Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1673-13T1
06-18-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAHEEM BATTLES, a/k/a RAHEEM L. BATTLES, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael Confusione, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Nugent and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 12-11-2800. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael Confusione, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant, Raheem Battles, appeals from his conviction for carjacking and theft, arguing the trial court erred in presenting "other crimes" evidence and in barring defendant from cross-examining a witness. Defendant additionally argues prosecutorial misconduct and an improper sentence warrant reversal. We affirm.
On March 20, 2012, J.B. drove his white pick-up truck to McDonald's restaurant in West Orange. Defendant, wielding a gun, approached the passenger side of J.B.'s vehicle. Defendant was using a cap gun, but J.B. believed it to be real at the time. Defendant told J.B. he was under arrest and to "get the [expletive] out of the car." J.B. exited the vehicle. Defendant entered it and drove away.
We utilize the initials of the victim. --------
Officer Joseph R. Alston, Jr. was patrolling a nearby area when he observed defendant speeding and swerving around other vehicles. Alston pursued defendant and observed him drive through two red lights before colliding with another vehicle. Defendant began to flee from the scene of the accident before Alston ordered him to stop. When defendant stopped, Alston handcuffed him. Alston looked inside the vehicle and observed what "appeared" to be a "black semiautomatic handgun on the driver's side floor area." Alston also recovered a black ski mask from defendant's pants' pocket.
After defendant left J.B. at McDonald's, J.B. ran to police headquarters and informed an officer he had been car-jacked at gunpoint. The officer drove J.B. to the collision scene where he identified defendant as the carjacker.
Defendant was charged with first-degree carjacking, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2 and third-degree theft, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a. A jury trial was held before Judge Michael L. Ravin. Defendant testified at trial that J.B. approached him and asked for drugs. Defendant stated J.B. proposed defendant "rent" his vehicle for twenty to thirty minutes in exchange for drugs, which defendant agreed to. The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant argues the following on appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT PERMITTED TOO MUCH OTHER CRIMES AND BAD ACT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY THAT CUMULATIVELY OVERWHELMED THE FAIRNESS OF THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE CARJACKING AND THEFT CRIMES ACTUALLY AT ISSUE AT TRIAL BELOW (PLAIN ERROR).
THE TRIAL COURT INFRINGED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE PRIMARY STATE WITNESS BEFORE THE JURY (PLAIN ERROR).
THE PROSECUTOR WENT BEYOND FAIR COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE AND TAINTED THE FAIRNESS OF THE JURY TRIAL BELOW (PLAIN ERROR).
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS IMPROPER AND EXCESSIVE.
Defendant raises these arguments, except for the improper and excessive sentence, for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we apply the plain error standard of review, i.e., error which is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336; R. 2:10-2.
Defendant first contends the trial court committed plain error in permitting the prosecution to present evidence of "other crimes," concerning defendant's conduct when fleeing from the arresting police officer. Defendant maintains this evidence constituted impermissible, other-crime evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b). We disagree.
We review a trial court's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 128 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion whenever it makes a decision "without a rational explanation." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citation omitted).
N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.
In general, other-crime evidence is not admissible to prove guilt by criminal predisposition. N.J.R.E. 404(b); see also State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 406 (1987) ("[I]t is not competent to prove one crime by proving another.") (citation omitted). The rationale for this is that a jury, aware of such evidence, may be tempted to convict, not by reason of proof, but by reason of perception. State v. Gibbons, 105 N.J. 67, 77 (1987).
"The threshold determination under Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence relates to 'other crimes,' and thus is subject to continued analysis under Rule 404(b), or whether it is evidence intrinsic to the charged crime, and thus need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly Rule 403." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 179 (2011). An uncharged offense is intrinsic evidence of a charged crime if: (1) "it 'directly proves' the charged offense," or (2) the uncharged act was "performed contemporaneously with the charged crime" and it "facilitate[d] the commission of the charged crime." Id. at 180 (citation omitted). Thus, under N.J.R.E. 404(b), other-crime evidence may be admitted for specific, non-propensity purposes to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge," or to establish a "necessary background." Id. at 181.
We are persuaded that the other-crime evidence presented was intrinsic to establish defendant's actions during the carjacking. The testimony was admitted for a specific, non-propensity purpose; to establish that defendant was speeding when he was observed by police, he fled from police, and he offered to police that he exchanged the vehicle for drugs. The other-crime evidence related to the carjacking and was relevant to establish defendant's conduct immediately before and after his arrest. The conduct demonstrated defendant's intent, the conduct was performed contemporaneously with the crime and the conduct facilitated the commission of the crimes charged. As such, we conclude the admission of the other-crime evidence was not erroneous.
Furthermore, under the plain error standard, an unchallenged error merits reversal only if it is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. That is, it must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Here, given the substantial proofs offered by the State during trial, the admission of the other-crime evidence does not undermine our confidence in the outcome. See State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010).
Defendant next argues that, in light of his constitutional right to confrontation, the trial judge improperly barred defendant from questioning J.B. whether he purchased drugs from individuals other than defendant.
The Confrontation Clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions ensures that criminal defendants will have "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" and will have the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses against them. State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 168 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160, 124 S. Ct. 1169, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (2004) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636, 645 (1986)). The right protects against improper restrictions on questions defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S. Ct. 989, 999, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 54 (1987).
Thus, the core principle protected by the Federal and State Confrontation Clauses is the right of the accused to present all relevant evidence necessary for the defense. Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 166. That right, however, is not absolute. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309 (1973).
In accord with that principle, N.J.R.E. 403 provides that the trial judge may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Once the trial judge determines that evidence is relevant pursuant to N.J.R.E. 401, the admissibility of such evidence falls largely within the judge's discretion. State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 470 (2002). The trial court is in the "best position to engage in th[e] balancing process" required by this rule. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266 (1987), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S. Ct. 2433, 124 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1993). Trial courts "retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 (1991).
Further, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 611, the trial judge is vested with broad discretion to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence" to effectuate the purposes set forth in the rule, i.e., ascertaining truth, using time effectively and avoiding embarrassment of the witness.
Notwithstanding the constitutional implications of limiting cross-examination, the scope of same is generally within the trial judge's control. "[A]n appellate court will not interfere with such control unless clear error and prejudice are shown . . . ." State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378, 394 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 334 (1990). In other words, there must be a "clear abuse of discretion which has deprived [a party] of a fair trial." Persley v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, 357 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 490 (2003). This same standard applies to general evidentiary rulings the trial judge makes pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403. State v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519, 534 (2007).
Here, on direct and cross-examination, J.B. testified he had never seen defendant before the day of the car-jacking and never "loaned" his vehicle to him. Defense counsel questioned J.B. if he ever purchased drugs during the spring of 2012. After the prosecutor objected, the judge barred the question on the ground that it was irrelevant. The judge held:
[J.B.] has un-categorically testified, whether the jury believes him or not, that he never met the defendant before this day in his life, so if that's his testimony, which the jury . . . may believe or disbelieve, that whether he bought drugs
from other people on other occasions, how would that be relevant?
. . . .
I don't see how whether he made purchases from other people of drugs . . . would be relevant . . . or admissible considering [N.J.R.E.] 403.
Based upon the record and our standard of review, we are satisfied it was not an abuse of discretion to preclude defendant from pursuing this line of questioning. The preclusion did not constitute an infringement upon defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.
Next, defendant contends there was prosecutorial misconduct which merits reversal of his conviction. Again, we disagree.
In reviewing alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct, we inquire whether "the conduct was so egregious that it deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999); State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 386 (1996); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322. In determining whether a defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied, we consider several factors, such as whether the defense counsel made a timely objection, whether the prosecution promptly withdrew the improper remark, whether the trial judge ordered the improper remark be stricken, and whether the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the improper remark. Id. at 322-23.
Defendant argues the prosecutor made improper statements during summation regarding his defense. The prosecutor referred to defendant as "the most unlucky person in the world" and called his defense a "story." The prosecutor stated that in order to believe defendant, the jury would "have to find that these police officers, for whatever reason, deliberately did not tell you the truth." The prosecutor added, "how unlucky for [defendant] that one of the police officers that's involved in his case is willing to lie."
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing remarks. After closing arguments were finished, on three occasions, the trial court advised the jury that the remarks of counsel during summation were not evidence, and it must decide what evidence is credible.
Generally, it is improper for a prosecutor to personally vouch for a police officer's credibility. See State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 331-32 (2005).
[P]rosecutorial misconduct can be a ground for reversal where the prosecutor's misconduct was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. In determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct was sufficiently egregious, an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred.
[Id. at 332-33 (quoting Frost, supra, 158 N.J. at 82-84).]
When a defense attorney fails to object to a prosecutor's summation, it "speak[s] volumes about the accuracy of what was said." Fertile v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 495 (2001) (citing State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 51 (1970)). An appellate court will "presume that when a lawyer observes an adversary's summation, and concludes that the gist of the evidence has been unfairly characterized, an objection will be advanced." Ibid.
Generally, if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial. The failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made. The failure to object also deprives the court of an opportunity to take curative action.
[R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 333 (quoting Frost, supra, 158 N.J. at 82-84).]
A prosecutor's improper remarks made during summation can be cured so long as the trial court "clearly instruct[s] the jury that the remarks made . . . were not evidence, but argument." State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 409 (2012); see also Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 390 (accepting the presumption that juries follow a court's instructions).
In regard to the prosecutor's remarks in summation, "[o]ur task is to consider the 'fair import' of the State's summation in its entirety." State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 409 (2012) (citations omitted). Here, defense counsel's failure to object suggests that defendant did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made. See R.B., supra, 183 N.J. at 333. We are satisfied the prosecutor's relatively brief comment in response to defense counsel's comments on the officers' credibility, though disfavored, did not produce an unjust result. Moreover, to the extent there was any prejudice, it was cured by the trial court's clear instructions to the jury that the attorneys' remarks made in summation were not to be considered as evidence. See Smith, supra, 212 N.J. at 409.
Finally, defendant contends his sentence is improper and excessive since the trial court erred in its evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
The trial court's findings on individual aggravating factors must be "based upon competent credible evidence in the record." State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010). A generalized explanation of the sentence is sufficient to satisfy Rule 3:21-4(g), although the trial court is encouraged to explicitly address each individual aggravating and mitigating factor. Id. at 609.
Defendant argues while the court cited aggravating factors three and nine, insufficient explanation of the specific facts for finding these factors was provided. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (a)(9). However, the judge provided an explanation for finding these factors, citing defendant's disorderly-persons convictions, numerous arrests and probation violations.
Defendant argues the court erred in failing to find mitigating factors two, three and four. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2)-(4). The judge acknowledged defendant's assertion that his schizophrenia be considered, but did not find it to be a mitigating factor. There was minimal, if any, evidence of defendant's alleged mental health history in the record. Absent such supporting evidence, the court did not err by rejecting mitigating factors two, three and four. See State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005) ("[W]here mitigating factors are amply based in the record . . . they must be found." (emphasis added)). The judge also found the aggravating factors outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors.
From our review of the sentence record, we hold Judge Ravin's findings were supported by competent, reasonably credible evidence. The judge's application of legal principles and guidelines was correct. As such, under our "limited" and "deferential" standard of review, we reject defendant's challenge to his sentence. See State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION