Opinion
C.A. Case No. 00CA0049, T.C. Case No. 99CR528, 00CR77.
September 7, 2001.
Stephen A. Schumaker, Pros. Attorney; David E. Smith, Asst. Pros. Attorney, 50 East Columbia Street, Springfield, Ohio 45502, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jon Paul Rion, P.O. Box 1262, Dayton, Ohio 45402, Atty. Reg. No. 0067020, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Defendant, Michael Beckett, appeals from his conviction and sentence for the murder of Christopher Dodds.
On June 6, 1999, Christopher Dodds and Brad Miller were at a softball tournament at Municipal Stadium in Springfield. Defendant, Michael Beckett, his brother, Rick Beckett, and Rick's wife, Sarah Beckett, were there also. An argument broke out between Rick Beckett and Brad Miller. The argument was witnessed by Defendant, by Sarah Beckett, and by Sarah's friend, Dalynn Gill. After the argument, the Becketts drove off in their car.
Shortly thereafter all three Becketts returned to the game on foot. Rick Beckett and Brad Miller then began fighting. Miller testified that he saw Defendant Michael Beckett "sucker punch" Christopher Dodds. Witnesses testified that they saw a man on top of Dodds, hitting him, and that a friend of Dodds struck that man on the head with a beer bottle. Other witnesses testified that they saw a man stab Dodds and then run into some nearby trees.
One witness testified that Defendant Michael Beckett looked like the man who had stabbed Dodds. A witness who saw Defendant emerge from the trees testified that Defendant was bleeding from the forehead. Rick Beckett also testified that when he located Defendant Michael Beckett after the fight with Brad Miller, Defendant was bleeding profusely from the forehead. As Dodds was being treated by medics, Sarah Beckett told Dalynn Gill that Defendant Michael Beckett "just stabbed that kid in the neck."
Later that same day Defendant flew to Camp Pendleton in California, where he was stationed in the Marine Corps. Agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Services interviewed Defendant at the request of Springfield police. During his second interview Defendant admitted that he was involved in an altercation with another man and may have stabbed him in the neck with a piece of glass. A DNA test of Defendant's socks revealed blood from the victim, Christopher Dodds. Some two months after the attack, Christopher Dodds died from his stab wounds., Defendant Michael Beckett was indicted in Case No. 99-CR-528 on one count of murder, purposely causing Dodds' death, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A). Subsequently, Defendant was indicted in Case No. 00CR77 on one count of murder, causing Dodds' death as a proximate result of committing felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). The two cases were consolidated for trial. Prior to trial Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to investigators. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Defendant's motion to suppress.
A jury trial commenced on June 5, 2000, after which the jury found Defendant not guilty of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), but guilty of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). The trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years to life imprisonment., Defendant has timely appealed to this court from his conviction and sentence.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS SUPPRESSED, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THOSE STATEMENTS WERE INVOLUNTARY.The evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrates that at the request of Springfield police, agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Services interviewed Defendant at Camp Pendleton, California, regarding the stabbing of Christopher Dodds. The first interview took place on June 8, 1999, and began around 4:45 p.m. Agent Proffitt first advised Defendant of his rights, which Defendant acknowledged that he understood and agreed to waive. Agents Proffitt and Haney then questioned Defendant for approximately four hours, from 5:00 p.m. until shortly before 9:00 p.m. At that time Defendant's barracks were searched with his permission, and articles of his clothing were collected., Defendant was released following this first interview. Defendant had admitted during the interview that he was at the softball game on June 6, 1999, at Springfield Municipal Stadium, and that he had been drinking. Defendant stated that he didn't remember being involved in a fight. Defendant indicated that he saw a fight break out, and when he tried to walk around it he was hit in the head with a beer bottle, and then he walked home. A second interview of Defendant was conducted on June 14, 1999. This interview lasted approximately eight hours, beginning around 1:00 p.m. and ending around 9:00 p.m. There were several breaks during that interview. Agent Proffitt once again began this interview by advising Defendant of his rights, which Defendant acknowledged he understood and waived. Agents Proffitt and Haney once again questioned Defendant about the stabbing of Christopher Dodds. After two and one-half hours a break was taken. Agent Proffitt left and Agent Humenansky, who had spoken to some of Defendant's fellow marines, took over the questioning. During this second interview Defendant was confronted with information obtained from his fellow marines regarding what Defendant had told them about the incident. Defendant was also told that the victim's DNA would be on his clothing. Although no tests had yet been performed on Defendant's clothing, subsequent tests did reveal the victim's blood on Defendant's socks. The interrogators urged Defendant to tell the truth in order to fulfill his duties as a marine. They also told Defendant that witnesses interviewed in Springfield had indicated that he was involved in this incident. Eventually, Defendant admitted that he had been involved in a fight with a man at the ballpark and may have jammed a sharp object, possibly glass, into that man's neck. Whether an accused's confession was voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment presents a question of law. An appellate court reviews that issue de novo , not being bound by the trial court's judgment on the same legal issue. The appellate court must give strong deference to the trial court's findings of the facts which underlie a claim of involuntariness. Here, the trial court made no findings of fact when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. While Defendant admits that he was "Mirandized" before each interview and that he waived his rights, administration of the Miranda warnings do not foreclose a further inquiry whether a defendant's will was overborne by the subsequent interrogation that produced his confession. Dickerson v. United States, (2000), 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405. The focus of that inquiry is whether police overreaching during the interrogation process was such as to overbear the defendant's will to resist and bring about a confession which is involuntary because it was not freely self-determined. Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515; 93 L.Ed. 473; State v. Edwards, (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31. A suspect's decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is made voluntarily absent evidence that his will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct. State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 555; State v. Petitjean (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 517. Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71. The voluntary nature of a defendant's statement is determined from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597; State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460. A confession is involuntary if, on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding his giving of the confession. Dickerson v. United States, supra; Petitjean, supra .
The totality of the circumstances test takes into consideration both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Petitjean, supra . Factors to be considered include the age, mentality and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement. State v. Edwards, supra . Use of deceit by the interrogating police officers and misrepresentations made to the suspect about the evidence police possess do not per se render a confession involuntary . Rather, it is but one factor bearing on voluntariness. State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20., Defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances surrounding his giving of a confession constitute coercive police conduct which overborne his will to resist, rendering his statements involuntary. We disagree., Defendant's primary complaint is that the interrogation sessions were unduly long in duration. The first interview on June 8, 1999, lasted approximately four hours. The second interview, conducted almost one week later on June 14, 1999, lasted eight hours. There were, however, several breaks taken during that interview. Defendant never exercised his rights during that June 14th interview by refusing to answer further questions, requesting that the interrogation cease, or asking to be provided with counsel. The length of the interrogation is only one factor to consider in determining voluntariness of a confession, Edwards, supra , and interrogations lasting seven hours have been upheld. State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275. Additionally, although Defendant complains that the small, windowless interview room was cramped, there is no evidence in this record that supports a finding that Defendant was intimidated by his surroundings., Defendant also complains because Naval investigators deceived him about the evidence they possessed. Investigators told Defendant that the victim's DNA would be on his clothing. However, no such tests had yet been performed. Misrepresentations made to a suspect about the strength of the evidence police possess do not per se render a confession involuntary. Rather, it is but one factor to consider bearing upon voluntariness. State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71. Subsequent tests performed on Defendant's clothing revealed that the victim's blood was on Defendant's socks. Though the agents were unaware of that fact when they questioned Defendant, their statements in that regard were not misrepresentations of fact., Defendant further complains that the Naval investigators falsely told him that witnesses interviewed by police in Springfield indicated that he was involved in this stabbing incident. The record does not demonstrate that those representations were false. The testimony of some of the witnesses does implicate Defendant in this crime., Defendant also asserts that it was improper for Naval investigators to admonish him to tell the truth and do the right thing in order to fulfill his duty as a Marine. While we disapprove of conveying to Defendant the notion that he had an obligation or duty to waive his Fifth Amendment right because as a Marine he was expected to live up to their code of honor, general admonitions to a suspect to tell the truth, which is what this record demonstrates, are neither threats nor inducements and do not render a confession involuntary. State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61.
The record demonstrates that prior to each interview Defendant was fully advised of his rights, he acknowledged that he understood those rights, and he agreed to waive his rights and speak with investigators. At no time during either of Defendant's interviews did he invoke his rights to terminate the interrogation. There is no evidence that Defendant was physically restrained, threatened, abused, deprived of necessities, promised anything, or intimidated by his interrogators. On the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the giving of Defendant's statements, we conclude that Defendant's will to resist confessing was not overborne by coercive police conduct. Therefore, Defendant's statements to investigators were not involuntary, and the trial court properly overruled his motion to suppress those statements.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING A STATEMENT AS AN "EXCITED UTTERANCE" HEARSAY EXCEPTION., Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted, over his objection, hearsay evidence of a statement made by his sister-in-law, Sarah Beckett, shortly after the stabbing occurred that "Mike just stabbed that kid in the neck." The trial court admitted this statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2).Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter resting within the trial court's sound discretion, and its decision in such matters will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173. An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of law or an error in judgment. It implies an arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court. State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151.
Evid.R. 803(2), which codifies the common law hearsay exception for spontaneous exclamations, provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
* * *
Excited utterance . A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
In State v. Duncan (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 215, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the requirements for admitting a statement under this hearsay exception:
Testimony as to a statement or declaration may be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations where the trial judge reasonably finds (a) that there was some occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement in the declarant, which was sufficient to still his reflective faculties and thereby make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs, and thus render his statement or declarations spontaneous and unreflective, (b) that the statement or declaration, even if not strictly contemporaneous with its exciting cause, was made before there had been time for such nervous excitement to lose a domination over his reflective faculties, so that such domination continued to remain sufficient to make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs, (c) that the statement or declaration related to such startling occurrence or the circumstances of such startling occurrence, and (d) that the declarant had an opportunity to observe personally the matters asserted in his statement or declaration. (Paragraph two of the syllabus in Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140, approved and followed.)
Syllabus.
Dalynn Gill testified at trial that she was at the softball game and had been in the company of the Becketts, but left before the stabbing occurred. When Gill heard about the stabbing she immediately returned to the softball field. Upon arrival, Gill observed paramedics loading Christopher Dodds into the ambulance. A short distance away Gill encountered Sarah Beckett, Defendant's sister-in-law. Gill testified that Sarah Beckett was hysterical, shaking and crying, and could barely stand up. Beckett had blood on her shirt. When Gill asked Sarah Beckett what had happened, Beckett kept repeating, "Mike just stabbed that kid in the neck." When Gill asked "with what," Beckett responded over and over, "with his fist." As she said this Sarah Beckett repeatedly gestured with her hand, making a downward stabbing motion., Defendant argues that Sarah Beckett's statement does not qualify for admission as an excited utterance because the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Beckett personally observed the startling event she related in her statement. We disagree.
The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that prior to the stabbing Sarah Beckett was at the softball field where the stabbing occurred with Defendant and her husband. Shortly after the stabbing occurred, while medics were still tending to the victim, Sarah Beckett was at the scene. She had blood on her clothing and she was hysterical, crying, shaking, and barely able to stand. The intensity of Sarah Beckett's emotional state strongly suggests that she had just witnessed a startling event. Moreover, as Sarah Beckett was explaining to Dalynn Gill what had happened, saying "Mike just stabbed that kid in the neck", she repeatedly gestured with her hand, making a downward stabbing motion. This clearly implies that Sarah Beckett observed the conduct which her verbal declaration described.
This evidence is sufficient to meet the requirements for admitting Sarah Beckett's statement as an excited utterance, including the requirement that the declarant have an opportunity to personally observe the matters asserted in his or her statement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
The second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
FAIN, J. and YOUNG, J., concur.