Opinion
No. 3-504 / 02-0969
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
Defendant-appellant appeals from his convictions and sentences for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, manufacturing a controlled substance, possession of ether with intent to use as a precursor, possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to use as a precursor, possession of lithium with intent to use as a precursor, and possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Daniel Voogt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Defendant-appellant, Mark Brown, appeals from his convictions and sentences for (1) conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, (2) manufacturing a controlled substance, (3) possession of ether with intent to use as a precursor, (4) possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to use as a precursor, (5) possession of lithium with intent to use as a precursor, and (5) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. He contends (1) insufficient evidence supports the convictions, (2) the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony, (3) trial counsel was ineffective, and (4) the court erred in failing to merge the conspiracy to manufacture and manufacturing counts. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
Background facts.
On January 11, 2002 police officers went to a home in response to a report of an ether smell coming from the garage. The officers noted the odor when they arrived and suspected methamphetamine manufacture. They found a man in the detached garage, rolling up aluminum foil. He tried to run but was apprehended and arrested. Also in the garage officers saw canisters containing a clear liquid, a propane tank adapted to store anhydrous ammonia, and a generator, consisting of a bottle and hose-all items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Long told officers there were other people in the house.
Officers announced their presence at the back door of the house, then entered when someone inside replied, "in here." Upon entry, officers heard repeated toilet flushing. The house smelled strongly of ether and anhydrous ammonia, both used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The officers arrested the persons found in the house. The appellant, Brown, was not at home at the time; he was at work and was arrested at work a few days later.
Officers searched the house. In the closet of the master bedroom were bank statements and papers that had been mailed to Brown at that address. In the same closet was a coffee grinder containing a white residue. In a dresser in that room were twelve new lithium batteries and at least four bottles which contained or had contained pseudoephedrine pills. Apparently the dresser was located in the closet of the bedroom, near Brown's personal papers and the coffee grinder. Elsewhere in the room were a coffee filter with a white powdery residue, and a paper towel with a white residue.
In the same room, the officers found pipes and glass tubes, which could be used to smoke drugs, and strips of aluminum foil, which could be used to hold methamphetamine while it is heated so the fumes can be inhaled. The room also contained finger scales and electronic scales with white residue. Also in the room were two plastic bags containing a material which an officer identified as marijuana, based on its smell and appearance. On the headboard of the bed was a hemostat, which marijuana smokers use to hold marijuana cigarettes.
In a second bedroom officers found plastic bags, a Tupperware pitcher, and a box of coffee filters. Officers found mail sent to Brown at that address in the kitchen cabinets and the living room.
Just outside the door of the house officers found a garbage bag containing plastic tubes and two pop bottles which had been modified so they could be used to contain a chemical reaction involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. In the garage officers found a container of the sludge from methamphetamine manufacture. Officers also found plastic tubing, a thermos, modified pop bottles, balls of aluminum foil, muriatic acid, paper towels, coffee filters, plastic containers, anhydrous ammonia, a metal valve which had been corroded by contact with anhydrous ammonia, heavy gloves for handling chemicals, one full container of camping fuel and five empty containers which had held camping fuel, Damp Rid (a drying agent), and metal valves which can be installed on propane tanks so they will hold anhydrous ammonia. All of these items can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
In a Dodge Aries parked in the driveway, officers found plastic tubing, two one-gallon jugs containing ether, an empty jug, plastic tubing, paper towels, several containers of salt, and a metal valve which had been corroded by contact with anhydrous ammonia. In a Mercury Cougar parked in the driveway, officers found a gun.
Trial court proceedings.
The State charged Brown with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in excess of five grams, manufacture of methamphetamine in excess of five grams, possession of ether as a precursor, possession of anhydrous ammonia as a precursor, possession of lithium as a precursor, and possession of marijuana. With respect to all of these crimes except the charge of conspiracy, the court instructed the jurors that they could find Brown guilty either as a principal or as an aider and abetter.
During the jury trial, a county sheriff detective testified the lithium batteries were found "in the bedroom of Mr. Brown's house." Counsel objected, noting there was no testimony or no evidence Mr. Brown owned the house. The district court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony. The detective also testified without objection that the finger scales and electronic scales found in the master bedroom told him that the person who had these items was "selling illegal narcotics." The lab report on the sludge, admitted without objection, contained the statement, "the person or persons associated with [this exhibit] in this case had manufactured methamphetamine via the lithium-ammonia reduction method."
The jury found Brown guilty on all counts. The court merged the conspiracy and manufacturing convictions for purposes of sentencing, imposing a twenty-five year sentence of imprisonment on those charges, concurrent sentences of five years on each of the three convictions for possession of a precursor, and a concurrent sentence of six months on the conviction for possession of marijuana.
Claims on appeal.
Brown raises the following issues for our consideration on appeal: (1) whether the record contains insufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing a statement into evidence indicating that Mr. Brown owned the house in question; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective; (4) whether the court erred in failing to properly merge the felony counts.
Analysis.
Sufficiency of the evidence . Brown's underlying claim, applicable to all his convictions, is that there was not sufficient evidence showing he lived in the house where the drug evidence was found. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 2001). A verdict will be upheld if substantial evidence in the record supports it. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002). All the evidence in the record is considered, not just the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. The State must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Iowa 1976). The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create mere speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative. State v. Boley, 456 N.W.2d 674, 679 (Iowa 1990).
Brown was not present when officers arrived at the house on January 11 or during the subsequent search of the house, garage, vehicles, and property. He claims "scant evidence" indicated he lived at the house, "only mail and the unsupported conclusion" of the detective who testified evidence was found "in the bedroom of Mr. Brown's house." He also argues most of the items found relating to manufacture of methamphetamine were portable, suggesting others could have brought them to the property without his knowledge while he was at work. We address each of the convictions in order.
A. Evidence connecting Brown to the house.
We first address Brown's underlying claim "scant evidence" connected him to the house. The mail sent to Brown at the address of the house was found in the kitchen, the living room, and the closet of the master bedroom. The mail in the closet included bank statements. Found in the kitchen were letters to Brown from two credit unions. The letter from one credit union was mailed four days before the search. Brown would have an interest in assuring his banks and credit unions had his correct address. Consequently, a rational fact finder could conclude that the mail from these institutions showed Brown lived at the address where the mail was sent.
B. Conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
Brown claims there was insufficient evidence he participated in a conspiracy. He argues "[a]ll the precursors and equipment were mobile and could have arrived in the vehicles present." The suggestion is that the people at the house when the officers arrived could have acted on their own in bringing the precursors and equipment, and in manufacturing methamphetamine in Brown's absence and without his knowledge or consent.
The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part:
[T]he State must prove all of the following elements of Conspiracy to Manufacture a Controlled Substance:
1. On or about January 11, 2002, the Defendant agreed with one or more persons,
A. That one or more of them would commit the crime of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance, or solicit another to Manufacture a Controlled Substance; or
B. Attempt to Manufacture a Controlled Substance.
2. The Defendant entered into this agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate the Manufacture of a Controlled Substance.
3. The Defendant, or one or more persons, committed an overt act.
Jury Instr. 14; seeIowa Code § 706.1(1)(a) (2001).
"[A]n agreement need not be — and often times is not — formal and express. . . . A tacit understanding — one `inherent in and inferred from the circumstances' — is sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction." State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). "Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to prove such a meeting of the minds." Id. at 742; State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999). The fact finder may consider all legitimate inferences arising reasonably and fairly from the evidence to support the verdict." Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 805; State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998).
The evidence belies Brown's suggestion the others acted without his knowledge or consent. The evidence found at Brown's house was evidence of ongoing manufacture of methamphetamine, its use, and distribution. In addition to the chemicals and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine, the officers found a coffee filter with a white powdery residue, a paper towel with a white residue, and sludge containing methamphetamine, demonstrating methamphetamine had been manufactured there previously, but recently enough that the waste had not yet been disposed of. The finger scales and electronic scales with white residue are consistent with distribution of the methamphetamine manufactured. The fact finder could rationally infer Brown's house and garage would not have been the scene of a continuing drug operation involving the manufacture, use, and distribution of methamphetamine, unless Brown knew and agreed to it.
Strong circumstantial evidence of agreement exists in the fact that the master bedroom contained the coffee grinder, lithium batteries, and bottles which contained or had contained pseudoephedrine pills, along with Brown's bank statements and other personal papers, which were found in the closet. The scales were consistent with drug distribution. Most of the items were hidden, rather than out in the open where others might have left them. The fact finder could rationally conclude the master bedroom was Brown's room, and that evidence of each phase of an on-going methamphetamine operation would not be found in that room unless Brown agreed with others that one or more of them would manufacture methamphetamine, using Brown's house as a place where the manufacturing could occur.
Brown cites State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002), State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 2001), and State v. Nickens, 644 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002) as examples in which appellate courts have determined the evidence was insufficient to uphold convictions for conspiracy or possession. The circumstances before us differ sufficiently from the cases cited that no similar result is required.
We conclude sufficient evidence supports Brown's conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine under Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) and affirm.
C. Manufacture of methamphetamine.
Brown claims the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine. The court instructed the jury it could find Brown guilty of manufacture of methamphetamine either as a principal or as an aider and abetter:
[T]he State must prove all of the following elements of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance:
1. On or about January 11, 2002, the Defendant manufactured or aided and abetted another who manufactured methamphetamine.
2. The Defendant knew that the substance he manufactured or aided and abetted another in manufacturing was methamphetamine.
Jury Instr. 21.
All persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether they directly commit the crime or knowingly "aid and abet" its commission, shall be treated in the same way.
"Aid and abet" means to knowingly approve and agree to the commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by knowingly advising and encouraging the act in some way before or when it is committed. . . .
Jury Instr. 23.
To sustain a conviction on the theory of aiding and abetting, the record must contain substantial evidence the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act by either actively participating or encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. Proof of participation or encouragement need not be established by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence will suffice. When intent is an element of the crime charged, a person may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if he participates with the requisite intent or with the knowledge the principal has the intent.
State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587, 591-92 (Iowa 2000) overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25-26 (Iowa 2001).
The same evidence demonstrating Brown was guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine also supports his conviction for aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Evidence of ongoing methamphetamine manufacture, use, and distribution was found in Brown's house and garage. Much of this evidence was found in the same room as Brown's personal papers. Given the strong odors of ether and anhydrous ammonia, it is not reasonable to conclude the manufacturing process could occur without Brown's knowledge. The jury could rationally find Brown encouraged, assented to, and facilitated the manufacture of methamphetamine by knowingly providing a place where the manufacture could occur. We conclude sufficient evidence supports Brown's conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine.
D. Possession of ether and anhydrous ammonia as precursors.
Brown claims he was not shown to be in actual or constructive possession of any contraband. He argues the other individuals could have brought the precursors to the house. Brown was convicted of possession of ether with intent to use it as a precursor, based on two one-gallon jugs containing ether police found in a vehicle parked in the driveway of the house. One of the individuals arrested at the scene told officers the car was his. Brown was also convicted of possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to use it as a precursor, based on evidence that police found a container of anhydrous ammonia in the garage.
The court instructed the jury it could convict Brown of possession of ether and anhydrous ammonia, with intent to use them as precursors, if they found Brown either (1) personally possessed those substances, or (2) aided and abetted such possession. Much of Brown's argument in his brief relates to his argument the State did not even prove constructive possession. However, the State need not prove, as a prerequisite to convicting a defendant of criminal possession on a theory of aiding and abetting, that he had either actual or constructive possession. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 531 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Concerning Brown's knowledge, "a person may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if he participates with the requisite intent or with the knowledge the principal has the intent." Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d at 592; Thomas, 531 N.W.2d at 136. "Knowledge is a state of mind seldom capable of direct proof, and may be inferred from the circumstances." Thomas, 531 N.W.2d at 137.
We conclude a rational jury could find, because Brown conspired to manufacture methamphetamine, and he aided and abetted the manufacture of methamphetamine, that Brown must have known of, assented to, and encouraged possession of the precursors by his co-conspirators. The evidence demonstrates the co-conspirators possessed the precursors with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Brown must have harbored the same intent himself. A rational jury could find Brown guilty on a theory of aiding and abetting, without considering whether Brown himself had either actual or constructive possession of the anhydrous ammonia. We conclude sufficient evidence supports his convictions on these charges and affirm.
E. Possession of lithium.
Brown was convicted of possession of lithium with intent to use it as a precursor, based on evidence that officers found twelve lithium batteries in a drawer of the dresser in the master bedroom, next to bottles which contained or had contained pseudoephedrine pills. The mail found in the bedroom provided strong evidence it was Brown's bedroom. The court instructed the jury it could find Brown guilty of possession of lithium if it found he had either actual or constructive possession of it, or if he aided and abetted another in possessing it. Jury Instrs. 27, 30.
To prove possession the State must prove (1) the defendant exercised dominion and control over the items, (2) the defendant knew of the presence of the items, and (3) the defendant knew the nature of the items. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002). The "dominion and control" element may be satisfied by evidence the defendant "maintains control or the right to control." Id. "The right to control, . . . in the absence of actual possession is constructive possession." Id. at 76-77.
[P]ossession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another.
. . .
But where the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises but only in joint possession, knowledge of the presence of the [item] on the premises and the ability to maintain control over [the item] by the accused will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused, or evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the [item] on the premises.Id. at 77 (quoting State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 22-23 (Iowa 1973)).
The lithium batteries were found in a dresser located in the master bedroom, and apparently in the closet of that room, which also contained Brown's personal papers. The batteries were concealed in a drawer, not out in the open. We determine a rational jury could conclude Brown knew the batteries were there, and that he had at least joint constructive possession of them — i.e., that he had at least joint control or the right to control them, even though he did not have actual possession. With the other evidence of ongoing methamphetamine manufacture, a rational jury could conclude Brown knew the purpose for the batteries, that they were to be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Accordingly, we affirm Brown's conviction on this charge.
F. Possession of marijuana.
Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to connect him with the marijuana. Police found a hemostat on the headboard and two plastic bags containing marijuana in the master bedroom. As noted above, Brown's personal papers were found in the closet in the same room. Based on the combination of evidence in the record, a rational jury could find Brown had at least joint constructive possession of the marijuana. A marijuana user may use a hemostat to hold marijuana cigarettes. We conclude a rational jury could find Brown knew the marijuana was there and what it was. We affirm his conviction on this charge.
Evidentiary rulings . Brown claims the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a detective that the house was "Mr. Brown's" house. Appellate courts "generally review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion." Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Iowa 1997). We will find an abuse of discretion when the trial court exercises its discretion "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997). "A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law." State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000)). We use a two-pronged test to determine if the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence: (1) whether the evidence is relevant, and, if so, (2) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Graber, 616 N.W.2d at 638. Even the erroneous admission of evidence is not prejudicial if substantially the same evidence is elsewhere in the record without objection. State v. Wells, 437 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1989).
Trial counsel was alert in objecting to the testimony in question because the detective was not responding to a question about the ownership of the house. The following interchange occurred on direct examination:
Q. What is State's Exhibit 2?
A. These are twelve lithium style batteries.
Q. Have you seen State's Exhibit No. 2 before? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. These were found . . . in the bedroom of Mr. Brown's house.
Trial counsel objected that there was no evidence Brown owned the house and that the testimony exceeded the minutes of testimony. In later questions about other items found, the detective simply identified the room and the address of the house, without commenting on its ownership.
Brown does not cite to or argue any authority for his assertion the testimony was improperly admitted. We agree with the State's assertion, "It cannot be argued that [the detective] could not testify to a fact unless some other witness had testified to the same fact already." Brown argues the evidence was "highly prejudicial." Although ownership of the house is an important fact in this case, the evidence of the mail found in the house prevents a conclusion Brown was prejudiced by the detective's statement. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.
Ineffective assistance . A claim trial counsel was ineffective can be an exception to the general rules of error preservation. State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982). Our review is de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). To prevail in a claim counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show counsel failed in an essential duty, and prejudiced resulted Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d at 142. A defendant must overcome the presumption counsel acted competently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed.2d at 695. A defendant must demonstrate his attorney's performance fell outside the normal range of competency. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998). In addition, a defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been different. Id. at 687-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-2068, 80 L. Ed.2d at 693-98; Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143-44. Both elements need not always be addressed. If the defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice, the claim can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L. Ed.2d at 699. Iowa appellate courts generally preserve ineffective assistance claims for possible postconviction proceedings, but may address the claims on direct appeal if the adequately presents the issue. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994).
A. Failure to move for a new trial.
Brown first claims trial counsel was ineffective in not moving for a new trial because the court has "a broader power to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witness" under the weight-of-the-evidence standard applied to motions for new trial. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa 1998). He claims such a motion likely would have been successful "considering the weak link between the defendant and the evidence found." Although we already have discussed the strength of the evidence linking the defendant to the house and the methamphetamine operation there, we preserve this claim for possible postconviction proceedings, "where an adequate record of the claim can be developed and the attorney charged with providing ineffective assistance may have an opportunity to respond to defendant's claims." State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002).
B. Failure to object to opinions on the ultimate issue.
Brown claims counsel should have objected (1) to a detective's testimony the scales indicated someone was selling drugs and (2) to a statement in a lab report that the sludge tested indicated someone had manufactured methamphetamine. He claims the statements are legal conclusions and improper, citing State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1992) and State v. Nimmo, 247 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1976). The State responds that, even had counsel objected, the State could have elicited the same information by rephrasing the questions to make the responses not objectionable. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996); State v. Adams, 544 N.W.2d 686, 692 n. 5 (Iowa 1996). We preserve this claim for post conviction proceedings.
C. Failure to move for judgment of acquittal.
Brown claims his counsel was ineffective in not moving for a judgment of acquittal on the possession of marijuana charge because no evidence was introduced the substance found was tested and determined to be marijuana. We preserve this claim for possible postconviction proceedings.
Failure to merge the conspiracy and manufacture convictions.
The trial court merged the convictions for the purpose of sentencing, but did not merge the actual convictions. Brown claims the court erred in not merging both the convictions and the sentences. This court's review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Cartee, 577 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1998); Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. General rules of error preservation do not apply to a claim the court imposed an illegal sentence. State v. Austin, 503 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Iowa 1993). Iowa Code section 706.4 provides:
A conspiracy to commit a public offense is an offense separate and distinct from any public offense which might be committed pursuant to such conspiracy. A person may not be convicted and sentenced for both the conspiracy and for the public offense.
Iowa Code § 706.4. The State agrees the court should have merged both the convictions and sentenced Brown only for the substantive offense. State v. Waterbury, 307 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Iowa 1981). We conclude the court erred in not merging the convictions. We therefore remand this case for entry of judgment and sentencing on the substantive offense of manufacturing methamphetamine and not the conspiracy conviction.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Miller, J. concurs, Hecht, J. dissents.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority's initial conclusion that mail addressed to Brown found on the premises is sufficient evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown lived at the residence. However, I believe that this evidence, taken in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, supports, at most, the conclusion that Brown was a joint possessor of the property. Joint possession of the premises alone is insufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband found there. See State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002). Although the marijuana and lithium batteries were found in a bedroom which contained mail addressed to Brown, the evidence does not indicate when Brown was last in that bedroom or how long the contraband had been there. Brown made no incriminating statements and no physical evidence linked him to any of the contraband. Thus, I conclude this case is analogous to Webb and would reverse Brown's convictions for possession.
I would also reverse Brown's convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine for the same reasons. Even if one concluded Brown lived in the house, the evidence does not indicate when Brown was last on the premises or how long the methamphetamine manufacturing operation had been in place. No fingerprints or other physical evidence linked Brown to any of the manufacturing equipment, and Brown made no incriminating statements. Because both the manufacturing and conspiracy charges require Brown to have knowledge of the methamphetamine manufacturing operation, and because I believe the evidence is insufficient to establish knowledge, much less intent and agreement, I would also reverse Brown's convictions for manufacturing and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.