Opinion
No. 2-304 / 01-0515.
Filed July 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, J. HOBART DARBYSHIRE, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions, following jury trial, for first-degree burglary and assault while participating in a felony. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
James Bryson Clements, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Jerald Feuerbach and Michael Walton, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Edward L. Black appeals his convictions, following jury trial, for first-degree burglary and assault while participating in a felony. Black alleges (1) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to tender a guilty plea on the morning of trial pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, (2) the court erred by not granting his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case involves incidents which allegedly took place on or about October 21, 2000 when Black and two other individuals entered the residence of Anthony Maples, his brother, Dennis Creel, and their mother, Lisa Newcomb, without permission and allegedly assaulted Maples while in the residence. Based on this incident Black was charged by trial information with burglary in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.3 (1999), assault while participating in a felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.3, and willful injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(2).
Black's defense counsel filed a notice of taking depositions of certain witnesses, including Maples, Creel and Newcomb, however the witnesses failed to appear on the date designated for the depositions. After several failed attempts by both defense counsel and the State to get the alleged victims and other witnesses to appear for interviews, the prosecutor apparently discussed the possibility of a plea offer with Black. However, no plea agreement was ever reduced to writing.
The plea agreement involved dismissing the burglary charge (a Class B forcible felony) and allowing Black to plead guilty to assault with intent (an aggravated misdemeanor), with a recommendation of two years in prison.
A pretrial conference was held on January 26, 2001. The resulting pretrial order indicated that speedy trial had not been waived and trial was set for February 26, 2001. The order also provided, "Possible pleas have been discussed and none agreed upon. The Court will entertain no plea except an open plea to the charge as filed on the day of trial." The case proceeded to jury trial on February 26, 2001 and the jury found Black guilty of first-degree burglary, assault while participating in a felony, and a lesser-included offense of assault.
Black filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on March 16, 2001. In his motion Black argued (1) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, and (2) he was denied his right to plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. In this second issue Black alleged he agreed to plead guilty on the Wednesday before trial, with the "minor modification" that mittimus be delayed. He asserts the prosecutor did not take exception to delaying mittimus, but stated that was an issue for the court to decide. On the Friday before trial Black's defense counsel and the prosecutor went to discuss the possibility of a delayed mittimus with the trial judge but the judge was assigned elsewhere. These events were brought to the attention of the trial judge on the morning of trial. Black contends he attempted to accept the plea agreement and plead guilty to the lesser offense on the morning of trial but the court refused to accept the plea agreement because it was "too late." Black argued in the motion that the trial court should set aside the jury verdict and allow him to enter a guilty plea pursuant to the plea agreement.
On March 23, 2001 the court denied Black's motion and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years on the burglary charge, and a concurrent indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years on the assault while participating in a felony charge. The court determined the assault merged with the burglary conviction.
Black appeals his conviction alleging (1) the court abused its discretion, pursuant to State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001), by not allowing him to accept the plea agreement on the morning of trial based solely on the fact the court-imposed deadline for submission of a plea agreement had passed, (2) the court erred in not granting his motion for new trial based on the State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. MERITS
We review a decision of the district court to reject a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2001). In Hager our supreme court determined a fixed policy should not be followed in rejecting plea agreements. Id. at 834. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the terms of a plea agreement solely because it was presented after the deadline for pleas set by the court. Id. at 837. The plea deadline policy was an unwritten rule implemented by the judges. Id. at 832 n. 3. "A missed plea deadline, alone, will not support the refusal to accept a plea agreement. There must be additional reasons." Id. at 837. "The benefits of strict adherence to plea deadlines do not outweigh the need for judges to exercise discretion, the deference to the discretion of prosecutors, and the rights of the defendant." Id.
Certain proceedings and discussions with the trial judge were apparently not reported and we find no explicit statement by the trial judge himself as to why he rejected Black's attempt to tender a guilty plea on the morning of trial. However, certain documents and statements by counsel and by the court clearly and convincingly demonstrate the rejection was based on a fixed policy of not accepting plea agreements after a deadline set by the court.
First, the court's pretrial order provides that no plea, except an open plea to the charges as filed, would be entertained on the day of trial. The order makes no provision for a "good cause" exception and thus strongly suggests an inflexible policy identical to the policy involved in the unwritten rule rejected in Hager. Second, in his motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict Black asserted, "On Monday morning [the morning of trial] the Court refused to accept the plea agreement, as the Court said it was too late." Third, in its resistance to Black's motion, in discussing events occurring prior to jury selection on the morning of trial the State appears to acknowledge timing was the critical factor, noting the trial court declined to accept guilty pleas to lesser offenses "at that time." Fourth, during oral arguments on the motions, in discussing the trial court's morning-of-trial refusal to consider a plea agreement, Black's counsel argued that, "I think this court made it clear . . . that because we waited until Monday morning, that it would not be allowed . . ." Fifth, during the State's argument in resistance to Black's motion for new trial the prosecutor stated,
I assume he [Black] was advised of the local rule, and Mr. Dusthimer is well aware of the local rule, that you have to plead before the morning of trial normally, and of course the acceptance of a plea would also be within the discretion of the Court. I find it hard to believe that the plea was rejected because there was a jury sitting there. It was rejected, because he waited too long to enter the plea and attempted to do it the morning of trial.
(Emphasis added). Finally, following argument and before ruling on the motion the trial judge secured the agreement of Black's counsel and counsel for a co-defendant that no rule required he approve the plea agreement the Friday before trial because he was the trial judge the following Monday, and the plea agreement could have been presented to another judge the Friday before trial.
These numerous portions of the record clearly and convincingly demonstrate that an unwritten plea deadline policy existed which was implemented by the judges and Black's plea was rejected because it was tendered to the court after the deadline set by the local policy. The trial court "strictly adhered to the deadline and refused to consider the individual pressures and indecision" faced by Black. See Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 836. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to entertain a guilty plea solely because it was tendered after the deadline set by the local plea deadline policy. See id. at 837.
We note the trial court could not have been aware of our supreme court's holding in Hager, as the opinion in Hager was not filed until several months after the trial court declined to entertain the guilty plea from Black and overruled his post-trial motions in this case.
III. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
The supreme court's holding and disposition in Hager are determinative and controlling here. We reverse Black's conviction and remand the case to the district court with directions to consider Black's request to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to the terms of the plea bargain offered prior to trial. In exercising discretion to accept or reject the plea, the court may not refuse the plea for the sole reason that it was tendered after the plea deadline set by the local policy. Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not address Black's remaining issues on appeal.
We recognize that here, as in Hager, the complete terms of the plea agreement may not be clear in the existing record, and an issue may arise on remand as to those terms or perhaps even as to the existence of a complete agreement. However, the record as a whole makes it clear that the State was not opposed to resolving the case by plea agreement on the eve of trial, or even the morning of trial. Thus, even if the parties never formalized all the details of the plea agreement before presenting it to the court on the morning of trial, Black suffered prejudice by the court's refusal to entertain a plea based solely on self-imposed time constraints because the trial court's decision denied him the opportunity to finalize the plea agreement with the State. See id. at 837 n. 5. However, if the parties are unable to reach a plea agreement on remand, the district court shall schedule the case for a new trial. See id. at 837.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.