Opinion
No. 3-711 / 02-1250
Filed November 17, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J. Dull, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals OWI conviction challenging the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. AFFIRMED.
Robert Deck, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Darin Raymond, County Attorney, Amy Oetken, Assistant County Attorney, and Marti Sleister, Prosecuting Intern, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Paul John Bindner appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI) challenging the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
Background Facts. Bindner was tried and convicted of OWI based on his arrest on January 11, 2000. The conviction was reversed on appeal, State v. Bindner, No. 01-0064 (Iowa Ct.App. March 27, 2002), and Bindner was granted a new trial. During the second trial, Bindner made a motion for judgment of acquittal after the close of the State's evidence. Bindner alleged that the State had failed to prove the year the offense took place. The district court denied the motion, and Bindner proceeded to present his case. Bindner renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal before the case was submitted to the jury; it was again denied. Bindner was convicted of OWI and now appeals.
Scope of Review. Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. A guilty verdict will be binding on appeal so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is found when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Discussion. Bindner argues that because the State did not specify the accurate year of the offense, the State failed to establish all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that the date of commission is not a material element of the offense requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor questioned several witnesses as to the date of the offense, January 11, but did not indicate which year. After the close of the State's case, Bindner made his motion for directed verdict and the court overruled it. The district court stated that he had mentioned the date of the alleged offense in the statement of the case given to the jury at the onset of the proceedings. The court further stated it was unsure that failure to mention the year was even defective. Bindner then presented his case, during which the State asked Bindner on cross-examination if he had been driving the vehicle on January 11, 2002. Bindner responded affirmatively; however, the offense did not occur in 2002, but rather 2000.
Every essential element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and we will not allow a finding of guilt to stand where there is an absence of proof on an essential element of the crime charged. State v. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 1969) (citing State v. Wimbush, 260 Iowa 1262, 1264, 150 N.W.2d 653, 654 (1967); State v. Stodola, 257 Iowa 863, 865, 134 N.W.2d 920, 921 (1965)). Not all factual showings required of the State must meet this rigorous standard, however; occasionally a preponderance of evidence suffices. State v. Allen, 293 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1980) (holding venue was not an essential element of the crime).
The jury was instructed as follows:
The State must prove both of the following elements of Operating While Intoxicated:
1. On or about the 11th day of January, 2000, the defendant operated a motor vehicle.
2. At that time the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
If the State has proved both of the elements, the defendant is guilty. If the State has failed to prove either of the elements, the defendant is not guilty.
Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a) (1999) provides, "[a] person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in this state . . . [w]hile under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a combination of such substances." Thus, the offense of operating while intoxicated consists of two essential elements: (1) the operation of a motor vehicle (2) while under the influence of alcohol. Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a); see also State v. Boleyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Iowa 1996). The code does not require specifying the date of the occurrence but rather the critical temporal finding is that the person was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Substantial evidence supported this finding. If this were a challenge to the statute of limitations, the exact date of the offense would be critical. State v. Howard, 273 N.W. 849, 850 (Iowa 1937). However, Bindner did not challenge the statute of limitations in his motion for judgment of acquittal, in the renewed motion, or on appeal. Because the year of the crime is not an essential element of OWI, we affirm the district court's denial of Bindner's motion for judgment of acquittal.