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State v. Brown

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jan 1, 1857
5 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1857)

Summary

holding as incompatible the offices of colonel of the line and major general of the division

Summary of this case from Felkner v. Chariho Regional Sch. Committee

Opinion

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1857.

PRESENT: HON. SAMUEL AMES, CHIEF JUSTICE. HON. GEORGE A. BRAYTON, HON. ALFRED BOSWORTH, JUSTICES.

The discretionary power of the court over an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto to inquire into the title to a public office, relates to allowing the information to be filed, in the name of the state, by a private relator; but when such information has been allowed to be filed, or when filed by the attorney-general by virtue of the authority of his office, the court have no more power to dispense with the law, applicable to the case, upon its trial, or to refuse to enforce the law, on the ground that the proceeding is unimportant or impolitic, than in any other case. The major-general of the Division of Rhode Island Militia holds a substantive public office, and does not merely exercise a function or employment as the deputy or servant of another; and an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto. filed by the attorney-general in the name of the state, lies, to inquire into the title by which he holds it. The office of major-general is, in its nature and duties under the militia law, incompatible with the office of colonel of a regimental company inseparably attached to a brigade of the division commanded by the major-general; and the acceptance and assumption of the latter office is a virtual resignation of the former office, before held by the same person. Where there is no pretence of improper motives on the part of him against whom judgment of ouster from his office is rendered on an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the fine imposed will be nominal merely.

INFORMATION in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, filed by the attorney-general of his own authority, but, as the information recited, on the relation of Jos. S. Pitman, a militia officer of Rhode Island, to inquire by what authority the defendant exercised the office of major-general of the Division of Rhode Island Militia. By agreement, the information was so amended as to set forth the facts relating to the defendant's title to that office, so that he might demur to it, and thus bring the questions of law upon which his title depended, at once, to the consideration of the court.

The information contained three counts, which were in substance as follows: —

1st. That the defendant's election as major-general was void, because not made by the grand committee of the general assembly upon the nomination of the brigadier-generals or the commanding officers of the brigades composing the division, as the militia act of 1856, in force at the time of his election, required; but was made by the grand committee without any such nomination.

2d. That the defendant did not, within the time prescribed by law, equip himself as major-general, to the satisfaction of the commander-in-chief; in which case the act provides, that his office "is hereby declared vacant."

3d. That whilst major-general, he was elected to and accepted the incompatible office of colonel of the First Light Infantry Company of Providence, chartered as a regimental company, and composing a portion of the Second Brigade of the Division of Rhode Island Militia.

To this information there was a general demurrer and joinder, which was argued by Jos. S. Pitman, with whom was Payne, for the state, and by Thomas A. Jenckes, for the defendant.

Jenckes, for defendant: —

I. This court has no jurisdiction over the title of a military officer to his office. 1. The militia system is subordinate to and a part of the executive department of the state. 2. The military portion of this department is by law exclusively within the control of the governor, as commander-in-chief. He is empowered to fill all vacancies in offices. Act of January, 1856, § 15. Rev. St. ch. 233, § 20, p. 606. Ib. ch. 234, § 6, p. 607. He may revoke any commission, and declare any military office vacant. Act of January, 1856, § 29. Rev. St. ch. 239, § 10, p. 621. Special courts-martial, under control of the governor, have jurisdiction of all offences of military officers. Rev. St. ch. 242, § 1, p. 625. Act of January, 1856, § 70. 3. The military arm is thus kept as distinct from the civil, as the executive department is kept distinct from the judicial or the legislative. It has all the powers necessary to correct any errors or irregularities within itself. 4. There is no precedent of the interference of a court of civil jurisdiction by this process, to oust a military officer, or to restore a military officer to an office from which he has been excluded. 5. The remedy by mandamus to compel election, or to instal an officer, is not allowable.

II. The title to the office is complete, as shown by the information. 1. The respondent was nominated in grand committee; he received a majority of ballots, and was declared elected. His commission was duly signed by the governor and secretary of state, delivered to the adjutant-general and by him transmitted to the respondent, by him accepted, and his oath of office duly taken. 2. His election and appointment were complete and perfect, unless the general assembly had surrendered their power of election by the provisions of section eighteen of the act of January, 1856. This act is merely directory in its terms. It requires and imposes no conditions. It confers no power on the brigadier-generals; the general assembly still remain the fountain of power and of honor. Unlike an appointment by the executive, by and with the consent of any other body, the nomination is a mere suggestion, which may be disregarded either by the commander-in-chief or by the grand committee. 3. A discretion is thus reserved to the grand committee; and whenever the electing or appointing body has such discretion — whenever they act judicially and not ministerially — their acts are not subject to revision by the courts. People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and cases there cited. 4 Cowen, 297. Mandamus will not lie in such cases. United States v. Lawrence, 3 Dallas, 42; Chase v. Blackstone Canal, 10 Pick. 244; Morse, Petitioner, 18 Ib. 443; Dennett, Petitioner, 32 Maine, 508; Taylor v. The Governor of Arkansas, 1 Pike, 21. 4. Irregularities do not vitiate an election where a majority of votes is cast for the person declared elected. Same cases, and The King v. Justices of Herefordshire, 1 Chitty, 700. 5. No irregularity here; the grand committee were the judges of the sufficiency of the nomination before them. 6. The validity of the election was recognized by the governor, by the commission, and by the order. The vacancy admitted to have existed was thus filled.

III. The subject of uniform is expressly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief. Act of January, 1856, § 50. Rev. St. ch. 235, § 14, p. 611. If any issue arises upon the action of the commander-in-chief, a court-martial decides it. Act of January, 1856, § 29. Rev. St. ch. 239, § 11, p. 621. It is within the jurisdiction of an ordinary court-martial. Act of January, 1856, § 70. Rev. St. ch. 242, § 4, p. 625. The objection is frivolous, in this jurisdiction. The acting of the respondent in his office is evidence that he has complied with the law.

IV. The offices of major-general and colonel of a regiment are not incompatible. Their union is permitted in the army of the United States, and in that of Great Britain. See any register of either army. Nothing in the statute prohibits the holding of the two offices by one person. Nothing incompatible in duties. Three points in information — replies: 1. By the act of January, 1856, a colonel could be discharged by the brigadier-general on resignation — § 28. 2. The second case put in information cannot arise, unless the brigadier-general can assume the command of the regimental companies at company trainings. 3. Neither can the third possibly occur.

V. The whole matter of relief on quo warranto is within the discretion of the court. 3 Mass. 385. 2 Johns. R. 184. 5 Richardson, (S.C.) Law, 299. 7 Ib. 234. 14 Serg. Rawle, 216. 15 Ib. 127. King v. Stacy, 1 Tenn. R. 3. The discretion of the court should not be exercised in favor of the attorney-general, because, 1. There is no intrusion into or usurpation of the office, which the respondent holds under a commission bearing the seal of the state, — the same evidence by which the judges hold their seats. 2. The exercise of the office and the duty of the respondent, then, has been recognized by the governor, the representative of the sovereign power for this purpose. 3. There is no pretence that any other person is entitled to the office, either by election or appointment. See 5 Rich. 299. 4. No person is wronged by respondent's holding the office; and the commission is sufficient warrant for the exercise of all the powers and duties of the office. 5. To allow the relief prayed for in such a case would be to allow the state to take advantage of its own wrong, if wrong there were, in the mode of electing a worthy and competent officer.

VI. The demurrer should be sustained, and the information dismissed.

Pitman and Payne, for the relator, argued the grounds set forth in the information; and, in support of the first of those grounds, cited Militia Law of 1856, § 18, and compared same with Militia Law of 1843, § 17, and of 1844, § 23, and amendment of 18th section of Militia Law of 1856 by the Militia Law of 1857. 3 Brevard, 396; 2 Espinasse, N.P. 331, 335. In support of the second ground of the information, they cited Militia Law of 1658, § 50; and in support of third ground, cited 3 Stephens, N.P. 2457; 2 Esp. N.P. 338; 2 Greenlf. Cruise, 3, 115; 3 Dane's Abr. 61, where see the case of Millward v. Thatcher; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill, 97; Angell Ames on Corp. § 434. To the right and duty of the court to inquire into the defendant's title to his office in this proceeding, they cited 2 Ld. Raym. 1559; State v. Utter, 2 Green. 84; State v. Wadkins, 1 Richard. Law R. 42.


The information in this case was filed by the attorney-general by virtue of the inherent authority of his office; and not the less so, because it professes to have been filed on the relation of a military officer next in rank to, and subject to the orders of, the defendant. To prevent delay by protracting the pleadings, upon the appearance of the defendant, it was agreed, that the information should be so amended as to set forth the facts upon which the government rely to impeach his title, so that he might demur to it, and bring the questions thereby raised, at once, to the consideration of the court. Although this course is certainly not regular, we have allowed it to be taken for the purpose of the speed made by saving two stages in the pleading.

It is very true that in cases in which a private relator moves, as he may, to be permitted to use the name of the state for the purpose of inquiring by what warrant an individual holds and exercises a public office, the motion is subject to the regulated discretion of the court. The necessity, the policy, of making the inquiry, and even the position and motives of the relator in proposing it, are all matters considered by the court, in the exercise of their discretion in granting such a motion; since a court of justice will not allow the name of the state to be used, and its own time to be occupied, improperly or unnecessarily, or merely to feed the grudge of a relator who has no interest in the matter of inquiry, to the disturbance of the public peace. The discretion to allow in such a case the filing of an information of this character, is, as we apprehend, all the discretion which courts of law can, with propriety, or do, exercise, and all that cases of authority justify. When the information is filed, all the discretionary power of the court is expended; and the issues of law or fact raised by the pleadings must be tried and decided, under the law, in the same manner, and with the same strictness, as in any other case, civil or criminal. We make these remarks, because a portion of the argument for the defendant seems to suppose, that the court has power to dispense with the law in a proceeding of this nature, and to exercise a discretion, whether it will notice an objection in law to the title of the defendant, when, though well founded, it is comparatively unimportant. We exercise, and wish to exercise, no such power; sitting here to obey and administer, and not to dispense with, or disregard the law, because in our view it is unnecessary or impolitic. However unimportant any one of its rules may seem to be, it is of the last importance that we should have no power to choose, whether we will, or will not, administer it.

It has been suggested that this court has no jurisdiction to inquire into the title of a militia officer, at least when a commission has been granted to him; it being a military matter merely, for the action of courts-martial or courts of inquiry, or of the governor as commander-in-chief, under the provisions of our militia system. Undoubtedly many cases may be imagined calling in question the title of a militia officer, in which the court would, at the suit of a private relator, refuse to interfere when application was made to it for leave to file an information of this character; on account, it might be, of the exclusively military nature of the questions involved; especially when it considered, that if, by its judgment, it should oust the officer as not entitled, the general assembly, or the governor, as commander-in-chief, could at once reappoint him to the same office. In this case, however, the state has seen fit, through its representative, the attorney-general, to call upon us, as he had right, to inquire by what warrant the highest military subordinate in the state holds his office. He neither asked nor needed our allowance for the taking of this step; and nothing but an actual defect of power to make the inquiry in this form of proceeding, can justify us in refusing to decide the questions thus brought before us.

The writ, or information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, is in the nature of a writ of right, we are told, for the king or state, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right; 3 Black. Com. 262; and it lies for usurping any office, whether created by charter of the crown alone, or by the crown with the consent of parliament, provided the office be of a public nature, and a substantive office, and not merely the function or employment of a deputy or servant, held at the will or pleasure of others. Darley v. Regina, (in Error,) 12 Cl. Fin. 520. Now, however it may be with the military servants of the Queen of England, or with the officers of the armies of continental Europe under governments less free, it is clear that the major-generalship of the militia of this state is a substantive office in the above sense, under our system of law. It is public in its nature, giving the highest active military command in the state, and carrying with it, especially in case of war or insurrection, large powers. The incumbent is elected to it by the general assembly, in grand committee, — receives a commission under the seal of the state, required by the constitution to be signed and countersigned in the same manner that a civil commission is, — and before he enters upon the duties of his office, must, by law, take the same oath that every civil officer, chosen by the general assembly, must take.

He holds his office for the term of five years, and until another is appointed and qualified as his successor; and so far from holding it at the will or pleasure of any one, can only be deprived of it against his will, upon charges duly preferred and proved to the satisfaction of a court-martial composed of his brother officers. In whatever nominal department of our government you choose to place him, whether in the executive or in a separate department, got between the constitution of the United States and of this state, as contended, and to be called, the Military department, he is, under the law, an officer — so styled in constitution and statute — of a free government, filling a public substantive office, with a stable, though appropriate tenure, and in no other sense is a servant of any one, than every officer under our system, is a servant of the state. The state has a right to know by what warrant one of its citizens presumes to exercise such an office; and when through its attorney-general it asks us, in this, the appropriate mode, to assist it in the inquiry, we can find no ground for declining to render it our aid. Even if the title of the incumbent of such an office were a proper subject of consideration and decision by a court-martial under the militia law, as has been contended, which we do not grant or stop to inquire into, our jurisdiction, vested as it is by the constitution, would not be ousted; and we can readily conceive that many questions affecting the title to a military office might arise, and, indeed, one such does arise in the case before us, far more appropriately to be decided by the highest court of the state, than by a court-martial. We are clear, upon principle, that this court has jurisdiction by quo warranto to inquire by what authority a person exercises the office of major-general of the militia of this state; and are supported in our judgment by the decision of the supreme court of New Jersey, and the dissenting opinion of an able judge, Mr. Justice Richardson, of the court of appeals of South Carolina. State v. Utter, 2 Green, R. 84; State v. Wadkins, 1 Richard. Law R. 44.

The ground upon which we intend to rest our judgment with regard to the title of the defendant to his command as major-general, renders it unnecessary for us to consider what irregularities or deficient preliminaries of his election to it, are, or are not, cured or concluded by his commission. The present and altered state of the law affecting such an election, renders unnecessary any decision upon the point relating to the defendant's election, so ably discussed, as a rule for the future; and we do not deem it proper for one branch of the government unnecessarily to canvass the doings of another. We prefer to rest our judgment, when we are able to do so, upon some ground, which, whilst it avoids all such criticism, is in itself, and apparently to all, substantial, and which, supposing the defendant to have been duly elected to, and qualified to exercise, the duties of major-general, regards his warrant or right to continue to exercise it at the time of the filing of this information.

The information, in substance, avers that the defendant, since his supposed election and qualification as major-general, was, on the 27th day of April, 1857, elected colonel of the First Light Infantry Company of Providence, a chartered company of the active militia belonging to, and comprising a part of, the second brigade of the division of the militia of the state, — that his election was duly approved, — that a commission was thereupon issued to him as such colonel, dated June 1, 1857, upon which, on the same day, he was sworn and qualified, and that ever since he has exercised the powers, and performed the duties, of colonel of such company; all which is admitted by the demurrer. The ground taken by the information and argued on the part of the state is, that the two offices, of major-general of a division and of the colonel of a company composing a part of a brigade of the same division, are incompatible offices, necessarily involving conflicting rights and duties; and that hence, the acceptance and exercise by the defendant of the latter office, subsequent to his election and qualification as major-general, is an implied resignation of his major-generalship. That the acceptance by the same person, of an office incompatible with another office held by him, is a virtual resignation of the latter office, is well settled by the authorities noted upon the brief handed to us by the relator, as well as by other authorities, and proceeds upon the irresistible presumption, that no man can intend, as well as upon the policy that no man will be permitted, to hold a trust, the duties of which he has disqualified himself from impartially performing, by the assumption of a new trust, involving inconsistent duties and liabilities. If this be the rule with regard to civil, it seems to us applicable with great force to military offices; in which, especially on emergent occasions, so much depends upon the prompt obedience, action, and example of each officer, in his appointed station. Nothing, surely, should be allowed to come between a soldier, of whatever rank, and the ready performance of his duty; nothing to weaken that due subordination of authority so necessary to military discipline. Whatever may be allowed in that respect under rules of foreign service, by special orders and dispensations issued in reward of military merit, our militia system certainly recognizes no pluralities of incompatible offices of the line, nor has the governor, as commander-in-chief, any authority, by commission or otherwise, to enable any officer to hold two or more such military offices. Are, then, the offices of a colonel of the line and of major-general of the division, to a brigade of which the regimental company of the colonel is by law inseparably attached, incompatible offices, so that the performance of the duties of either is endangered by the union of the two offices in the same person? It is nothing to say that the defendant might or would, by his exemplary demeanor under all temptations and embarrassments, so conduct himself amid the conflict of duties in his two offices, as to "be clear" in both; and that the example of a major-general's application of his time to the details of the discipline of a company, would enforce in the strongest manner the importance of this great feature of military efficiency. The law is adapted not to individual and exceptional cases, but to human nature as it ordinarily exhibits itself; and it cannot afford to dispense with the well-known guards of common policy for the chance of now and then stumbling upon a bright example, or producing a startling effect. The question of incompatibility is to be determined from the nature of the duties of the two offices, and not from a possibility, or even a probability, that the defendant might duly perform the duties of both.

Now, looking at the duties of the two offices in question, the legal compatibility of the two is hardly an arguable position. For the same person to be commander and commanded, — to be superior and subordinate at the same time, — above his brigadier in one capacity, and below him in another, contradicts every notion of military authority and discipline, unless, as the argument for the defendant supposes, when acting in his higher capacity, he abandons his lower capacity, or vice versa; the admitted necessity for which is the strongest proof of the incompatibility of the two offices which can be imagined. Again, the only legal security that, when acting as colonel, the defendant will obey the orders of his brigadier, is wholly lost by this union of offices; since by the 70th section of the militia act of 1856, in force at the time when the defendant accepted his colonelcy, and by ch. 212, § 2, of the Revised Statutes, he alone, as major-general, could appoint, and designate the members of a court-martial on himself, as colonel; the delinquent to call and constitute the court to try the question of his own delinquency ! ! As the law now stands, in order to check improper or inopportune resignations, it requires, that the resignation of a field officer should be approved, not only by his brigadier, but by the major-general; but as this latter check did not exist at the time when the defendant accepted his inferior command, we do not rest our judgment upon this ground. We have no choice but to declare, that the offices of major-general of the division, and of colonel of the First Light Infantry company of Providence, united in the defendant, are incompatible offices; and that upon his acceptance of the latter, he virtually resigned the former office.

Let judgment of ouster from the office of major-general be entered up against the defendant; but, as there is no pretence of improper motives on his part, the nominal fine of ten cents only will be imposed upon him.


Summaries of

State v. Brown

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jan 1, 1857
5 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1857)

holding as incompatible the offices of colonel of the line and major general of the division

Summary of this case from Felkner v. Chariho Regional Sch. Committee

In Brown, the court exercised its discretion to allow the Attorney General to file an information in vindication of a public right to challenge the title of the acting major-general of the Division of the Rhode Island Militia.

Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Webb v. Cianci

In State v. Brown, 5 R.I. 1, 7 (1857), Chief Justice Ames observed that the writ and the information performed the same function.

Summary of this case from Violet v. Voccola

In State v. Brown, 5 R.I. 1, 7 (1857), Chief Justice Ames observed that the writ and the information performed the same function.

Summary of this case from Fargnoli v. Cianci
Case details for

State v. Brown

Case Details

Full title:STATE v. WILLIAM W. BROWN

Court:Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date published: Jan 1, 1857

Citations

5 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1857)

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