Opinion
2022 KA 0437
11-04-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TREMELL BATISTE
Kristine Russell District Attorney Joseph S. Soignet Heather Hendrix Assistant District Attorneys Thibodaux, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Gwendolyn K. Brown Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Tremell Batiste
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the Seventeenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Lafourche State of Louisiana Docket Number 571648 Honorable Maria M. Abel, Judge Presiding
Kristine Russell District Attorney Joseph S. Soignet Heather Hendrix Assistant District Attorneys Thibodaux, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana
Gwendolyn K. Brown Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Tremell Batiste
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, AND WOLFE, JJ.
GUIDRY, J.
The defendant, Tremell Batiste, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The defendant pled not guilty and later changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and, following a hearing on the matter, the motion was denied. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating six assignments of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On November 15, 2017, Dontrell Bryant and the defendant went to Ridgefield Road in Thibodaux to buy marijuana from Chansie White. Bryant was the driver, and the defendant was the front-seat passenger. It was the defendant's intention to rob White. The defendant did not know White. White got into the backseat of Bryant's car behind Bryant. When White produced a baggie of marijuana, the defendant showed a handgun and told White to give it to him. White began exiting the car with the marijuana when the defendant shot him three times. White was taken to the hospital where he died. The defendant was subsequently apprehended in Assumption Parish. In his recorded statement to the police, the defendant admitted that he shot White while trying to rob him.
The defendant testified at trial. According to the defendant, his shooting of White was an "accident."
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1 and 6
In these assignments of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying him a contradictory hearing for his motion for a sanity commission; and the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on this issue.
Pretrial, defense counsel filed a motion for a sanity commission to determine if the defendant was competent to assist counsel at trial The trial court appointed Dr. Richard W. Richoux and Dr. Rafael F. Salcedo. At a hearing on March 3, 2021, the reports of the doctors were submitted into evidence. Both doctors found the defendant competent to proceed. Defense counsel objected to the submission of the reports because it precluded him from questioning the doctors in person. As the colloquy continued, it became clear defense counsel was confused about what the reports of the doctors indicated. Defense counsel thought the doctors' findings were limited to the defendant's state of mind when he gave his statement to detectives in November of 2017. At any rate, the trial court explained that the only issue decided by the doctors was whether the defendant was competent to proceed to trial. Accordingly, the trial court found that based on the reports of the doctors, the defendant was "competent and . . . capable of assisting his defense lawyer in preparation of his defense for trial." Defense counsel objected.
Defense counsel then filed another motion requesting a "contradictory sanity review hearing." Specifically, defense counsel asserted the reports of the doctors were admitted into evidence without being subject to in-person cross-examination. At the March 8, 2021 hearing on this issue, the trial court continued the matter and instructed defense counsel to subpoena Drs. Richoux and Salcedo to appear in court on March 24, 2021.
At the hearing on March 24, 2021, the doctors were not present. Defense counsel noted that the trial court had issued subpoenas for the doctors, but since the doctors had not appeared in court, defense counsel asked for a continuance so that "both doctors can come and appear in court or by Zoom and testify as to the reports which were admitted into evidence." The State objected to the continuance on the grounds that the sanity commission, itself, was appointed only out of an abundance of caution because, up until that point, the defendant had not alleged any specific facts or reasonable grounds for the trial court to doubt the defendant's capacity to proceed to trial. In denying the motion to continue and in reiterating the defendant's competency to proceed, the trial court found as follows:
The Court will note that this - this case has - I should say the bill of information - the grand jury met and the bill of information was filed on January 24th of 2018. From that time in January of 2018 until the present motion for a sanity commission was filed, there'd never been any indication in the record that this Court has noted indicating that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to stand trial. At the time that the Court granted the motion for a sanity commission, the Court was granting the motion out of an abundance of caution. There had not been anything specifically alleged by the defense counsel related to Mr. Batiste's inability to assist in the defense or his lack of understanding of the nature of the charges or of the severity of the charges against him. However, the Court did appoint the sanity commission out of an abundance of caution. Those reports were received and indicated that neither Dr. Richoux or Salcedo had any question as to whether or not the defendant met the Bennett criteria and was competent to stand trial.
The Court will note that under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 647, the report of the sanity commission is admissible in evidence. It does not have to be authenticated through testimony meaning that the doctors do not have to come to court and testify to authenticate their report. The article provides that the members may be called as witnesses of the court. It is not a requirement that they be called to testify. Based on the fact that the reports here clearly both conclude that there are no issues as to whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial, and given the facts that this case [has] been pending for a substantial period of time without any allegation as it relates to the defendant's competency and the Court's own observations of the defendant on proceedings by video, the Court has never seen any indication that the defendant did not understand the proceedings, did not understand the Court's role, his attorney's role, did not understand what he was being charged with or the severity of the charge.
The defendant argues in brief that the trial court's ruling was in error. According to the defendant, the trial court failed to conduct a contradictory hearing wherein he would have been able to cross-examine the doctors on their findings. The defendant suggests the trial court's failure to have a contradictory hearing violated his right to confront the witnesses (doctors) regarding their testimonial statements. In support of his contention, the defendant cites to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); and State v. Simmons, 11-1280 (La. 1/20/12), 78 So.3d 743 (per curiam).
At issue is La. C.Cr.P. art. 647, which provides:
The issue of the defendant's mental capacity to proceed shall be determined by the court in a contradictory hearing. The report of the sanity commission is admissible in evidence at the hearing, and members of the sanity commission may be called as witnesses by the court, the defense, or the district attorney. Regardless of who calls them as witnesses, the members of the commission are subject to cross-examination by the defense, by the district attorney, and by the court. Other evidence pertaining to the defendant's mental capacity to proceed may be introduced at the hearing by the defense and by the district attorney.
We agree with the trial court's findings. Due process requires that the trial court review the findings of the physicians who examined the defendant and render a formal determination that the defendant is competent to proceed. See State v. Higgins, 50,654, p. 7 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 6/22/16), 198 So.3d 135, 139. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 647, whether members of the sanity commission are called to testify at such a contradictory hearing is controlled by the permissive "may" in the Article. But when they are called as witnesses, then, and only then, are they subject to cross-examination by the defense. Under Article 647, the trial court is well within its authority to accept the reports of expert witnesses into evidence without requiring those witnesses to testify at the hearing. See State v. Myers, 02-1296, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1183, 1188-89, writ denied, 03-0991 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 330.
On March 3, 2021, the trial court held a contradictory hearing pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 647, to determine the defendant's mental capacity to proceed. There was nothing preventing the defendant from subpoenaing the doctors to testify at the March 3, 2021 hearing, but he chose not to do so. Moreover, the defendant failed to submit any records or evidence of his own, although he was clearly entitled to. See Myers, 02-1296 at p. 7, 839 So.2d at 1188-89 (finding the fact that the court-appointed doctor, Dr. Boppana, did not participate by report or testimony did not in itself suggest an error since the defendant, who had the burden of proof, was free to subpoena Dr. Boppana or any other doctor who might be helpful to his case and further, that while a court is permitted to receive the aid of expert medical testimony on the issue, the ultimate decision of competency is the court's alone).
We find also that the doctors' pretrial reports were not testimonial and, as such, there was no confrontation violation. Statements made for diagnosis and medical treatment do not violate Crawford if they are nontestimonial. Statements made with no reasonable belief that they would later be used in a trial are not considered "testimonial" in nature. State v. Morgan, 45,110, pp. 25-26 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 4/14/10), 34 So.3d 1127, 1142-43, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Morgan v. State, 10-1201 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 992. The doctors' findings regarding the defendant's competence to stand trial were necessarily pretrial and would not be used at trial. Only that evidence or those records introduced at trial that tend to inculpate the defendant raise confrontational issues under Crawford. As the State correctly points out in brief, at the heart of the confrontation cases cited by the defendant is the right to confront witnesses against him on the issue of his culpability during the guilt phase of the trial.
Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, even had the trial court failed to conduct a contradictory hearing, the error would have been harmless. See State v. Lightell, 98-2246, pp. 5-8 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/19/00), 761 So.2d 67, 70-72; State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1061-62 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 584 So.2d 679 (La. 1991). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial on this issue.
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 2, 5, and 6
In these assignments of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement. Specifically, the defendant asserts his statement was not freely and voluntarily given because his mental illness and intoxication precluded him from forming the requisite intent to waive his rights. Further, the defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing his request to proffer evidence at the motion to suppress hearing and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on these issues.
Before a confession can be introduced into evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights. State v. Vigne, 01-2940, p. 6 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 533, 537. Since the general admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial court, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d 1144, 1150 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 11 (La. 1991). Testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Maten, 04-1718, p. 12 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 05-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544.
Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. .2d 694 (1966).
When a confession is challenged on the ground that it was not freely and voluntarily given because the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the confession, the confession will be inadmissible only when the intoxication is of such a degree as to negate the defendant's comprehension and to make him unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying. Whether intoxication exists and is sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of a confession are questions of fact, and the ruling of the trial court on this issue will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the evidence. Maten, 04-1718 at p. 12, 899 So.2d at 721.
When insanity is the basis of a motion to suppress a confession, the State must prove that defendant had the mental capacity to waive his right against self-incrimination. La. C.Cr.R art. 703(D). State v. Widenhouse, 582 So.2d 1374, 1380 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied, 586 So.2d 567 (La. 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 910, 112 S.Ct. 1274, 117 L.Ed.2d 500 (1992). The prosecuting attorney is not required to present evidence at a suppression hearing. Instead, he may rely on the presumption of sanity provided in La. R.S. 15:432, leaving to the defendant the burden to prove the existence of a mental abnormality which, under the limited circumstances, may have destroyed the voluntary nature of his confession. If the defendant fails to prove the existence of a mental disease or defect or that such disorder prevented his confession from being voluntary, the State need not negate defendant's alleged mental abnormality; but it must in all other respects prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. See State v. Stewart, 93-0708 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/11/94), 633 So.2d 925, 931-32, writ denied. 94-0860 (La. 9/16/94), 642 So.2d 189.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Karissa Waguespack, with the Thibodaux Police Department, testified that she Mirandized the defendant and that he signed the waiver of rights form. She indicated the defendant seemed fine and was cooperative, but he had more of a rapport with Lieutenant Taylor. According to Detective Waguespack, the defendant was courteous, and nothing in his behavior gave her concern for his mental state or suggested he did not understand what was happening. She indicated the defendant was not promised anything or threatened in any way. The detective further indicated on cross-examination that she did not believe the defendant was intoxicated, nor did he show any signs of intoxication. She indicated the defendant was awake, alert, and responded appropriately to questioning. She also did not smell alcohol, marijuana, or any other illegal drug on the defendant. According to Detective Waguespack, nothing about the defendant suggested to her that he had a mental illness before, during, or after the interview.
Lieutenant Varick Taylor, Jr., with the Thibodaux Police Department, did most of the questioning in the defendant's interview. Lieutenant Taylor testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the defendant was alert, and he did not find the defendant to be intoxicated, he did not smell alcohol or marijuana on him, and he did not have concerns about the defendant's state of mind.
In the recorded interview, which was conducted the day following the shooting, the defendant admitted to pointing a gun at Chansie White, demanding the marijuana that White had, then shooting White several times as White tried to get out of the car. The trial court viewed the defendant's recorded confession and noted the following during the hearing:
As far as intoxication, the law provides that intoxication does not vitiate a confession unless it is to the degree of nullifying the accused's comprehension and renders him unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying. I don't think there has been any evidence or in reviewing the - the video of the confession that - that Mr. Batiste's intoxication would've been to any level nearing him being unconscious of- of the consequences of what he was saying.
The Court observed in the video Mr. Batiste getting up from one chair going to another chair, walking around. He did not appear in any of those video clips to be to the point of intoxication where he would have been unconscious or nearing unconsciousness or able to appreciate the consequences of what he was saying.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the defendant's statement and made the following findings: the defendant was properly Mirandized, waived those rights, and elected to provide a statement about the shooting; the defendant's confession was made freely and voluntarily; the defendant moved around the interrogation room, and Lieutenant Taylor was not "in his face" and did not scream or threaten the defendant in any way; for the majority of the interview, the defendant spoke without being prompted, which indicated he was not under any duress or any pressure; and the video clearly showed the defendant's statement was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, threats, menaces, inducements, or promises.
Further, the video showed that the defendant was alert, rational, responsive to questioning, and recalled the details of the incident, including his actions following the shooting. Accordingly, we find no error in the conclusion that the defendant made no showing that the voluntariness of his confession was destroyed by a mental abnormality or defect, or intoxication. The State's evidence provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's finding that the defendant was able to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and comprehend the meaning of his confession, and that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. See Widenhouse, 582 So.2d at 1381. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. This assignment is without merit.
The defendant further argues the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel's request to proffer alleged statements between the defendant's mother and Detective Waguespack. On the cross-examination of Detective Waguespack at the motion to suppress hearing, defense counsel asked her if she, at any time, had spoken with the defendant's mother. The State objected on the grounds the question was beyond the scope of the hearing. Defense counsel argued it was relevant because there was an interrogation, and the defendant's mother was present at the hearing and could testify as to "what goes into the heart of our motion to suppress." The trial court noted the defendant was not a juvenile, his mother was not present with him during the interrogation and, as such, the trial court did not believe any conversations between the defendant's mother and detectives was relevant. Defense counsel informed the trial court that these conversations go directly to whether the defendant was intoxicated when he gave his statement because there were conversations that took place between Detective Waguespack and the defendant's mother, "in which in so many words, things came out about his intoxication at the jail." The State argued the issue was a matter for trial. The trial court sustained the State's objection, finding that nothing in the video it reviewed indicated the defendant was so intoxicated that his confession was not freely given.
The defendant states in brief that the defense sought to call the defendant's mother to testify, "but the request was denied upon the State's urging that her testimony was irrelevant." The defendant claims the defense then sought to proffer the testimony of the defendant's mother.
The defendant's assertion is incorrect. Defense counsel never sought nor was he denied the right to call the defendant's mother; defense counsel also did not seek to proffer such testimony. The record reveals that what actually transpired was that after the trial court sustained the State's objection to defense counsel's attempt to question Detective Waguespack about her conversations with the defendant's mother, defense counsel stated that he wanted to make a proffer of the conversations between Detective Waguespack and the defendant's mother "in which from our recollection, Mr. Batiste was so intoxication [sic] that he could not give any interrogation or any statements for about two or three days until he came down off of his intoxication level." The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, finding that the defendant's possible intoxication at the time of the offense was an issue for trial.
Despite this ruling, the trial court did, in fact, over the State's objection, subsequently permit defense counsel at the motion to suppress hearing to ask Detective Waguespack about conversations with the defendant's mother. Detective Waguespack indicated the defendant's mother was interviewed throughout the investigation and that she believed "later on" (after the interrogation) his mother brought up the defendant may suffer from a mental illness. Regardless, Detective Waguespack could not remember when she spoke to the defendant's mother or recall any of the particulars of a conversation with her.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear there would have been nothing for defense counsel to proffer, particularly through Detective Waguespack. More importantly, however, the defendant's mother was present at the motion to suppress hearing, prepared to testify. Thus, instead of attempting to elicit a second-hand account through another witness (Detective Waguespack) of what the defendant's mother told that witness about her son, defense counsel had the opportunity to directly question the defendant's mother about what she herself knew and said about the defendant. Yet, in his case-in-chief, defense counsel did not call the defendant's mother to testify. Just prior to the State resting its case at the hearing, defense counsel asked Lieutenant Taylor if he spoke to the defendant's mother during the investigation. When Lieutenant Taylor testified he did not recall speaking to the defendant's mother, defense counsel responded, "If she would testify as to that being to the contrary, you wouldn't have any reason to deny that, right?" It appeared, then, defense counsel was poised to call the defendant's mother to testify. But when the State rested, defense counsel stated, "No - no other witnesses, Your Honor."
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in denying the request to proffer or denying the motion for new trial based on this issue. These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 3. 5, and 6
In these assignments of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in not allowing him to introduce medical evidence in support of his not guilty by reason of insanity plea, and in denying his motion for new trial based on this issue.
Trial began on Monday, May 3, 2021. That Friday before, on April 30, 2021, the defendant changed his not guilty plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. On this same date, defense counsel again requested a contradictory hearing regarding the defendant's competency to proceed. According to the defendant in brief, defense counsel "had medical records that he hoped to present." The defendant further asserts that the State in its "tortured application of the law" convinced the trial court it need not entertain evidence on the competency issue by misleading it into believing the defense was confusing competency to proceed with the issue of sanity at the time of the offense.
The record does not support the defendant's assertion that defense counsel had "records that he hoped to present." Rather, the record establishes that defense counsel sought a contradictory hearing regarding the defendant's competency to proceed based on a motion filed the previous day. Defense counsel again argued that he was entitled to cross-examine the doctors who had submitted their reports to the trial court. In denying the motion, the trial court explained that the hearing held on March 3, 2021 was the contradictory hearing and that defense counsel did not present any other evidence. The trial court noted that it followed the mandatory language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 647, which required that a hearing be held. Throughout pretrial hearings, the trial court consistently noted that the only purpose of the sanity commission was to determine the defendant's competency to proceed rather than his sanity on the day of the offense. Accordingly, because the contradictory hearing had already been held and the trial court found the defendant was competent to proceed, we find the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a contradictory hearing. Moreover, this issue has already been addressed in previous assignments of error.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 726 provides:
A. If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a
mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he shall not later than ten days prior to trial or such reasonable time as the court may permit, notify the district attorney in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other orders as may be appropriate.
B. If there is a failure to give notice as required by Subsection A of this Article, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition.
The defendant asserts in brief that when the matter was called for trial, defense counsel informed the trial court that he would like to introduce evidence in support of the dual plea. But this is not what occurred. Defense counsel did not seek to introduce anything regarding the defendant's sanity vel non on the day of the offense; rather, defense counsel sought to introduce evidence regarding the defense of intoxication. See La. R.S. 14:15. Defense counsel filed his notice of intent to use the defense of intoxication on the first day of trial. The State objected because it had been given no prior notice of defense counsel's intent to present the defense of intoxication. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 726. The defendant acknowledges in his appellate brief that Article 726 permits a trial court to allow a late filing, and that the reason for the rule is to prevent surprise. According to the defendant, the State had no valid claim of surprise because at least as early as February of 2021, the State was aware of the defendant's long history of mental health issues. But the State's alleged prior awareness of any mental health issue is beside the point. Defense counsel was required to provide the State timely notice of intent to present an intoxication defense and failed to do so. See State v. Brown, 18-01999, p. 37 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 234, cert, denied, ___ U.S.____, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022) (finding that although the defendant argued the State was aware of evidence of intoxication, and thus would not have been "surprised" by the introduction of such evidence, the State would have been prejudiced by the introduction of such evidence simply by being unaware that it would be required to prepare a response to this defense).
The trial court noted that La. C.Cr.R art. 726 required defense counsel to provide notice to the State no later than ten days before trial unless the court finds cause to allow for a late filing. The trial court found there was no good cause to allow the defense of intoxication to be used at trial. We find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling.
This issue is also discussed in subsequent assignments of error.
Thus, despite the defendant's assertion in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred in ruling he was not allowed to introduce medical evidence in support of his not guilty by reason of insanity plea, we find nothing in the record to support this claim. As noted herein, the defendant was precluded from offering evidence regarding intoxication, not insanity. In fact, the trial court specifically informed the defendant he could submit records at trial to argue the defendant's sanity on the day of the offense. At the end of the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court informed the defendant, "I think that the medical records can absolutely come into play potentially at the trial and in arguing about the time of the commission of the crime."
At the start of trial, but prior to opening statements, defense counsel informed the trial court that at trial he wanted to use Northlake Behavioral System records. Defense counsel had subpoenaed Dr. Danielle Levy to testify as an expert regarding these records. Defense counsel specifically informed the trial court that Dr. Levy had no opinion regarding the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the testimony of Dr. Levy would have addressed neither the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense nor the defendant's competency to proceed at trial.
Defense counsel informed the trial court that Dr. Levy's expert opinion was that the defendant was a threat to society and himself.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 726 applied here as well. That is, Article 726 applies to both intoxication as well as to mental defect, yet there was no notice provided to the State, Moreover, as the trial court noted, Dr. Levy, according to defense counsel, last treated the defendant in January of 2017, ten months before the instant offense. Accordingly, Dr. Levy would have no information regarding the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. As such, the trial court found no good cause to allow the late filing of the notice of intent to introduce testimony related to a mental disease, defect or other condition.The trial court further noted that it had never received any Northlake records, was not sure where the records defense counsel possessed had come from, whether they were mistakenly sent to the defense, or why the defense had never provided those records to the State. At any rate, the trial court found the State could not adequately prepare for its case when it only received the Northlake records on the morning of trial. Thus, because there was no notice given under La. C.Cr.P. art. 726, the trial court ruled it would exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the defendant on the issue of his mental condition.
Under La. R.S. 14:14, Louisiana's codification of the M'Naughten Rule, an offender is exempt from criminal responsibility only if he is incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question. Thus, Louisiana does not recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity absent a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Evidence of a mental defect, which does not meet the M'Naughten definition of insanity, therefore, cannot negate a specific intent to commit a crime and reduce the degree of the offense. Consequently, in crimes requiring specific intent, diminished mental capacity is not a recognized defense. State v. Dressner, 08-1366, pp. 25-26 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 144, cert, denied, 562 U.S. 1271, 131 S.Ct. 1605, 179 L.Ed.2d 500 (2011).
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling. Without proper notice, the State had no way to prepare its case in rebuttal, including obtaining its own expert witness. See State v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 6 (La. 1990). Moreover, the State would have been entitled to have the defendant examined by an expert of its choosing. See State v. Bright, 97-2938 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So.2d 1386 (per curiam).
Finally, the defendant suggests in brief that the trial court's refusal to allow into evidence those medical records through the testimony of Dr. Levy, or to allow evidence of intoxication, affected his trial strategy of arguing he lacked specific intent to kill White. The issue of specific intent, however, was ultimately moot. While the evidence at trial clearly established the defendant had the specific intent to kill, the element of specific intent was not required for a conviction of second degree murder in this case. The defendant killed White during the commission of an armed robbery or an attempted armed robbery. As such, the defendant was guilty of felony murder, which does not require the specific intent to kill. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2).
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 4,5, and 6
In these assignments of error, the defendant again argues the trial court erred in ruling he could not introduce medical evidence in support of his intoxication defense, and in denying his motion for new trial based on this issue.
Voluntary intoxication is a defense to a prosecution for second degree murder when the circumstances indicate that intoxication precluded the defendant from forming the requisite specific intent. See La. R.S. 14:15(2). The defendant has the burden of proving his intoxication defense. Thereafter, the State must negate that defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that specific intent was present despite the defendant's alleged intoxication. The question of whether the defendant's intoxication precluded him from forming specific intent is a question to be resolved by the jury. State v. Mickelson. 12-2539, p. 7 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 183.
As discussed, however, preclusion of specific intent did not need to be established by the defendant since specific intent was not an element of the charged offense of felony murder. Moreover, the defendant testified at trial and admitted to robbing and shooting White. The defendant did not indicate in his testimony that he was intoxicated, but rather that his killing of White was an accident. He also testified that "of course" he knew the difference between right and wrong. Moreover, after the shooting, the defendant fled the scene, did not contact the police, and disposed of the clothes he was wearing, the gun he had used, and the shell casings from the gun, all indicia that the defendant was in control of his faculties and clearly cognizant of his wrongdoing. See State v. Bland, 15-1662, pp. 11-12 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/20/16), 194 So.3d 679, 686-87, writ denied, 16-0920 (La. 4/24/17), 219 So.3d 1097.
The foregoing notwithstanding, as discussed in previous assignments of error, the trial court correctly precluded defense counsel from arguing an intoxication defense at trial because he waited until the first day of trial to provide notice to the State that he would be using this defense. While the language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 726(A) addresses "testimony relating to a mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged," the jurisprudence has interpreted this language to include intoxication as an "other condition" bearing on the issue of whether the defendant had the requisite mental state for the offense charged. See Brown, 18-01999 at p. 37, 330 So.3d at 234; State v. Gibson, 93-0305, pp. 9-11 (La.App. 4th Cir. 10/13/94), 644 So.2d 1093, 1098-99 (finding the trial court acted within its discretion in prohibiting introduction of evidence concerning an intoxication defense where defense counsel did not file written notice of its intent to present such a defense until the morning of trial). Accordingly, Article 726 controlled whether notice of an intoxication defense was timely provided. We find the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in prohibiting evidence of an intoxication defense or in denying the defendant's motion for new trial.
These assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.