Applying the doctrine of res judicata to post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea brought pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is a more straightforward route towards accomplishing this court's stated goal of preventing criminal defendants from circumventing the time constraints of direct appeal and post conviction relief. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals accomplished as much in State v. Cale (March 23, 2001), Lake App. No. 2000-l-034, by rejecting the Hill case and applying res judicata. Moreover, applying res judicata to Crim.R. 32.1 motions will not prevent a criminal defendant from filing a Crim.R.32.1 motion asserting a constitutional claim while the time for post-conviction relief is still ripe. (The Hill rationale would automatically transform this motion into a petition for post-conviction relief.) Finally, consistently applying res judicata to post-sentence Crim.R. 32.1 motions will still allow a criminal defendant to raise an error that could not have been redressed via direct appeal or post conviction relief such as when a plea agreement is breached.

The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 2001-1161) and pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case No. 2001-1247). The conflict cases are State v. Cale (Mar. 23, 2001), 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-034, 2001 WL 285794, and State v. Talley (Jan. 30, 1998), 2d Dist. No. 16479, 1998 WL 31516. B. Case Nos. 2001-1375 and 2001-1480: Appellant Northern

It must be noted that the Second and Eleventh District Court of Appeals have ruled contrary to Reynolds and held that the time constraints of R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 should not apply to motions made under Crim.R. 32.1. See, State v. Cale (Mar. 23, 2001), Lake App. No. 2000-L-034, unreported and State v. Talley (Jan. 30, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16479, unreported. In the case sub judice, the appellant captioned her motion as a motion to set aside her guilty pleas.

It must be noted that the Second and Eleventh District Court of Appeals have ruled contrary to Reynolds and held that the time constraints of R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 should not apply to motions made under Crim.R. 32.1. See, State v. Cale (Mar. 23, 2001), Lake App. No. 2000-L-034, unreported and State v. Talley (Jan. 30, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16479, unreported. In the case sub judice, the appellant captioned her motion as a motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1.

See, e.g., State v. Deer (Mar. 2, 2001), Lawrence App. No. 00CA24, unreported; State v. Walters (1998), 138 Ohio App.3d 715, discretionary appeal not allowed (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 1479; State v. Gaddis, supra; State v. Phelps (Sept. 26, 2000), Franklin App. No. 00AP0-109, unreported; State v. Lewis (Feb. 9, 1999), Lorain App. No. 98CA007007, unreported; State v. Hill (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 658, discretionary appeal not allowed (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 1470. But see, State v. Cale (Mar. 23, 2001), Lake App. No. 2000-L-034, unreported and State v. Talley (Jan. 30, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16479, unreported (holding that the time constraints of R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 should not apply to motions made under Crim.R. 32.1). By interpreting Reynolds in this manner, the courts have created a "bright-line rule".

As such, in addition to the other reasons stated herein, many of his claims would be barred by res judicata. See, e.g., State v. Gegia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-0026, 2004-Ohio-1441, ¶ 24; State v. Cale, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-034, 2001 WL 285794, *3 (Mar. 23, 2001).{¶40} Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of the alleged threat by a prosecutor of a life sentence without the possibility for parole.

Sua sponte, cause consolidated with 01-1247, State v. Bush, Union App. No. 14-2000-44. The conflict cases are State v. Cale (Mar. 23, 2001), Lake App. No. 2000-L-034, unreported, 2001 WL 285794; and State v. Talley (Jan. 30, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16479, unreported, 1998 WL 31516. 01-1253.

As such, in addition to the other reasons stated herein, many of his claims would be barred by res judicata. See, e.g., State v. Gegia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-0026, 2004-Ohio-1441, ¶24; State v. Cale, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-034, 2001 WL 285794, *3 (Mar. 23, 2001). {¶40} Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of the alleged threat by a prosecutor of a life sentence without the possibility for parole.

Dist. No. E-08-041, 2009-Ohio-1118, ¶ 16; State v. Cale, 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-034, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1385, 2001 WL 285794 (Mar. 23, 2001).A petition for postconviction relief that claims a violation of a constitutional right must be filed no later than 180 days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction.

{¶ 8} The doctrine of res judicata may bar claims made in successive postsentence motions to withdraw plea that were or could have been made in a previous motion. State v. Tovar, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1106, 2012-Ohio-6156, ¶ 17-18; State v. Cale, 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-034 (Mar. 23, 2001). For example, the defendant in Tovar filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea in which he asserted a claim that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2943.031 when it accepted his plea.