State v. Buford

19 Citing cases

  1. State v. Cleve

    127 N.M. 240 (N.M. 1999)   Cited 94 times
    Concluding that the Legislature intended for the phrase "any animal" to have the same meaning "within a single subsection" of the animal cruelty statute

    We disagree with the Court of Appeals' construction of Section 30-18-1. {10} In State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110 (1958), this Court reviewed a statute nearly identical to Section 30-18-1 in defining cruelty to animals. See id. at 52, 331 P.2d at 1110 (quoting in substantial part 1887 NM Laws, ch. 1, § 1 (repealed 1963)).

  2. State v. Cleve

    124 N.M. 289 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 5 times

    Defendant argues that the phrase "any animal" in the cruelty to animals statute does not apply to game animals. Defendant also argues that the Supreme Court's observation in State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 58, 331 P.2d 1110, 1115 (1958), that "[t]he language of the statute . . . seems to apply only to brute creatures and work animals" is persuasive authority that this court should follow. However, the language Defendant relies on in Buford is dicta.

  3. Brackett v. State

    236 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 7 times
    In Brackett, however, "[t]he only evidence that the appellants committed an act of cruelty to the gamecocks was that they were among the spectators.

    Other states have construed their cruelty to animals statutes not to include cockfighting, primarily because there was lacking any showing of legislative intent to include fowls as "animals." See State v. Stockton, 85 Ariz. 153 ( 333 P.2d 735); State v. Claiborne, 211 Kan. 264 ( 505 P.2d 732); State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51 ( 331 P.2d 1110); and Lock v. Falkenstine, supra. In contrast, our legislature appears to have expressed its intent by the committee note which declares the statute "covers all animals" and adds, "the public's sensibilities are as likely to be outraged by wanton acts of inhumanity to goldfish, lions, turtles and dolphins as when the acts are suffered by more frequently encountered or more valuable animals."

  4. People v. Olary

    10 Mich. App. 640 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 2 times

    See 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 145; People v. Dubina (1943), 304 Mich. 363. Compare People v. Adamowski (1954), 340 Mich. 422, 429. In State v. Buford (1958), 65 N.M. 51, 58 ( 331 P.2d 1110, 1115, 82 ALR2d 787), the court held New Mexico's cruelty to animals statute did not prohibit cockfighting, and in so holding made the following observation: "Penal statutes are to be strictly construed since every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime.

  5. State v. Tabor

    678 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. 1984)   Cited 10 times
    Ruling a statute "must be read with common sense and will be interpreted and applied by the courts only to prohibit persons from assembling deliberately and knowingly, to watch animals being exhibited, baited, or fought for the purpose of injuring other animals for amusement, sport or gain"

    1978) (obscenity ordinance will not be given strained or extreme construction). It is suggested by appellees that the sport of cockfighting is an ancient and honorable one and that courts of several jurisdictions have so noted. See State v. Stockton, 333 P.2d 735 (1958); State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 211 Kan. 264, 85 Ariz. 153, 505 P.2d 732 (1973); State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110 (1958); Lock v. Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963). In all four of these cases, gamecocks were held not to be "animals" within the purview of statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals.

  6. Peck v. Dunn

    574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978)   Cited 17 times
    Determining that despite the absence of express terms requiring a culpable mental state, a sensible and practical application of the cockfighting ordinance would require purposeful and intentional presence as a spectator as opposed to a mere passerby to fall within ordinance's terms

    Over the centuries the disposition to look upon such brutalities with favor or approval has gradually lessened, and compassion and concern for man's fellow creatures of the earth has increased to the extent that it is now quite generally thought that the witnessing of animals fighting, injuring and perhaps killing one another is a cruel and barbarous practice, discordant to man's better instincts and so offensive to his finer sensibilities that it is demeaning to morals.State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110, 82 A.L.R.2d 787 (1958); State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 211 Kan. 264, 505 P.2d 732 (1973). See a good expression on this subject by Justice Steele, in Bland v. People, 32 Colo. 319, 76 P. 359 (1904).

  7. State, ex Rel. v. Claiborne

    211 Kan. 264 (Kan. 1973)   Cited 5 times

    In State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110, the Supreme Court of New Mexico concluded that the statute in force in that state was of a type which would not have been passed with the intention of prohibiting a sport such as cockfighting. The New Mexico statute forbids any person to torture, torment, deprive of necessary sustenance, cruelly beat, mutilate or overdrive any animal or unnecessarily fail to provide the same with proper food or drink, or cruelly work or drive the same when unfit for labor, and is analogous, in such respects, to statutes long in force in Kansas.

  8. State v. Collins

    80 N.M. 499 (N.M. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that "[p]enal statutes are strictly construed and should be of sufficient certainty so that a person will know his act is criminal when he does it"

    Penal statutes are strictly construed and should be of sufficient certainty so that a person will know his act is criminal when he does it. State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110, 82 A.L.R.2d 787 (1958); State v. Clark, 80 N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844 (1969). On the other hand, if we review the evidence as we must in the light most favorable to the State, and resolve all conflicts in favor of the verdict, we still lack permissible inferences with which to sustain the verdict.

  9. State v. Clark

    80 N.M. 340 (N.M. 1969)   Cited 46 times
    Explaining that the force needed to accomplish a kidnapping need only be minimal and need not necessarily be violent or deadly

    We also recognize the rule which requires that penal statutes be strictly construed. State v. Bell, 78 N.M. 317, 431 P.2d 50 (1967); State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110, 82 A.L.R.2d 787 (1958). When these rules are considered, together with the additional principle that statutes passed at the same session of the legislature and pertaining to the same subject matter be construed as in pari materia, with both to be given effect if reasonably possible to do so, State v. Chavez, supra; State v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 36 N.M. 166, 9 P.2d 700 (1932); State v. Marcus, 34 N.M. 378, 281 P. 454 (1929), we are brought to the conclusion hereinafter set forth.

  10. State v. Bell

    78 N.M. 317 (N.M. 1967)   Cited 3 times

    The statute is criminal in nature and must be construed strictly. State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110; State v. Thompson, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370; State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 193 P.2d 405. Also see State v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 74 N.M. 55, 390 P.2d 437. The order should be sustained.