State v. Beard

7 Citing cases

  1. State ex Rel. Wichman v. Gerbig

    55 Nev. 46 (Nev. 1933)   Cited 2 times

    The question is whether such amendment, operating as a republication of the original section, repealed by implication section 1935 N.C.L. The supreme court of this state has, at least twice, held that in such a situation no repeal by implication will be effected. State ex rel. Love v. County Commissioners Elko County, 21 Nev. 19, 23 P. 935; State ex rel. Dunkle, Sheriff, v. Beard, Auditor, 21 Nev. 219, 29 P. 531. The contention of respondent is, as to section 5 of article VI of the Nevada constitution: First, that said provision does not prohibit a change in the boundaries of a judicial district at any time, but the words "such change" refer only to diminishing the number of districts and the number of judges therein; second, that the law here involved relates not to judicial districts and does not make any change in their boundaries, but is simply a law relating to counties, and there is nothing therein evidencing any intent to change the boundaries of a judicial district.

  2. Duggar v. Mobile Gulf Nav. Co.

    224 Ala. 359 (Ala. 1932)   Cited 7 times

    36 Cyc. 1084; Hacken v. Isenberg, 210 Ill. App. 120; Horn v. State (Ga. Sup.) 40 S.E. 297; Goodrich v. Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co., 141 Mich. 343, 104 N.W. 669; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N.W. 850; State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218, 29 P. 531; Co-op. Asso. v. Fawick, 11 S.D. 589, 79 N.W. 847; Taggart v. Hillman, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 93 S.W. 245; Bentley v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386, 66 N.W. 505.

  3. Dunseath v. Industrial Commission

    52 Nev. 104 (Nev. 1929)   Cited 4 times
    In Dunseath v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 1929, 52 Nev. 104, 282 P. 879, Dunseath, the attorney for an injured employee, sued to compel the commission to pay him $600 for an attorney's fee out of an increased award to an injured workman.

    The statute authorizing the award to a claimant on certain conditions being a special act, those conditions must control, notwithstanding the general law as to attorney's liens. State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218, 29 P. 531; 36 Cyc. 1087. While section 5376, Rev. Laws, provides for attorney's liens, it expressly excepts those cases restrained by law.

  4. Peters v. Jones

    26 Nev. 259 (Nev. 1901)   Cited 1 times

    A general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. ( State ex rel. Dunkle v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218.) The repeal, total or partial, of statutes by implication is not favored.

  5. State v. Lagrave

    23 Nev. 373 (Nev. 1897)   Cited 4 times

    A general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. ( State ex rel. Dunkle v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218.) The repeal, total or partial, of statutes by implication is not favored.

  6. State v. Commissioners Washoe Co.

    22 Nev. 203 (Nev. 1894)   Cited 9 times

    Except as limited by the constitution, the legislature undoubtedly has full control over county affairs, and it is not suggested that it did not have the power to make the change indicated; but it is contended that it did not do so, upon the principle that a general statute does not repeal a special one, unless the intention so to do is clearly manifested; that, as the act of 1861 is nowhere mentioned in the act of 1887, the latter, at most, can only constitute a repeal of the former by implication, and, as the two acts can stand together — the one as constituting an exception to the general rule of the other that no county officer shall be permitted to contract for the county — no such repeal exists. This principle is illustrated by the case of State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218. The question is one of intention upon the part of the legislature, but of intention to be ascertained under the established rules for the interpretation of statutes.

  7. Duggar v. Mobile Gulf Nav. Co.

    25 Ala. App. 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1931)   Cited 4 times

    A later law, which is merely a re-enactment of a former, does not repeal an intermediate act which qualifies or limits the first one, but such intermediate act will be deemed to remain in force and to qualify or modify the new act in the same manner as it did the first. 36 Cyc. 1084; Hacken v. Isenberg, 210 Ill. App. 120; Horn v. State, 114 Ga. 509, 40 S.E. 768; Goodrich v. Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co., 141 Mich. 343, 104 N.W. 669; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N.W. 850; State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218, 29 P. 531; Co-op. S. L. Co. v. Fawick, 11 S.D. 589, 79 N.W. 847; Taggart v. Hillman, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 93 S.W. 245; Bentley v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386, 66 N.W. 505. Re-enactment or codification of statutes is a legislative adoption of the judicial construction placed thereon. U.S.C. tit. 40, c. 18, §§ 544, 601; U.S.C. Compact Ed. 1; Duramus v. Harrison, 26 Ala. 326; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619, 4 S.Ct. 142, 28 L.Ed. 269. Where there is a reasonable field of operation, by a just construction for two statutes which are repugnant to each other, both will be given effect.