State v. Bell

52 Citing cases

  1. State v. Powell

    120 Idaho 707 (Idaho 1991)   Cited 10 times
    In Powell, we explained that "[a]lthough the evidence received in each proceeding may be very similar, the issues for which that evidence is offered as proof [may] differ significantly."

    In such instances a liberal practice in the admission of evidence is followed in this state, supported, as it is, with a presumption on appeal that the trial judge, knowing the applicable rules of evidence, will not consider matters which are inadmissible when making his findings. State v. Bell, [ 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962)], supra. And, in non-jury proceedings a new trial ordinarily will not be granted for error in the admission of evidence, if there remains substantial admissible evidence to otherwise support the trial court's findings.

  2. State v. Read

    106 Wn. App. 138 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 5 times

    In such instances a liberal practice in the admission of evidence is followed in this state, supported, as it is, with a presumption on appeal that the trial judge, knowing the applicable rules of evidence, will not consider matters which are inadmissible when making his findings. State v. Bell, [ 59 Wn.2d 338, 352, 368 P.2d 177, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962)]. And, in nonjury proceedings a new trial ordinarily will not be granted for error in the admission of evidence, if there remains substantial admissible evidence to otherwise support the trial court's findings.

  3. State v. Gower

    179 Wn. 2d 851 (Wash. 2014)   Cited 49 times
    Holding inapplicable the presumption that judges do not rely on inadmissible evidence when a trial judge actually considers inadmissible evidence in their findings (citing State v. Read , 147 Wash.2d 238, 245-46, 53 P.3d 26 (2002) )

    The presumption is based on the notion that the trial judge knows and applies the law, even if he or she did not recite the particular legal rule at the time; it is “a presumption on appeal that the trial judge, knowing the applicable rules of evidence, will not consider matters which are inadmissible when making his [or her] findings.” State v. Miles, 77 Wash.2d 593, 601, 464 P.2d 723 (1970) (citing State v. Bell, 59 Wash.2d 338, 352, 368 P.2d 177 (1962)). ¶ 8 The Read presumption is, therefore, inapplicable when the judge actually “consider[ed] matters which are inadmissible when making his [or her] findings.

  4. State v. Hayes

    108 Wn. 2d 344 (Wash. 1987)   Cited 5 times

    Washington legislation with an invalid emergency clause takes effect when standard legislation takes effect, provided that the passage procedures of standard legislation are followed in all other respects. We indicated that an invalid emergency clause does not void a statute ab initio and merely delays the time of taking effect in State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 355, 368 P.2d 177, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962). The plaintiff in Bell challenged the emergency appointment of a special prosecutor.

  5. State v. Adams

    91 Wn. 2d 86 (Wash. 1978)   Cited 116 times
    Finding nothing unduly suggestive about the photomontage where all the black and white photos showed men with small amount of facial hair and facial scars

    But it must be remembered that this was a trial to the court. It can safely be assumed that the trial court judge recognized the questions for what they were and disregarded any improper material produced thereby in reaching a decision. See State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962). Thus, under our present standard, even if defense counsel's conduct could be criticized as inadequate (and we do not think it can be), it would be harmless error because appellant suffered no actual prejudice.

  6. In re Harbert

    85 Wn. 2d 719 (Wash. 1975)   Cited 60 times
    Holding that hearsay was admissible at decline hearing, that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply in this kind of hearing," and that due process was satisfied by the opportunity to inspect the report prior to the hearing and to obtain controverting evidence or witnesses

    In Washington, a trial judge is presumed to know the rules of evidence and is presumed to have considered only the evidence properly before the court, and for proper purposes. State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818, 9 L.Ed.2d 59, 83 S.Ct. 34 (1962); State v. Jefferson, 74 Wn.2d 787, 446 P.2d 971 (1968). For the purpose of the hearing on declination, the plaque was properly admitted.

  7. Hanson v. Seattle

    80 Wn. 2d 242 (Wash. 1972)   Cited 20 times

    We disagree. It may be considered in pari materia with the other pension acts in determining the legislative purpose of pension legislation. See Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968); State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818, 88 S.Ct. 34 (1962); Seattle v. State, 54 Wn.2d 139, 338 P.2d 126 (1959). From an examination of the foregoing pension and retirement acts, we believe it is inherent that the benefits, as related to dependent surviving children of a deceased employee covered under the particular system, have the objectives and purposes as stated in the policy statement of the 1969 act. [4] The law is well established that pension legislation must be liberally construed most strongly in favor of the beneficiaries.

  8. Hoppe v. State

    78 Wn. 2d 164 (Wash. 1970)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that where appellant referred only to newspaper articles and an undated motel rate schedule, he had presented no authoritative facts of which the court could properly take judicial notice

    Where possible the court should attempt to harmonize statutes pertaining to the same subject and give effect to each. State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962), and cases cited therein. The statutory sections should be considered as units of a total scheme so that the integrity of each is maintained.

  9. State v. Chapman

    469 P.2d 883 (Wash. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    [2] Upon this state of the record we will not substitute our evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses nor overturn amply supported findings of fact entered by the trial court. State v. Sawyer, 72 Wn.2d 410, 433 P.2d 213 (1967); Davis v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 496, 413 P.2d 654 (1966); State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 368 P.2d 177 (1962). The judgment is affirmed.

  10. State v. Miles

    77 Wn. 2d 593 (Wash. 1970)   Cited 98 times
    Finding presumption that judge in a bench trial did not consider inadmissible evidence

    We pass for the moment appellant's third and fourth assignments of error, and turn to his fifth assignment which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of guilt as to the charge of rape with respect to Cornelia Smith. In State v. Bell, 59 Wn.2d 338, 352, 368 P.2d 177 (1962), we stated: The trial court, in a criminal case (where a jury has been waived), has the duty of evaluating the testimony of the various witnesses where there is a conflict and of making findings of fact.