Opinion
No. ID. No. 86002026DI.
Date Submitted: September 7, 2007.
Date Decided: October 23, 2007.
Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
DENIED.Alan T. Brooks, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Huntingdon, PA, Defendant, pro se.
Richard Andrews, Esquire, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant collaterally attacks his conviction for felony murder, claiming that the revised interpretation of Del. C § 636(a)(2) as set forth in Williams v. State requires this Court to vacate his conviction. Because Defendant fails to establish that the murder of Ronald Irons was not committed "in furtherance of" and "in the course of" attempted robbery, his claim is DISMISSED.
818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002).
II. BACKGROUND
On May 5, 1987, a jury convicted defendant Alan T. Brooks of felony-murder, first-degree robbery, attempted first-degree robbery, second-degree kidnapping, second-degree conspiracy, and possession of a deadly weapon during commission of felony. On March 31, 1987, the Court sentenced Brooks to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and 52 years for the remaining offenses. The convictions were affirmed on appeal by the Delaware Supreme Court on July 3, 1990.On August 26, 1993, Brooks filed his first pro se motion for postconviction relief. On September 20, 1993, this Court denied the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on February 10, 1994. On July 13, 2001, Brooks filed his second pro se motion for postconviction relief. On August 8, 2001, this Court denied the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on December 19, 2001. Brooks filed his third and current pro se motion on September 7, 2007.
Def. Mot. for Postconviction Relief, Docket Item ("D.I.") 61.
Brooks v. State, Del. Super., I.D. 862002026, Bifferato, J. (Letter Opinion) (Sept. 9, 1993), aff'd Del. Supr., No. 383, 1993 (Feb. 10, 1994) (ORDER).
Del. Super., I.D. 862002026, Jurden, J. (ORDER) (Aug. 8, 2001), aff'd Del. Supr., No. 450, 2001 (Dec. 19, 2001) (ORDER).
Def. Mot. for Postconvictin Relief, D.I. 93.
III. DISCUSSION
Before addressing the merits of a postconviction relief claim, the Court must first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61(i). To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not address the substantive aspects of the defendant's claims if they procedurally barred.Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1), a postconviction motion that is filed more than three years after judgment of conviction is procedurally barred. Rule 61(i)(1) specifically provides:
Brooks' claims are not subject to the amendment to Rule 61 that bars all claims filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final, as this amendment applies to cases in which the judgment of conviction became final after July 1, 2005. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
Id.
Under certain circumstances, Rule 61 provides a means of circumventing the procedural bars. Specifically, Rule 61(i)(5) states "[t]he bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of [Rule 61(i)] shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings."
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Brooks' motion for postconviction relief fails the procedural bar imposed by Rule 61(i)(1). His conviction became final on July 3, 1990. Because Brooks filed the current motion seventeen years after his final conviction, and he fails to assert a new retroactive rule, his motion is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1).
Mandate, D.I. 60.
Because Brooks is procedurally time barred under Rule 61(i)(1), the Court must determine if his claim fits the exception set forth in Rule 61(i)(5). This exception allows a defendant to avoid the first three procedural bars if (1) the court lacked jurisdiction or (2) defendant states a colorable claim that must be remedied to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This exception, however, is narrowly construed and the defendant has the burden of proof to show that there has been a deprivation of a substantial constitutional right that "undermined the fundamental . . . reliability" of the prior proceedings. Because Brooks does not claim that this court lacked jurisdiction, he must establish a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(i)(5).
Id.
Brooks sets forth a "colorable claim" for postconviction relief based upon the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Williams v. State. In Williams, the Delaware Supreme Court revised the interpretation of the "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" language of 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2) and held that a defendant may not be convicted of felony murder unless it has been established that the murder helped to move the underlying felony forward.
The Court in Williams overruled Chao v. State, which held that in order "[f]or felony murder liability to attach, a killing need only accompany the commission of an underlying felony. Thus, if the `in furtherance' language has any limiting effect, it is solely to require that the killing be done by the felon, him or himself." 604 A.2d 1351 (Del. 1992).
Applying the holding in Williams to the case at bar, it is evident that the murder of Ronald Irons served to further the underlying felony of attempted robbery. In Hassan-El v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court held:
911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006).
The General Assembly anticipated the fact that every intended felony might not be completed. The felony-murder statute expressly provides that a homicide committed during an attempted felony can constitute felony murder . . . even if the separate felony of robbery was not accomplished-for whatever reason.
Id. at 392.
The same analysis applies here. The record reflects that on the evening of February 22, 1986, Brooks, along with co-defendants Willie Chase and Edward Sanders, approached the home of Ronald Irons. All three men were carrying handguns. A fourth co-defendant, Edward Skinner, waited in a car parked around the corner. When Irons answered the door, he was shot in the head and the three defendants ran away. Earlier that same day, Brooks and his three co-defendants were involved in the robbery of another victim, Jose Grinage. It is clear from these facts that Brooks intended to rob Ronald Irons and, during the commission of that felony, he murdered Irons. Irons' murder was "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" the robbery. The fact that Brooks did not complete the robbery is irrelevant. Because the murder of Ronald Irons' was committed "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" the attempted robbery pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(2), this claim is DISMISSED.
The record reflects that on the morning Irons was killed, Jose Grinage gave Chase a ride to a liquor store while Brooks, Sanders and Skinner followed in a separate car. Chase told Grinage tha t the four men wanted Grinage to help them rob the store but Grinage refused to do so. After purchasing cigarettes, Grinage returned to his car and saw Chase sitting in the front passenger seat. As he opened the door, Sanders sat up in the backseat brandishing a pistol and ordered Grinage to get into the car. After driving a short distance, Grinage was ordered to pull his car onto the shoulder. Brooks and Skinner, following behind in a separate car, stopped behind Grinage. Sanders threatened to shoot Grinage if he fled. Chase and Sanders then took five dollars in cash, two watches, Grinage's car keys, and his class ring. Brooks and Skinner sold Grinage's class ring to an antique jewelry store that afternoon. See Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1111-18.
See Hassan-El, 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006).