Opinion
No. 5-259 / 04-1103
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Timothy O'Grady, Judge.
Kenneth Candelaria appeals from his convictions and sentences following the entry of his guilty pleas. FINES VACATED, REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, and James P. Barry, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Kenneth Candelaria appeals from his convictions and sentences following the entry of his guilty pleas. We vacate his fines and remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the afternoon of August 28, 2004, Trooper Kenneth Haas noticed the front-seat passenger in a passing truck was not wearing his seatbelt. He also observed the truck was missing its front license plate. Based on these violations, Haas decided to pull the truck over. Kenneth Candelaria was the front-seat passenger and Alisa Esquibel, the truck's owner and Candelaria's common law wife, was the rear-seat passenger. Candelaria's cousin, Alex Gallegos, who was the driver of the truck, was first taken to Haas' vehicle for questioning. Gallegos made statements about the group's trip from Arizona. Haas next questioned Candelaria, who gave Trooper Haas an inconsistent account of the reasons for the trip.
With all parties present, Haas requested and received both oral and written consent from Esquibel to search the vehicle and its contents. During this search, Haas located one-half pound of methamphetamine and nine pounds of bricked marijuana. Gallegos, the driver, claimed sole possession of the contraband. He, Esquibel, and Candelaria were arrested and charged with multiple counts of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances.
Candelaria was offered a "package" plea bargain. Its terms were characterized during the plea-taking colloquy:
[PROSECUTOR]: The State has offered a plea agreement to the defendant that I believe the defendant is willing to accept this morning. That acceptance of that agreement is not with, apparently, consent or advice of counsel. For purposes of the record here, the plea offer that's been made by the State is that the defendant would plead guilty to the amended charge of Possession with intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, to-wit, Methamphetamine, as a Class C felony in Count I per 124.401(1) (c) (6). Defendant would also plead guilty to Count II, Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Deliver, as a Class C felony. Sentencing recommendation would be that both of those charges would run concurrently, the defendant would be sentenced to the State penitentiary. The minimum mandatory sentence that is required by statute would be waived by the Court. Any minimum fine would be waived by the Court. . . .
[THE COURT]: Okay. Mr. Candelaria, is that your understanding of the agreement?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
Candelaria appeared with counsel at the plea hearing and established a factual basis for both counts by admitting he possessed the drugs found in the truck and he intended to sell, trade or give those drugs to another person. Counsel informed the district court that the plea agreement also contemplated certain plea and sentencing concessions for Esquibel and Gallegos:
[THE COURT]: . . . [D]id anyone promise you anything to get you to plead guilty?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, if I may?
[THE COURT]: You may.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was with the understanding that the charge against Elisa Esquibo (sic). . . . would be amended to a Possession of Controlled Substance and she would receive a sentence of time served through the Courts, which was part of the agreement as well, which is the reason that Mr. Candelaria is accepting the offer against my advice, Your Honor.
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[PROSECUTOR]: that is the offer . . ., Your Honor. The other codefendant would be receiving a suspended sentence, which is part of the agreement as well. . . .
After Candelaria affirmed that he had received no other promises in consideration for his agreement to plead guilty, the district court informed him of the trial rights he proposed to waive and the maximum penalties he could face as a consequence of the contemplated a guilty plea. The district court also inquired about Candelaria's reasons for rejecting his counsel's advice:
[THE COURT]: All right. We should probably cover the against (sic) counsel's advice for this plea, too. Have you had enough time to talk to [your counsel] about this guilty plea?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Ah, yes.
[THE COURT]: And you understand that she's advising you not to accept the State's offer and to not enter this guilty plea?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]: And you have, for reasons of your own, decided to reject her advice and go ahead and enter a plea anyway, is that true?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
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[THE COURT]: And your reasons for rejecting [your counsel's] advice is not because you're unhappy with her services —
[THE DEFENDANT]: No.
[THE COURT]: — but because you're trying to look after one of your codefendants, is that the case?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. My significant other and/or common-law wife.
[THE COURT]: Are there any other reasons that you have for rejecting your counsel's advice today?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Just that and for the deal with my cousin, the same.
The district court then offered defense counsel the opportunity to make further record on the subject, but counsel declined. The court thereafter accepted Candelaria's guilty pleas.
Candelaria waived the sentencing delay and a presentence investigation, and was sentenced immediately. The district court imposed concurrent indeterminate terms of ten and five years, and also imposed the minimum statutory fines of $1000 and $750. Although the plea agreement did address waiver of fines, trial counsel failed to object when the district court imposed fines as part of Candelaria's sentence.
Candelaria now appeals, contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea hearing in that trial counsel (1) failed to secure the most favorable sentence possible for Candelaria when she failed to object to the imposition of statutory fines counter to the terms of the plea bargain, and (2) failed to adequately alert the district court to expand the colloquy with Candelaria in order to probe the voluntariness concerns inherent in the "package" plea bargain offered by the State.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review de novo the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by Candelaria. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal are generally preserved for post conviction relief proceedings so that a sufficient record can be developed, and so attorneys whose ineffectiveness is alleged may have an opportunity to defend their actions. State v. Allen, 348 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1984). But where the record on appeal is adequate to review the actions of trial counsel, or where the record available permits us to address whether prejudice resulted from counsel's unprofessional error, we may decide the ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal. Id. III. Discussion. A. Fines.
In order to prevail on his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the most favorable sentence by not objecting to the district court's deviation from the plea bargain's terms, Candelaria must show: (1) counsel's breach of an essential duty; and (2) a reasonable probability that such a breach would have resulted in a different outcome. State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Iowa 1999). The district court has broad discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea, and where the plea bargain negotiated between the State and the defendant is conditioned upon the district court's acceptance, the court may (1) accept the plea bargain arrangement; (2) reject the arrangement and allow the defendant to withdraw the plea; or (3) defer its decision until it receives a presentence report. State v. Wenzel, 306 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Iowa 1981); State v. Baker, 476 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). However, once the district court has chosen to accept the defendant's guilty plea, the court is bound by the plea bargain's terms at sentencing unless it has both informed defendant it will not be bound by the agreement, and afforded defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Baker, 476 N.W.2d at 626.
The State concedes (1) there is no plausible explanation for Candelaria's counsel's failure to object to the court's imposition of fines in this case, and (2) there is at least a reasonable probability that the sentencing court would have adhered to the agreement and not imposed fines if counsel had objected. We agree. We therefore must determine the proper remedy under the circumstances.
Candelaria contends his sentences should be vacated as a consequence of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, and requests a remand with instructions for resentencing without fines. The State urges this court to vacate only the fines and remand for resentencing without instructions to waive the fines because the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing court's acceptance of all its terms. We note the plea colloquy does characterize the State's commitment to make a "sentencing recommendation," but gives no indication that the plea agreement's enforceability is conditioned on the sentencing court's acceptance. Moreover, Candelaria, stated during allocution without contradiction from either the court or counsel his understanding that his sentence was "up to [the district court]". We are not persuaded that the parties intended the plea agreement to be enforceable only if fully accepted by the district court.
We note that when the sentencing court's failure to include in the sentence a waiver of any mandatory minimum sentences otherwise applicable under Iowa Code chapter 124 was called to the court's attention, the court did order such a waiver. Although this could support an inference that the sentencing court considered itself bound by the parties' plea agreement, the other relevant portions of the record do not incline us to make that inference.
When an erroneous portion of a sentence is severable, we will vacate that portion of the sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing. See State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Iowa 1999) (per curiam); State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Iowa 1999). The fines are severable from the remainder of the sentences in this case, and we therefore conclude the appropriate remedy is vacation of the fines. We remand this case to the district court for resentencing. Because the district court is not bound by the terms of the parties' plea bargain, the court retains discretion to impose legal fines, giving due weight to the arguments and recommendations of the parties.
The State argues it should not be required to produce Candelaria for his resentencing proceeding because the resentencing is not considered a stage of trial. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.27(4); see also State v. Austin, 585 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Iowa 1998) (holding the State need not produce defendant at proceeding to correct sentence). We note, however, that in Austin, the resentencing court was given specific instructions concerning the entry of the amended sentence. Austin, 585 N.W.2d at 244. Here, however, the district court retains full discretion on remand to impose fines under the statute. We view this proceeding as the functional analog of the initial sentencing proceeding at which Candelaria would otherwise have a right to be present and we thus decline to order that the State need not produce him for resentencing. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.27(1) (requiring defendant's presence at the imposition of sentence).
B. "Package" Plea Bargain.
We next address Candelaria's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to urge the district court to engage in a more searching voluntariness inquiry given the circumstances surrounding the "package" plea bargain. Some courts have concluded that package plea agreements raise the specter of innocent defendants pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit. Those courts have viewed with disfavor plea arrangements that pitted a defendant's loyalty to a loved-one against the right to hold the State to its burden of proof at trial. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 1994); see also People v. James, 225 N.W.2d 520, 520 (Mich. 1975) (noting that while promises of leniency to relatives do not render involuntary a guilty plea as a matter of law, they may do so as a matter of fact).
The direct appeal record is clearly insufficient to allow us to address the merits of this claim. We know too little about Candelaria's thought processes and motivations to assess whether further inquiry by the sentencing court would have induced the court to find the plea was involuntary. We also know too little about the relative merits of the State's claims against Candelaria, Esquibel, and Gallegos, to assess whether Candelaria's guilty plea was motivated by his desire to accept the sentencing concessions offered by the State, or by an over-weaning desire to protect his loved ones. We therefore preserve this claim of ineffectiveness for possible postconviction proceedings.