"Due to an automobile's mobility, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be a reasonable search of an automobile." State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 647, 490 P.2d 123, review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1003 (1971); accord, State v. Jones, 2 Wn. App. 627, 632, 472 P.2d 402 (1970). Discussing warrantless searches based upon probable cause, this court recently stated: "Because of the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle, it is impracticable in many situations to obtain a warrant prior to a vehicle search."

However, a search by an officer who shone a light through a minute crack in the wall in order to observe items within a locked storage building was invalidated in State v. Tarantino, 322 N.C. 386, 368 S.E.2d 588 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010, 103 L.Ed.2d 180, 109 S.Ct. 1117 (1989).See State v. Young, 28 Wn. App. 412, 624 P.2d 725 (holding no search of automobile when police officer shone his flashlight into the interior of defendant's unoccupied automobile following a burglary; looking into a car parked in a public place and observing what is exposed to open view is not conducting a search in the constitutional sense), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1024 (1981); State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 646, 490 P.2d 123 (the fact that officer was aided by the use of a flashlight to see what would have been clearly visible in daylight does not transform his observations into a search), review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1003 (1971). Compare People v. Wheeler, 28 Cal.App.3d 1065, 105 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1972) (upholding police conduct where officer, standing in a lawful position, shone his flashlight through an open garage door to observe stolen property); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (upholding police conduct where officer shone flashlight through gap in garage door to observe stolen property, stating, "it cannot be said that [the appellant's] actions in storing the stolen transmission — which, no doubt, he would like to have kept hidden — in a garage having a nine-inch gap between the doors were calculated to keep his possession of it `strictly private and free from perception by others'"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947, 30 L.Ed.2d 817, 92 S.Ct. 986 (1972).

The use of a flashlight has been upheld under the open view theory in a number of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Young, 28 Wn. App. 412, 624 P.2d 725 (where vehicle parked in public place, and officer's observation would not have constituted a search if it occurred in daylight, fact that officer used a flashlight does not transform observation into search), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1024 (1981); State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (same), review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1003 (1971); State v. Regan, 76 Wn.2d 331, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969) (same); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927) (no search occurred when a Coast Guard patrol used a searchlight to see aboard a motorboat and discovered alcohol on board; use of a searchlight to see on the deck of the motorboat is comparable to use of a field glass or a marine glass, and is not prohibited by the Constitution); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Ky. 1989) (where defendant left his motel door and window partially open to public view he was deprived of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the determination of whether contraband lay in plain view should not depend upon existing lighting conditions: "[o]ne seeking to maintain his privacy should reasonably expect that persons disposed to look inside a motel room will not hesitate to enhance their visibility by use of a widely available device such as a flashlight"), cert. denied, 494

See State v. Sullivan, 65 Wn.2d 47, 395 P.2d 745 (1964) (relying on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)). See also State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). At about the time that the searches at issue here took place, this court confidently stated that

[1] The plain view doctrine comes into play only when the officer "has a right to be in a position to have that view." State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). Hence the determinative issue is whether the police had a right to stop defendant's automobile and, thereby, put themselves in a position to view the contraband.

And there is substantial authority holding that use of a flashlight does not transform an otherwise lawful observation into an unlawful search. See e.g. State v. Cagle, 5 Wn.App. 644, 646, 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer's use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399, 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible search simply because it became dark and that use of a flashlight is not an intrusive method of viewing that would undermine the open view doctrine); State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 578, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) ("The use of a flashlight to illuminate at night what is plainly visible during the day is not an unconstitutional intrusion into a citize

Other Washington cases have applied the plain view doctrine to allow a police officer who has lawfully stopped a vehicle and observed contraband in it to seize such evidence and search the entire vehicle. State v. Regan, 76 Wn.2d 331, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969); State v. Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 422, 426-27, 357 P.2d 735 (1960); State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 657, 490 P.2d 123, review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1003 (1971); see also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 88 S.Ct. 992 (1968). Here, the van was parked in a public place and the officer observed the marijuana pipe which was exposed to open view.

The police had the right to make a notation with the use of a flashlight in the darkness to see that which they could have seen in the daylight. State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). The notation of the identification number is distinguishable from State v. Murray, 8 Wn. App. 944, 509 P.2d 1003 (1973), aff'd, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974).

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra at 269, quoting from Carroll v. United States, supra at 153. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Carroll v. United States, supra; State v. Birdwell, 6 Wn. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972); State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). (b) Search incident to valid arrest.

There was probable cause to search the car when effecting the arrest for the purpose of obtaining stolen property or other evidence of an incriminating nature. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970); State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 647, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). Furthermore, the arrest of defendant, in his car on a public highway, under the circumstances described herein, satisfies the exigent circumstances requirement for the search of the car without a warrant.