Opinion
No. 3-931 / 03-0023.
Filed January 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D. Ackerman, Judge.
On discretionary review, the State appeals the district court's grant of a defendant's motion to suppress his confession. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Mullin, County Attorney, and Brigit Barnes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Randy Hisey, South Sioux City, Nebraska, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Eisenhauer, JJ.
On discretionary review, the State appeals the district court's grant of defendant Kenneth Lee Bursell's motion to suppress his confession. The State contends, among other things, that Bursell's motion was untimely. We review the district court's ruling on whether good cause exists for an untimely motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. See, 532 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11 requires a motion to suppress to be filed no later than forty days after arraignment. Bursell was arraigned on one count of second-degree sexual abuse on January 11, 2002. Bursell did not file his motion to suppress until October 1, 2002. Although Bursell argued there was period of time during which he was unrepresented by counsel, the record reflects Bursell was represented from January 4 until May 23, the entirety of the forty-day period in which a motion to suppress was required to be filed.
The district court overruled the State's timeliness objection to Bursell's motion, finding good cause existed for defendant's failure to file his motion within forty days of his arraignment. The court cited State v. Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999), in reaching its conclusion, but did not further elaborate. We conclude the district court erred in concluding good cause existed for Bursell's untimely filing of his motion to suppress. When considering what constitutes good cause for an untimely motion to suppress, we examine the adequacy of the defendant's reasons for failure to comply with applicable rules of procedure and whether the State was prejudiced as a result. Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d at 736. Bursell was represented by counsel during the time in which he was required to file a motion to suppress. His failure to timely file such a motion because he was later unrepresented does not provide good cause. The district court's reliance on Eldridge, in which a defendant was unrepresented during the forty days after his arraignment, is misplaced. Because the district court's grant of Bursell's motion to suppress was untenable, we find it abused its discretion. See id. ("We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's action was clearly untenable or unreasonable.") Accordingly, we reverse.
REVERSED.
I respectfully dissent. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding good cause existed for defendant's failure to file his motion to suppress within forty days of his arraignment. What constitutes good cause for an untimely motion to suppress is a discretionary decision of the trial court. State v. Eldridge, 90 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); State v. Lewis, 391 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Factors considered in the application of this standard include the adequacy of the defendant's reasons for failure to comply with applicable rules of procedure and whether the State was prejudiced as a result State v. Christensen, 323 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Iowa 1982). The defendant's interest in a full and fair trial must be weighed against the State's interest in avoiding surprise and unnecessary delays. State v. Lewis, 391 N.W.2d at 729. Preclusive sanctions against a defendant in a criminal case should not be imposed lightly. See id. We review determinations of good cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. See, 532 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's action was clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Christensen, 323 N.W.2d at 222.
The State correctly argues that it resisted the motion as being untimely. The State does not contend on appeal that the resistance included a showing it was prejudiced nor does the State argue prejudice on appeal. While I agree with the majority that the district court gave us little guidance as to why it found good cause for the untimely motion, the fact defendant's initial attorney withdrew and he was without an attorney for a period indicates that defendant had problem with adequate representation. The district court is in a better position to judge the adequacy of representation than we are on appeal, and I would not find it abused its discretion in reaching the decision it reached here. Having made that determination I need also address the State's contention that the defendant's motion should have overruled. After reviewing the district court's carefully written ruling, I find no reason to disagree and would affirm.