The court divided on the question as to what was decided by the case against Mr. Justice Adair sought to apply the doctrine. This case is not comparable to that of State ex rel. Morgan v. State Board of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336, 340, quoted from in the dissenting opinion, wherein we followed the rule previously announced that "previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated." In that case we expressly overruled a former one (Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130 Mont. 512, 305 P.2d 340) which had stood for less than three months.
The highest court of each of these states has held that the Enabling Act created a trust and that federally granted land was to be held in trust for the beneficiaries enumerated in the act. Bryant v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 130 Mont. 512, 515, 305 P.2d 340 (1956) ("As to all these lands Montana takes title as does a trustee of an express trust, charged with the duty of devoting the trust property both the corpus and the income to the purpose specified in the instrument (here the Enabling Act) by which the trust is created."), overruled on other grounds by State v. State Bd. of Exam'rs, 131 Mont. 188, 194, 309 P.2d 336 (1957); State ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. City of Sherwood, 489 N.W.2d 584, 585 (N.D. 1992) ("When North Dakota was admitted to the Union in 1889, it received several million acres of land from the public domain for the support and maintenance of schools. This land, commonly known as school trust land, is held in trust by the State and carries numerous restrictions upon transfer."
The highest court of each of these states has held that the Enabling Act created a trust and that federally granted land was to be held in trust for the beneficiaries enumerated in the act. Bryant v. Bd. of Exam'rs , 130 Mont. 512, 515, 305 P.2d 340 (1956) ("As to all these lands Montana takes title as does a trustee of an express trust, charged with the duty of devoting the trust property both the corpus and the income to the purpose specified in the instrument (here the Enabling Act) by which the trust is created."), overruled on other grounds by State v. State Bd. of Exam'rs , 131 Mont. 188, 194, 309 P.2d 336 (1957) ; State ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. City of Sherwood , 489 N.W.2d 584, 585 (N.D. 1992) ("When North Dakota was admitted to the Union in 1889, it received several million acres of land from the public domain for the support and maintenance of schools. This land, commonly known as school trust land, is held in trust by the State and carries numerous restrictions upon transfer."
¶ 7 Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a particular class of cases. State ex rel. Morgan v. State Bd. of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 212, 309 P.2d 336, 349 (1957). If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction it “cannot acquire it even by consent of the parties.”
The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule since previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated. State v. State Board of Examiners (1957), 131 Mont. 188, 194, 309 P.2d 336, 340. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint because Plaintiffs failed to file proof of service of summons with the clerk of court within three years of the commencement of this action.
Thus "construct" has been equated with "provide", with acquisition of structures in place, with betterment of existing facilities, with remodeling an existing system, with repairing existing facilities, or with operating lines after construction. Ostrander v. City of Salmon, 20 Idaho 153, 117 P. 692 (1911); Independent Highway Dist. v. Ada County, 24 Idaho 416, 134 P. 542 (1913); State ex rel. Edwards v. Millar, 21 Okl. 448, 96 P. 747 (1908); State ex rel. Morgan v. State Board of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336 (1957); Inyo County v. Hess, 53 Cal.App. 415, 200 P. 373 (1921). If a statute is sufficiently definite to enable the court to place thereon a reasonable construction and declare legislative intent, it is not so ambiguous as to be void for uncertainty. Nor is it objectionable per se for the statute to use general terms, while leaving it to ultimate court decisions whether a given case falls within those terms.
The majority opinion in the Hardy case has not been acquiesced in by the general public over a period of years as is true in the cases of O'Connell and Mills, supra, and hence the members of this court are free to question its soundness. State ex rel. Morgan v. State Board of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336. I think for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in the Hardy case, supra, the tax should not be doubled.
The words "erect" and "construct" are synonymous. State of Montana ex rel. Morgan, Relator v. State Board of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336 (1957); State ex rel. Davis v. Barber, 139 Fla. 706, 190 So. 809 (1939); State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383, 135 S.W. 929 (1911); Butz v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 199 Mo. 279, 97 S.W. 895 (1906). Section 1501 of the Building Code defines the word "erect" as applied to a sign shall mean to build, construct, attach, hang, place, suspend, or affix at the place of display.