State v. Bowers

62 Citing cases

  1. State v. Apadaca

    2015 UT App. 212 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    We agree. ¶ 9 Although we generally lack jurisdiction to consider appeals that were not filed within the “30–day period for filing notice of appeal in a criminal case,” see State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1065 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), courts “may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time,” Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The language of rule 22(e) allows an appellate court to “vacate the illegal sentence without first remanding the case to the trial court, even if the matter was never raised before.”

  2. Salt Lake City v. Ausbeck

    2011 UT App. 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 2 times
    Recognizing that where a restitution order is entered after sentencing, "the sentence constitutes the final order" for purposes of appealing the sentence, and the "order of restitution is a separate appealable order"

    In a criminal case, the sentence itself constitutes the final order from which to appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.

  3. Salt Lake City v. Ausbeck

    2011 UT App. 179 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)

    In a criminal case, the sentence itself constitutes the final order from which to appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.

  4. State v. Vaughn

    266 P.3d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    However, if Vaughn's appeal is untimely, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider this issue on the merits and must dismiss Vaughn's appeal of this issue. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶¶ 4–5, 57 P.3d 1065. ¶ 9 Next, Vaughn contends that the inclusion of the Post Sentence Jail Notes in the Post Sentencing Judgment/Commitments renders his sentences illegal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the prison to place Vaughn in treatment programs.

  5. State v. Baum

    258 P.3d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)

    In a criminal case, the sentence constitutes the final order from which to appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065. ¶ 3 Here, the order appealed was merely an interlocutory order.

  6. State v. Grant

    256 P.3d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 3 The State argues that Grant's notice of appeal is untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of the announcement of sentence on April 13, 2010, arguing that "[i]n a criminal case, it is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which the appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1065. The State's literal argument fails to take into account the requirement of rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that a notice of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R.App. P. 4(a).

  7. State v. Anderson

    203 P.3d 990 (Utah 2009)   Cited 9 times

    By requiring concurrent or consecutive sentencing determinations to be made at the time of the final judgment, a defendant also receives finality of judgment and can then appeal if he chooses to do so. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065 ("In a criminal case, it is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which [the] appellant has the right to appeal." (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  8. State v. Yazzie

    2009 UT 14 (Utah 2009)   Cited 29 times

    By requiring concurrent or consecutive sentencing determinations to be made at the time of the final judgment, a defendant also receives finality of judgment and can then appeal if he chooses to do so. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065 ("In a criminal case, it is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which [the] appellant has the right to appeal." (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  9. Manning v. State

    2005 UT 61 (Utah 2005)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that “upon a defendant's motion, the trial or sentencing court may reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal”

    Thus, in the vast majority of cases where a defendant fails to comply with the rule 4(a) thirty-day requirement for filing a timely appeal, or with the rule 4(e) provision for requesting an extension of the time to appeal "upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause," the defendant will be held to have waived his right to appeal and the claim will properly be dismissed. State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1065; State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989). II. MANNING'S CLAIM OF BEING DENIED AN APPEAL UNDER THE NEW MANNING EXCEPTIONS

  10. State v. Harris

    2004 UT 103 (Utah 2004)   Cited 20 times
    Reversing denial of motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy after judge declared a mistrial and discharged the jury

    ¶ 20 In sum, having determined that the considerations driving Ambrose's holding with respect to final judgments are no longer present under our current appellate framework, we overrule Ambrose to the extent that it deviates from our general final judgment jurisprudence, and reaffirm that in criminal cases, "it is `the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which [a defendant] has the right to appeal.'" State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1065 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978)). Therefore, a defendant may, in accordance with Utah Code section 77-18a-1(1)(c), file a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.