Opinion
No. 5-727 / 04-0567
Filed November 23, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, James M. Richardson, Judge.
David M. Becerra argues the trial evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Jeff T. Courtney, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Matt Wilber, County Attorney, and John J. Jacobmeier, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
A jury found David M. Gonzales Becerra guilty of first-degree murder for his involvement in the September 2003 death of Oscar Flores, and the district court imposed a life sentence. Becerra appeals, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the required mental elements of first-degree murder. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Background
The facts in this case are disturbing, as to be expected in a first-degree murder case. We recite only as many facts as are necessary, and review the facts in a light most favorable to the State.
David Becerra lived with his mother, Catalina Becerra, and his sister, Nalleli Moreno, in Council Bluffs. His family hosted a party for his sister, who was turning seventeen the next day. Danielle Schmitt, a longtime friend of Nalleli's, came to the party and invited Oscar Figueroa and Oscar Flores. Nalleli also invited Centel Duncan, who invited J.H., a fifteen-year old girl, and L.O, a sixteen-year old girl. Becerra's uncles, Irvin Lucero and Juan Aldaco, were also at Nalleli's party. Becerra and his family provided alcohol for the guests.
While at the party, J.H. became very drunk. According to some testimony, she was dancing with Flores. Duncan and L.O. stated Lucero was flirting with J.H. and "grabbing" her and was jealous of the attention she was paying to Flores. One witness, Jose Figueroa, Oscar Figueroa's brother, stated Mr. Becerra "punched a table really hard" and told him he "felt like punching somebody." Jose Figueroa also stated Lucero was intoxicated and "looked like he wanted trouble with Oscar Flores." Later, Becerra told the Figueroa brothers and Flores that he "didn't like Salvadorans."
The Figueroa brothers and Flores are all of Salvadoran descent.
Flores and the Figueroa brothers were asked to leave the party. As they were doing so, they saw Duncan with J.H., who was "falling-down drunk" at the time, in the front yard. Oscar Figueroa agreed to give Duncan and J.H. a ride home. Those three and Flores were getting into Oscar Figueroa's car when Lucero approached the vehicle and struck Flores. Flores and Lucero fought, and Flores ran toward nearby train tracks. He was followed by Lucero and Becerra, and they were followed by J.H., who wanted to hit Lucero, and Duncan, who wanted to bring J.H. back to the party. The two groups stopped pursuing Flores and returned to the party.
Some witnesses report seeing Flores strike Lucero with a beer bottle, while others stated Lucero struck Flores with the beer bottle.
At about this time, Oscar Figueroa was fighting with an unnamed "tall man," who held Oscar Figueroa's arm behind his back and told Lucero to hit him. After Lucero began punching and kicking Oscar Figueroa, Becerra approached carrying part of a baseball bat. Becerra, Lucero, and Aldaco beat Oscar Figueroa to the ground, at which time they began kicking him. Oscar Figueroa escaped and made it to his vehicle. As he was driving away, Becerra broke the back window of his vehicle with the bat fragment.
Around this time, Flores was returning toward the party. Daniel Swift, a nearby resident, testified that Flores approached him and asked for a bat. Flores stated one of his friends was being beaten, and he wanted a bat to assist his friend. After Swift told him he did not have a bat, Flores asked Swift to call 911, which he did.
Denise Gaver, who had lived across the street from Becerra for more than four years, witnessed most of the events from her windows. She testified Becerra and two other men dragged Flores from a car and began beating on him. She stated Flores ran away and the defendant and others chased him. After this, Becerra and his companions returned to Becerra's back yard.
Gaver testified she saw Flores return to the party with a stick in his hand. She stated Becerra and the two other men "come across the street like packs of dogs and grabbed ahold of" Flores. The men and Flores continued to struggle, and Flores would up on the ground in Gaver's yard. The men took the stick away from Flores and beat him with it.
Gaver testified she heard Flores beg the three men to stop. They continued to beat and kick Flores. During the beating, Becerra told Flores, "You ain't gonna [expletive] do me this way." He picked Flores's head up, punched him in the head, and let his head fall back to the ground. Becerra and the two other men continued to beat Flores until the police arrived, in response to one of Gaver's 911 calls. In all, Gaver called 911 four times, and recordings of her calls were received into evidence. The police located Flores in Gaver's front yard, where blood from his head wounds was forming a halo in the grass. Flores was transported to the hospital, where he died of his injuries.
Becerra was taken into custody and transported to the police station. There, he gave a statement in which he admitted punching Flores but denied kicking him. He indicated he was angry with Flores for what he considered to be improper interests in J.H. He stated he was in his back yard when he heard that Flores and his uncle were fighting. He ran to the front yard where he "lost it" and began wildly taking punches at Flores. Becerra had Flores's blood on his nose, shirt, pants, and hat.
The State charged Becerra, Lucero, and Aldaco with first-degree murder. The charges against the latter two were resolved separately. After the jury returned a verdict finding Becerra guilty of first-degree murder, the court sentenced him to life in prison, and he appealed. On appeal, he argues the State presented insufficient evidence that he acted (1) with malice aforethought and (2) deliberately and with premeditation. He preserved these issues for our review by filing motions for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case and the close of the evidence.
Standard of Review
We review Becerra's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for the correction of errors at law. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996).
We review all evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is the quality and quantity of evidence that could persuade a reasonable person of a defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). Evidence which does no more than "raise `suspicion, speculation, or conjecture' regarding defendant's guilt" is not substantial. Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 671 (quoting State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1972)).
Discussion
Under Iowa law, one commits murder when one "kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied." Iowa Code § 707.1 (2003). If the State shows the defendant committed murder "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation," see id. § 707.2(1), or "while participating in a forcible felony," see id. § 707.2(2), the State has proven the defendant has committed murder in the first degree. Here, Mr. Becerra contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence of either malice aforethought or deliberateness and premeditation. We cannot agree.
In addition to these alternatives, section 707.2 provides four additional alternatives, none of which are relevant to this case.
"Malice aforethought is a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed." State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 49 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002)). Premeditation is defined as "to think or ponder upon the matter before acting." Id. at 48. Neither malice aforethought nor premeditation is required to "exist for any particular length of time." Id. at 49 (quoting Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 579).
Deliberation and premeditation may be shown by circumstantial evidence in one of three ways:
(1) Evidence of planning activity of the defendant which was directed toward the killing;
(2) Evidence of motive which might be inferred from prior relationships between defendant and the victim; and
(3) Evidence regarding the nature of the killing.
State v. Helm, 504 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (citing State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1984)). The third option may be satisfied by showing "the use of a deadly weapon combined with an opportunity to deliberate." Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 48. The jury was instructed that it may find Becerra guilty of first-degree murder if the State proved Becerra, or someone he aided and abetted, killed Flores "with malice aforethought" and "willfully, deliberately, [and] premeditatedly." We conclude the jury had sufficient evidence to do so.
The jury also received a felony-murder instruction, see Iowa Code § 707.2(2), containing aider-and-abetter language.
Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the State, there is evidence Becerra acted both with malice aforethought and "deliberately" and with premeditation. There is evidence, including Becerra's own statement at the police station, showing Becerra was angry with Flores while Flores was at the party. Becerra stated he felt like hitting someone. Becerra stated he "did not like" persons of Flores's ethnic origin. He participated in Flores's first beating and chased him toward the railroad track. He also participated in the beating of Flores's friend, Oscar Figueroa, and broke his rear car window with a bat fragment. The evidence further reflects Becerra and his codefendants attacked Flores "like packs of dogs" and, ignoring Flores's pleas, beat him to death. The beating was so severe that Becerra was spattered with Flores's blood. Becerra was heard making angry comments to Flores, and was seen lifting Flores's head off the ground and striking his head. These facts would support a reasonable fact-finder's conclusion that Becerra acted with malice aforethought and deliberate premeditation. See Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 48-50.
The evidence is even clearer that someone Becerra aided and abetted acted with malice aforethought and deliberate premeditation. A jury may convict Becerra of first degree murder if someone he aided and abetted acted with malice aforethought and deliberate premeditation. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 362 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1985). Here, the evidence reflected Becerra's uncles beat Flores with the stick Flores was carrying. The evidence further reflects one of Becerra's uncles was jealous of the attention J.H. was paying to Flores and had pulled Flores from a vehicle as Flores was seeking to leave the party. We conclude a reasonable jury could conclude someone Becerra aided and abetted committed the killing with the mental state required by chapter 707.
On appeal, Becerra argues he never used a weapon against Flores. Assuming this to be true, we cannot see how this provides a reason to disturb the trial court's judgment. Although use of a weapon may be sufficient to support a finding of deliberate premeditation, see, e.g., Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 48, Becerra cites no authorities stating use of a weapon is necessary to support a finding of deliberate premeditation. Becerra also argues, based on his statement to the police, that he "lost it" and was not thinking when he beat Flores. We reject this argument, for there is contrary evidence in the record and the jury is not required to believe Becerra's account of the events. See, e.g., Helm, 504 N.W.2d at 146.
Conclusion
We conclude the evidence presented supported the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment of the district court.