Opinion
No. COA10-737
Filed 17 May 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 22 September 2009 by Judge Arnold O. Jones, II, in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Stanley G. Abrams, for the State. Economos Law Firm, PLLC, by Larry C. Economos, for defendant.
Wayne County No. 07 CRS 55283.
Moses Earl Brodie, Jr. (defendant), was found guilty by a jury of feloniously trafficking in cocaine by possession of at least twenty-eight grams but less than 200 grams of cocaine. From judgment imposing a prison sentence of thirty-five to forty-two months, defendant appeals.
Defendant's name is spelled both "Moses" and "Mose" in different documents in the record. For the most part, however, it is spelled "Moses," and we use that spelling here.
I.
On 9 August 2007, a confidential informant made five telephone calls in the presence of Officer Karen Powers of the Goldsboro Police Department, to defendant, arranging for a transaction in illegal drugs. Within fifteen minutes of the informant's last conversation with defendant, Officer Powers and other members of the Goldsboro Police Department apprehended defendant in an area near Edwards Mobile Home Park. The officers were aided in their identification of defendant by a photograph given to them by the informant, and predictive behavior communicated to them by the informant of where defendant would be walking. Following defendant's arrest, a search of his person revealed two bags of cocaine and cash.
The record does not indicate whether this informant was previously known to the police.
While en route to the magistrate in the custody of Officer Peters, defendant asked how the officers had known that he had drugs in his possession. At trial, Officer Powers testified that a fellow officer, Sergeant Dan Peters, told defendant that "`someone had called Crime Stoppers and said he was walking around outside shooting a gun and selling drugs." Officer Powers testified that defendant replied "`I won't shooting no gun. I mean I had the drugs, but I weren't shooting no gun.'"
Defendant made a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the stop, including the drugs found on his person and the statements made by him to police after his arrest. That motion was denied.
II.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the trial court's conclusions of law are not supported by its findings of fact. We disagree.
Upon review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting." State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App. 107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant admits outright that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by competent evidence; his only argument concerns the conclusions of law. We review those conclusions of law de novo. State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61, 69 (2002).
The conclusion of law challenged by defendant is that probable cause existed to arrest and search defendant. "Police officers may arrest without a warrant any person who they have probable cause to believe has committed a felony." State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 34, 261 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1980). Information from an informant may supply the probable cause for that arrest so long as it bears indicia of reliability; whether such indicia exists is determined via an examination of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 204, 539 S.E.2d 625, 628 (2000).
Defendant argues that the information provided by the informant was not specific enough — that is, that it was deficient because defendant did not report actually having seen defendant in possession of drugs. For this argument, he relies entirely on State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 237 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
In Wooten, a confidential informant who had provided reliable information in the past told officers that the defendant was "`hustling' drugs" in a certain area. 34 N.C. App. at 86, 237 S.E.2d at 303. The officers told him to be back in touch "if further information developed," and the informant called later that night to report he had just seen the defendant in the area mentioned and that the defendant was in possession of tinfoil packets that he represented contained heroin. Id. The informant also provided a physical description of the defendant, including his race, stature, and current clothing. Id. When the officers arrived at the location indicated by the informant, they found the defendant by the informant's description; a search of his person produced eleven .32 caliber bullets, $89.00 in cash, and a pistol. 34 N.C. App. at 87, 237 S.E.2d at 303. The defendant was placed under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon and taken to the police station, where an officer observed a small object fall from the defendant's hands. Id. The object turned out to be a manila envelope containing tinfoil packets of heroin. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that no probable cause existed to support the search and his subsequent arrest. 34 N.C. App. at 87-88, 237 S.E.2d at 303-04. This Court held that the information provided by the informant was reliable and sufficiently corroborated by police work at the scene to support probable cause. 34 N.C. App. at 88, 237 S.E.2d at 304.
Defendant argues that the case at hand is distinguishable because, here,
the confidential informant did not report seeing drugs on [defendant] in the area of the Edwards Mobile Home Park, but only that the informant reported that [ sic] he had placed calls to [defendant] to arrange a drug buy and that [defendant] was expected to be in the area of the Edwards Mobile Home Park. Based on the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, this does not rise to the level of probable cause to arrest and search [defendant] absent any further corroboration of his possession of drugs.
We disagree.
Defendant's argument is implicitly based on the assumption that the key point for the Court in Wooten was that the informant in that case saw the defendant in possession of drugs immediately before the search. However, a reading of Wooten suggests no such conclusion to this Court. The key, as noted above, is whether the information provided by the informant was reliable and corroborated by police work on the scene. Here, as in Wooten, the police were provided with information by an informant that a specific person was in a specific place at a specific time with specific narcotics. In Wooten, the informant provided a description of the defendant to the officers, and here, the informant identified a picture of defendant for the officers. In Wooten, the defendant represented to the informant in person that he had drugs for sale, and here that representation was made over the phone. In both cases, the police arrived at the scene, confirmed the information given to them by the informants, and made an arrest.
Defendant has made no real argument, and we see none, that Wooten does not control in this situation. As such, his argument is overruled. Defendant received a trial free from error.
No error.
Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).