you want, but [D.M. would not have been] susceptible to any of those acute events had he not been injured." The trial court denied Caro's Rule 20 motion.
¶32 To support a conviction for manslaughter under A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1), the state must prove a defendant recklessly caused the death of another person. "'Recklessly' means . . . that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists." A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(c). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. Further, "[a] person who creates such a risk but who is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to such risk." Id. "'Voluntary intoxication' means intoxication caused by the knowing use of . . . intoxicating liquors," which causes intoxication that the person "knows or ought to know." § 13-105(43).
¶33 "An intervening event is a superseding cause constituting a legal excuse only if unforeseeable and, with benefit of hindsight, abnormal or extraordinary." State v. Paxson, 203 Ariz. 38, ¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2002) (concluding "spontaneous deployment of the passenger-side air bag" not "reasonably anticipated event" and "might constitute a legal excuse to a charge of vehicular manslaughter"). But an event is not a superseding cause if the death is foreseeable or "with benefit of hindsight . . . may be described as" normal or ordinary. See State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, ¶¶ 1, 11, 14 (2000) (affirming jury instructions when driver used "speeds in excess of limit," other vehicle changed lanes in front of speeding vehicle, and passenger "grabbed the steering wheel and jerked it" causing "severe multi-car collision that left one person dead").
¶34 Here, sufficient evidence was presented that although D.M. may have suffered from underlying medical conditions and complications, his death was not "unforeseeable" nor "abnormal or extraordinary," see Paxson, 203 Ariz. 38, ¶ 11; Bass, 189 Ariz. 571, ¶¶ 11, 14, as the medical examiner testified that D.M.'s cause of death was from "complications of blunt force injuries due to being a bicyclist struck by a motor vehicle." He clarified that any medical conditions D.M. may have experienced while in the hospital would "fall under the umbrella of complications of blunt force injuries," but D.M.'s cause of death was "the initiating event"—being struck by a vehicle. Similarly, D.M.'s trauma surgeon testified that when D.M. was brought into the hospital, he had been assigned "the highest level of [trauma team] activation," which means the patient has "high likelihood to have significant injuries" and "the trauma team is present in the emergency room on the patient's arrival." The surgeon testified that D.M. had been in fact a "severely injured patient" and he would not disagree with the medical examiner's finding that D.M.'s death was the result of complications due to blunt force trauma. Accordingly, substantial evidence was presented to support a conviction under § 13-1103(A)(1), see West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 14.
Disposition
¶35 For the reasons stated above, we affirm Caro's convictions and sentences.