Absent such a showing, we can find no error. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982), reh. denied, 459 U.S. 1189, 103 S.Ct. 839 (1983); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981). Each defendant now questions the jury selection process, although neither requested an individual voir dire, presumably based on our holding in Oliver I.
Although we are bound by federal courts’ decisions regarding the Due Process Clause, seeCunningham , 108 N.C. App. at 195, 423 S.E.2d at 808, in State v. Brown , our Supreme Court held a criminal defendant has a due process right to inspect the crime scene under limited circumstances. State v. Brown , 306 N.C. 151, 165, 293 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1982). In Brown , the defendant murdered a mother and daughter.
On July 13, 1982, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions and declined to set aside the death sentences imposed. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569 (1982). Petitioner received a stay of execution pending his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Under current statutory and case law, error committed at trial which infringes upon defendant's constitutional rights is presumed to be prejudicial and entitles him to a new trial unless the error in question is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982); N.C.G.S. 15A-1443 (b) (1983). Significantly, this Court has held that the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant insists that lack of remorse is an irrelevant factor in a case such as this in which the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance (N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9)) was not submitted, e.g., State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. at 346-47, 307 S.E.2d at 318-19, or in which remorselessness was not offered to rebut the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that although the act itself may have been harmful, defendant had not shown himself to be otherwise evil. See State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 180, 293 S.E.2d 569, 588, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982). Evidence of the absence of remorse "sometime after the commission [of the offense] when defendant has had an opportunity to reflect on his criminal deed" has been approved to support a nonstatutory aggravating factor under the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. 15A-1340.4 (1983).
We agree that this evidence falls short of that necessary to support the submission of G.S. 15A-2000(f)(2), that the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance when he murdered Ransom Connelly. The inability to control one's drinking habits or one's temper is neither a mental disturbance nor an emotional disturbance as contemplated by this mitigating factor. In State v. Brown 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982), we reiterated this Court's position with respect to the definition of mitigating circumstances under G.S. 15A-2000. That definition and the policy it represents bears repeating: "A definition of mitigating circumstance approved by this Court is a fact or group of facts which do not constitute any justification or excuse for killing or reduce it to a lesser degree of the crime of first-degree murder, which may be considered as extenuating, or reducing the moral culpability of killing or making it less deserving of the extreme punishment than other first-degree murders."
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Brown, 293 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080 (1982). A North Carolina district court denied Brown's post-conviction motion for appropriate relief, and both the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The North Carolina Supreme Court found no merit to any of Brown's numerous assignments of error, and affirmed. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 103 S.Ct. 503, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982). On July 16, 1984, Judge William H. Helms of the North Carolina Superior Court for Moore County denied Brown's motion for post-conviction relief. The motion asserted, among other things, that the prosecutor had improperly exercised his peremptory challenges to purge the jury of all persons with scruples about imposing a death sentence.
The prosecutor objected, and a voir dire was held on the issue of the propriety of defendant's argument. The trial court ruled that pursuant to this Court's decision in State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982), it would sustain the prosecution's objection to this line of argument. In Brown this Court held that it was not error not to submit the absence of a particular aggravating circumstance as a mitigating circumstance, holding that the absence of an aggravating circumstance did not show "the presence of a mitigating one."
A defendant's eligibility for parole is not a proper matter for consideration by a jury. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 182, 293 S.E.2d 569, 589, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982). As defendant suggests, we have approved the inclusion of the language "life means life" in response to such inquires; however, we have not required it. Compare State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 266-67, 439 S.E.2d 547, 557-58, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 L.Ed.2d 162, reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 L.Ed.2d 532 (1994) with Brown, 306 N.C. at 181-82, 293 S.E.2d at 588-89.