Opinion
No.2020-K-01061
12-08-2020
STATE of Louisiana v. Brandon BELL-BRAYBOY
Writ application denied.
Johnson, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., would grant.
McCallum, J., recused.
Johnson, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons: The defendant was pulled over by a Louisiana State Police trooper and detained after the vehicle he was driving eastbound on I-20 crossed the fog line from the right hand lane of the highway. The trooper determined that the defendant's vehicle was not reported stolen and that he had no prior criminal convictions or outstanding warrants. Nevertheless, the trooper allegedly suspected that the defendant was engaged in drug activity. Consequently, after completing the initial traffic stop, he detained the defendant for 22 minutes to await the arrival of a drug sniff dog. After the dog arrived and then alerted, troopers searched the car and located heroin and cocaine hidden in the back panels. The defendant immediately explained his apparently limited role in transporting the narcotics and offered to perform a controlled delivery in Atlanta, where he was being paid to deliver the car. But the agents "just couldn't get everything together." State v. Bell-Brayboy , 53, 413 at *9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20) (on r'hg). So instead this defendant was arrested and subsequently prosecuted by federal authorities.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that the search of the vehicle Mr. Bell-Brayboy was driving violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and, consequently, excluded the evidence obtained from it, resulting in the dismissal of federal charges against the defendant. State authorities nevertheless pursued charges against this defendant based on the same evidence suppressed by the federal court. In the course of those proceedings—in response to the defendant's motion to suppress—the State presented testimony from the same trooper, but with more explanation of his experience and training in narcotics enforcement and with more detailed explanations for his suspicion that the defendant was transporting narcotics. Apparently on the basis of the trooper's additional reasons for his suspicion, the court of appeal found the same evidence excluded by the federal court to be admissible in state court.
In the courts below, the State offered no additional circumstances to justify the officer's suspicion than those already considered, and found insufficient, by the federal court. Therefore I would grant the writ and reverse the court of appeal.
Supreme Court precedent instructs that "[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the [traffic] stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectual th[at] purpose’ " and "[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Rodriguez v. U.S. , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) and U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ). The Fourth Amendment prohibits any detention beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation unless there is reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 358, 135 S.Ct. 1609.
The State has merely offered, and the court of appeal accepted, additional reasons that the trooper found the facts of the encounter suspicious enough to detain the defendant past the initial traffic stop. But none of those reasons change the basic premise of the federal district court's decision, which found that each of those circumstances could also have an innocuous explanation. It is of no moment that "[n]one of the trooper's suspicions were shown to be incorrect." Bell-Brayboy , 53, 413, ––– So.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1035959, at *4. It is axiomatic that no Fourth Amendment violation is justified by the ends reached. I agree with the reasons given by Judge Stevens in dissent in the court below:
In this case, Officer Strickland had a "hunch" that the Defendant was participating in an illegal activity. However, as accurate as that intuition may have been, it cannot and does not serve as grounds to suspend one's constitutional rights. Likewise, hunches cannot become the grounds for contriving suspicious activities where none actually exist.
Frankly, the most clearly suspicious activity engaged in by the Defendant was the assertion of his constitutional right to refuse the search. It is quite ironic that asserting your constitutional right will cause you to forfeit that right. I cannot and will not condone the legal premise that asserting one's constitutional rights somehow serves as grounds to deprive a person of that right.
I am thoroughly convinced that the Federal Court, as well as the original panel, was correct in its exclusion of the evidence. I would grant the motion to suppress.
State v. Bell-Brayboy , 53, 413, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1035959, at *29 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2020). For these reasons, I would grant defendant's writ application.