Opinion
No. CV 04-4000931S
April 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff State of Connecticut (State) brought this action against the defendant, Theodore Bogucki, Executor of the Estate of Paul Vaillancourt, (Bogucki) to determine the validity of the State's claim for reimbursement of the cost of care and support rendered to the decedent's minor son, Joshua Vaillancourt. (Joshua).
Intermittently from 1996 through July 1999, the Department of Children and Families provided care and support services to Joshua through a program known as Foster Care Support Services. General Statutes § 46b-130 requires parents of children receiving support services under the program to reimburse the state to the same extent and under the same terms and conditions as a parent of recipients of public assistance.
Joshua's father, Paul Vaillancourt (Paul), died on May 12, 2002. Bogucki was appointed executor of the Estate of Paul Vaillancourt on May 14, 2002 by the Probate Court of Southington. The State alleges that on August 9, 2002, the Department of Administrative Services (DAS) presented to Bogucki a written statement of its creditor's claim against the estate in the amount of $75,667.94 for reimbursement of care and support rendered to Joshua. Bogucki received and signed for a mailing from DAS containing claim letters seeking reimbursement on August 14, 2002. Bogucki maintains he first learned of the state's claim against the estate for $75,667.94 on June 17, 2004. Bogucki disallowed the state's claim against the estate for reimbursemert of $75,667.94 and in his Revised Return of Claims to the Probate Court in August 2004, he stated: "[C]laim first presented to the Executor on June 17, 2004 and disallowed June 18, 2004 due to untimely presentation."
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Bogucki received timely notice of the State's claim against the estate for reimbursement of sums due for care and services rendered to Joshua. The resolution of the issues in this matter rests solely on the credibility of the witnesses. Bogucki admits to having received two notices dated August 9, 2002, both asserting claims for reimbursement against the distributive share of Joshua. (Exhibits 5b and 5c.) Bogucki denies receiving a third notice dated August 9, 2002, which the state claims to have sent in the mailing from DAS received by Bogucki on August 14, 2002, and in which the state asserts a claim for reimbursement against the estate. (Exhibit 5d.)
After a trial to the court, at which the parties were heard and after due consideration of the testimony of the witnesses, their credibility and their exhibits, the court finds against the state and in favor of the defendant for the reason that the state failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it provided timely notice to Bogucki of its claim against the estate, including the amount of the claim.
Although the court admitted Exhibit C, a redacted letter from Assistant Attorney General Samalot to Attorney Koskoff, attorney for the defendant, in consideration of the arguments set forth in the plaintiff's post-trial memorandum, the court has not relied on that Exhibit and has drawn no inferences from it.
I find Bogucki to be a very credible witness. I find that he took his role as fiduciary seriously and carried it out with fidelity and honesty to the estate, the heirs and to the claimants who submitted timely claims. He testified that he signed for and received DAS claim letters by certified mail (Exhibit D and recalled receiving only the claim letters against the distributive share of the heir, of Joshua (Exhibits 5b and 5c), and that he did not receive notice of the state's claim against the estate until June 17, 2004. I believe him.
The court was presented with testimony and exhibits concerning the procedures and systems for processing estate claim letters by DAS. (Exhibit 12.) I find the DAS witnesses who testified also came across as honest and forthright, committed to carrying out their work duties in an efficient and systematic manner. None, however, could say that she placed the notice in contention, Exhibit 5c, in the envelope received by Bogucki on August 14, 2002. Exhibit 10, a copy of the receipt signed by Bogucki does not indicate the items enclosed in the one mailing of claim letters to him. In essence, the state's witnesses relied upon their certainty in the infallibility of their protocol and procedures.
I, however, am not persuaded by that testimony because of errors and inconsistencies revealed in the exhibits. For instance, although there appear to have been three letters generated under the date of August 9, 2002, the Probate Worksheet, Exhibit 9, which was used to generate the claim letters, refers only to a request for two letters pertaining to Public Assistance and DCF Assistance to Joshua, the heir. Exhibit 5b which is a letter dated August 9, 2002 and asserts a claim against the distributive share of Joshua in the amount of $4,771.00 and Exhibit 5c which is a letter dated August 9, 2002 and asserts a claim against the distributive share of Joshua in the amount of $75,667.94. Exhibit 5c was generated in error; the state's witness, Susan Bolduc, conceded that Exhibit 5c is incorrect. The letters received by the Probate Court add further confusion. (Exhibits 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d.) The clerk for the Southington Probate Court testified that her file contained copies of all three notice of claim letters plus a cover letter. Not all the letters were stamped as received, but from the testimony of the clerk and from examining the letters that do and do not bear stamps, I draw the reasonable inference that 5a and 5b were separated and handled separately from 5c and 5d. Additionally, the fact that it took nearly four years before the state provided a number close to amount of its claim — some $50,000.00 less than what it had claimed in its letters and in its complaint filed July 26, 2004 — calls into question whether any of the notices issued by DAS reflecting a claim for $75,667.94 should be considered timely under these circumstances. But see, Cattle Company v. D'addario, 268 Conn. 441 (2004). See also Roth v. Ravich, 111 Conn. 649, 654 (1930). ("[T]he form of the writing is of little importance so long as it furnishes information to the executor of the extent of the demand and the character of the transaction out of which it grew.")
Finally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof with respect to all the essential elements of the complaint. Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211 (1981). This applies to damages which must be proved with reasonable certainty. Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz Schatz, Ribicoff Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 69 (1998). On the day of trial the state was allowed to file an amended complaint in which it alleged the amount of $72,442.94 for care and services rendered against which reimbursements in the amount of $47,527.04 had been received, leaving an unreimbursed sum of $24,916.90. Even then, at trial, one of the state's witnesses testified that the net debt was not actually that amount. "The purpose of the statute as a whole remains, however, for `the security and benefit of . . . estates;' `to produce a speedy settlement of estates and the repose of titles derived under persons who are dead' and `to ensure . . . that the executor shall know exactly what the claims are.'" Wright v. Wright, 121 Conn. 115 (1936).
I cannot find that the plaintiff sustained its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of the debt or claim and that timely notice thereof was given to Bogucki.
Accordingly, judgment may enter for the defendant.