ce, 852; 72 A.L.R. 579. As to the cross examination conductedby the solicitor, and the argument made by him, being improperand prejudicial and precluding defendant from receivinga fair and impartial trial: 216 S.C. 44, 56 S.E.2d 736; 207 S.C. 126, 35 S.E.2d 38; 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559; 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409-421; 210 S.C. 481, 43 S.E.2d 360; 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163; 201 S.C. 519; 163 S.C. 295, 161 S.E. 498. As to theSupreme Court taking notice of any error apparent on therecord affecting substantially the rights of the accused, eventhough not made a ground of appeal: 174 S.C. 295, 177 S.E. 375; 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 210 S.C. 487, 43 S.E.2d 360; 191 S.C. 1, 3 S.E.2d 257; 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 164. Mr. Robert W. Hemphill, Solicitor, of Chester, for Respondent, cites: As to the sentence imposed by trial judgebeing power and not excessive and appellate court has nopower to reduce: 158 S.E. 685, 160 S.C. 301; 215 S.C. 450, 55 S.E.2d 785; 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273, 277; 54 S.E.2d 900, 215 S.C. 315; 59 S.E.2d 168, 216 S.C. 579, 71 S.Ct. 78; 127 S.C. 116, 120 S.E. 490; 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532; 216 S.C. 552, 59 S.E.2d 155; 100 S.C. 77, 84 S.E. 304. As to trial judgeproperly excluding hypothetical questions as asked by defendant'scounsel: 187 S.C. 334, 197 S.E. 398, 400; 32 C.J.S. 347; 192 N.E. 378, 489 Ohio App. 71; 162 S.C. 509, 161 S.E. 177, 185. As to trial judge properly admittingin evidence the photographs of the scene of the crime: 201 S.C. 403, 23 S.E.2d 387, 390; 46 S.C. 55, 24 S.E. 60; 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503, 139 A.L.R. 1171; 159 A.L.R. 1413; 179 Va. 359, 19 S.E.2d 69, 140 A.L.R. 527; (Fla.) 83 So. 513, 8 A.L.R. 1034. As to non-expertwitness, not having testified to any relevant facts. having noright to give opinion testimony: 20 Am. Jur. 714, Evidence, Sec. 853; 158 Wn. 504, 291 P. 1093, 72 A.L.R. 571; 357 Ill. 117, 191 N.E. 268, 93 A.L.R. 1041. As to duty onsolicitor to prosecute vigorously: 218 S.C. 106, 62 S.E.2d 101, 106, 107; 163 S.C. 295, 161 S.E. 496, 498.

March 10, 1952.Mr. N. Welch Morrisette, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellant, cites: As to the circumstances of the individual case beingdeterminative as to whether or not the punishment is excessive: 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 272. Mr. T.P. Taylor, Solicitor, of Columbia, for Respondent.

ppellant spent in Georgia while contesting extradictionfrom Georgia to South Carolina when Appellant was beingheld in Georgia solely because of a South Carolina detainer: 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 1995 (5); 11 Mich. App. 69, 160 N.W.2d 629; 272 Sec. 333; New York Penal Law Section 2193; 96 N.Y.S.2d 749; 43 Misc.2d 131, 250 N.Y.S.2d 145; 21 A.D.2d 490, N.Y.S.2d 107; 207 A. Super. 443, 217 A.2d 772; 82 C.J.S. Statutes Section 321; 84 S.Ct. 1697, 378 U.S. 347, 122 L.Ed.2d 894; 82 C.J.S. Statutes, Section 389; 258 S.C. 163, 187 S.E.2d 654. As to errorin sentencing Appellant to a term of five (5) years for grandlarceny and housebreaking when both of the Co-defendantscharged with the same offenses were sentenced at the sametime to only three (3) years each: 24 B.C.J.S. Criminal Law Sect. 1980; 171 S.E.2d 159; Ledbetter and Myers, Criminal Defense in South Carolina Errata p. 10 (1970); 16 S.E.2d 532; 159 S.C. 165, 156 S.E. 353; 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793; 221 S.C. 175, 69 S.E.2d 915; 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 69 Ill. App.2d 188, 215 N.E.2d 854; 27 91 Ill. App.2d 179, 234 N.E.2d 171. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Robert M. Ariail,Asst. Atty. Gen., and Joseph R. Barker, Staff Atty., of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the trial Court's beingcorrect in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict: 255 S.C. 86, 177 S.E.2d 464; Section 753 (1); Criminal Law, South Carolina Digest. As to the trial Court's beingcorrect in refusing to give Appellant credit on his sentencefor pre-conviction jail time which Appellant spent inGeorgia while contesting extradiction to this State: Section 55-11 of the South Carolina Code of Laws of 1962, as amended; 96 N.Y.S.2d 749; 43 Misc.2d 131, 250 N.Y.S.2d 145; 11 Mich. App. 69, 150 N.W.2d 629; 272 So.2d 333; 207 A. Super 443, 217 A.2d 772; Section 1216(1) Criminal Law, Decennial Digests. As to the trial Court's acting properly within its discretionin sentencing Appellant to a term of five years for grandlarceny and housebreaking: 222 S.C. 108,

May 24, 1971.Laughlin McDonald, Esq., of Columbia, for Appellant, cites: As to the procedure in South Carolina for sentencingmisdemeanants for crimes for which the legislature has setno maximum penalty being arbitrary and irrational and inviolation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendmentof the Constitution of the United States and Article 1,Sections 5 and 19 of the Constitution of South Carolina: Section 16-632, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; Section 17-553, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962; 179 S.E.2d 227; 86 S.C. 367, 68 S.E. 633; 89 F. Supp. 62; 378 U.S. 347; 333 U.S. 483, 495; 145 F.2d 643; 267 Fed. 529; 143 S.C. 347, 141 S.E. 610; 107 S.C. 349, 92 S.E. 1054; 21 Brooklyn L. Rev. 2; 20 S.C. 363; 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 215 S.C. 314, 54 S.E.2d 901; Ledbetter and Myers, Criminal Defense in South Carolina, 1970, p. 170; 60 J. of Crim. L., 182; Vand. L. Rev. 671; 37 Colum. L. Rev. 521; 32 F.R.D. 245, 275, 319; 356 U.S. 165, 188; 355 U.S. 66, 75-76; 352 U.S. 385; 330 U.S. 258; 334 U.S. 736; 334 U.S. at 741; 389 U.S. 129; 115 S.C. 233, 105 S.E. 349; 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273; eighth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Sec. 19 South Carolina Constitution; 235 S.C. 11, 109 S.E.2d 715; 217 U.S. 349; 304 F.2d 520; 269 F.2d 39; 262 F.2d 687; 356 U.S. 86; 356 U.S. 44, 375 U.S. 889; 267 F.2d 453; 307 F.2d 193; 278 F.2d 500, 503; 195 F.2d 583, 605; 344 U.S. 838; 32 F.R.D. 249, 319; 46 A.B.J.A. 139; 367 U.S. 643; 391 U.S. 145; 351 U.S. 12; 384 U.S. 486; 60 J. of Crim. L. 182, 183. As to insufficient evidence from which the jury couldfind that appellant knew a certain TV set had been stolenand bought or have received it with the intent to deprivethe owner of his property: Section 1

As to Trial Court's properly failing to quash this indictment: Section 17-402, 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina; 221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410; 162 S.C. 509, 161 S.E. 177; 106 S.C. 220, 91 S.E. 3; 245 S.C. 550, 141 S.E.2d 818; 247 S.C. 34, 145 S.E.2d 434; 248 S.C. 227, 148 S.E.2d 598; 252 S.C. 36, 165 S.E.2d 72; 215 S.C. 387, 55 S.E.2d 343; 232 S.C. 489, 102 S.E.2d 873. As to the Trial Court's not abusing its discretionin sentencing this Defendant to an eighteen-month (18) period ofconfinement for a first offense: Section 32-1510.3 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina, as amended; 251 S.C. 592, 164 S.E.2d 760; 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 242 S.C. 193, 130 S.E.2d 481. Messrs.

As to an unfavorable inference notarising because of the failure of a party to call a witnesswho is equally available to the other party: 29 Am. Jur.2d 226, Sec. 180; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 144; 226 S.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d 873; 249 S.C. 80, 152 S.E.2d 684; 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545; 135 A.L.R. 1375; 253 S.C. 468, 171 S.E.2d 717; 151 N.W.2d 505; 111 So.2d 627. As to the sentenceimposed not being cruel or unusual punishment: 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793; 212 S.C. 150, 46 S.E.2d 693; 137 S.C. 364, 135 S.E. 360; 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 221 S.C. 175, 69 S.E.2d 915; 225 S.C. 267, 82 S.E.2d 63; 245 S.C. 362, 140 S.E.2d 597; 251 S.C. 593, 164 S.E.2d 760. June 16, 1970.

This court has repeatedly held that it has no jurisdiction on appeal to correct a sentence alleged to be excessive when it is within the limits prescribed by law for the discretion of the trial judge, and is not the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive. Statev. Bell, 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900, and State v. Bass, 242 S.C. 193, 130 S.E.2d 481. The forty year sentence was imposed pursuant to Section 16-72 of the Code, and being within the limits of its provisions, this court is without authority to change the sentence. The exceptions of the appellant are overruled and the judgment below is,

July 26, 1955.John M. Schofield, Esq., of Walhalla, for Appellant, cites: As to the sentence imposed in this case being so severe asto violate the constitutional ban forbidding cruel and unusualpunishment: (S.C.) 54 S.E.2d 901; 212 S.C. 150, 46 S.E.2d 693; 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273. Rufus Fant, Esq., Solicitor, of Anderson, for Respondent, cites: As to punishment imposed not being cruel orunusual: 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d 802; 224 S.C. 546, 90 S.E.2d 239; 221 S.C. 175, 69 S.E.2d 915; 215 S.C. 314, 54 S.E.2d 901; 215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900; 209 S.C. 108, 39 S.E.2d 197; 193 S.C. 273, 8 S.E.2d 626; 187 S.C. 271, 198 S.E. 310; 185 S.C. 296, 194 S.E. 21; 137 S.C. 365, 135 S.E. 361; 137 S.C. 364, 135 S.E. 360; 88 S.C. 229, 70 S.E. 811; 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d 822; 159 S.C. 165, 156 S.E. 353; 68 S.C. 192, 47 S.E. 55; 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793; 227 S.C. 150, 46 S.E.2d 693. John M. Schofield, Esq., of Walhalla, for Appellant,in reply.

Mr. George W. Keels, of Florence, for Appellant, cites: As to a trial judge, in the absence of statutory authority,having no right to ask a recommendation of the jury as tolength of sentence to be imposed: 15 Am. Jur. 160; 77 A.L. R. 1199; 345 Ill. 142; 21 Okla. 40; 53 Am. Jur. 243; Wharton on Homicide (3rd. Ed.) 1054, Sec. 660; 210 S.C. 495; 79 S.C. 139. Messrs. J. Reuben Long, Solicitor, and Frank A. Thompson, of Conway, for Respondent, cite: As to a sentence,within limits prescribed by law for discretion of trial judge,being beyond the power of Appellant Court to upset: 54 S.E.2d 900, 215 S.C. 311; 59 S.E.2d 168, 216 S.C. 579. As to right of Trial Judge to seek enlightenment by anyreasonable means before passing sentence: 79 S.C. 139, 60 S.E. 434; 43 S.E.2d 449. November 7, 1951.

Constitution of 1895, Art. I, Sec. 19. We have dealt with this question of excessive sentences in two very recent cases: State v. Bell, S.C. 54 S.E.2d 900; and State v. Phillips, S.C. 54 S.E.2d 901, which cite many other cases where the principle is fully discussed. This court has repeatedly held that it has no jurisdiction on appeal to correct a sentence alleged to be excessive when it is within the limits prescribed by law for the discretion of the trial judge, and is not the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive.