Opinion
ID. No. 0704021625.
Submitted: March 3, 2008, Decided: April 21, 2008.
On Defendant Ira D. Brown's Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Ira D. Brown, Defendant, Pro Se.
ORDER
1. On September 24, 2007, Ira D. Brown pled guilty to: (1) First Degree Reckless Endangering; and (2) Fourth Degree Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances. Brown was sentenced to 9 months at Level V. On November 9, 2007, Brown was sentenced to 5 months at Level V for violating probation.
2. On March 3, 2008, Brown filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief based on violation of his 4th Amendment right against illegal detention. Brown claims he was charged with violating probation, even though he was not in fact on probation.
3. In evaluating a postconviction relief motion, the Court must first ascertain if any procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) apply. If a procedural bar is found to exist, the Court should refrain from considering the merits of the individual claims. This Court will not address claims for postconviction relief that are conclusory and unsubstantiated.
See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
See id.
See id. at 555.
4. Pursuant to Rule 61 (a), a motion for postconviction relief must be based on "a sufficient factual and legal basis." According to Rule 61(i)(l), a postconviction relief motion may not be filed more than a year after judgment of conviction is final or one year after a newly-discovered, retroactively-applicable right is recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme court. Pursuant to Rule 61(b)(2): "[T]he motion shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to movant . . ., and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified."
5. Any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction relief motion is thereafter barred unless consideration of the claim is necessary in the interest of justice. Grounds for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction are thereafter barred, unless the movant demonstrates: (1) cause for the procedural default; and (2) prejudice from violation of movant's rights. Any formerly-adjudicated ground for relief, whether in a proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, or in a postconviction proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
6. Brown alleges he was charged with violating probation even though he was not in fact on probation. Specifically, Brown claims that in January of 2007, he was arrested for a DUI. In April of 2007, he was charged with First Degree Reckless Endangering and Maintaining a Vehicle. In May of 2007, Brown was sentenced for the DUI. In November 9, 2007, Brown was sentenced for violating probation. Brown claims his VOP sentence was based on his DUI charge, "even though I was not on probation at the time of my arrest for the 1st Degree Reckless Endangering."
7. This Court previously addressed this argument when Brown filed a postconviction relief motion on February 5, 2008. On March 13, 2008, the Court ruled:
This is really a motion for modification of a sentence. The claim is that when sentenced for a violation on 11/9/07, it was not for the charges for which he was sentenced on 9/24/07. The reasons were stated at the 11/9 hearing and have nothing to do with the 9/24 matters.
In addition, Brown also filed a Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on December 14, 2007. The Court found:
The sentence was imposed after a VOP hearing was held, and the Court determined the defendant had violated the terms of his probation . . . Defendant was on probation for these offences on April 11, 2007 when reckless endangering and maintaining offenses occurred, (sentenced 9/24/07). VOP was for other reasons, however.
8. On January 20, 2007, Brown pled guilty to the DUI and made bail. From the date Brown pled, until sentencing, Brown was on pre-sentence supervision. On April 18, 2007, when Brown pled guilty to reckless endangering, he violated the terms of his pre-sentence supervision for the DUI charge. Additionally, Brown's May 2007 probationary sentence relates back to the date of the guilty plea. Therefore, Brown was indeed on probation in April of 2007.
THEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction relief is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.