LEWIS, J. We have for review the decision in Diaz v. State, 800 So.2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wikso, 738 So.2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction.
559 So.2d at 461. Similarly, in Bass v. State, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), under similar circumstances, the court held that "once the vehicle was properly stopped, the officer could ask to see the driver's license and registration." 609 So.2d at 152.
See State v. Fernandez, 526 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA),cause dismissed, 532 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1988) (a court must accept evidence which is neither impeached, discredited, controverted, contradictory within itself, or physically impossible). Notably, State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), the case cited by the dissent, is clearly distinguishable because, in Bass, the trial court made a specific finding that it believed the officer's testimony that he could not read the tag on the car driven by the defendant. In closing, we note that, contrary to the state's urging, it is essential that there be an objective standard in which to justify the stop of a motorist because, absent an objective standard, there would be no protection against unreasonable seizures.
If the stop is for a traffic violation and is not pretextual, the police officer is permitted to talk with the driver, tell him or her why they were stopped, and request the person's driver's license, the car registration and information about ownership of the car. See State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Johnson v. State, 537 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); The police officer may also ask the driver questions beyond the scope of those matters, although the driver need not answer them. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
As the trial court correctly pointed out, the Diaz decision was announced after the defendant entered his plea, and the original trial counsel could not be faulted for failing to rely on a decision not yet announced. Although not mentioned in the motion, other opinions on the issue include State v. Wikso, 738 So.2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); and L.W. v. State, 538 So.2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). On appeal it is now contended that the motion really meant that the original trial counsel should have relied on the authorities cited within the Diaz decision.
Accordingly, we reverse Diaz's conviction. However, because the Fourth District in State v. Wikso, 738 So.2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and the Fifth District in State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), appear to have reached a conclusion contrary to our decision in Palmer, we also certify conflict with Bass and Wikso. Reversed.
Once Robinson was legally stopped, the use of a drug-sniffing dog is not an unconstitutional search under the fourth amendment. State v. Brooks, 662 So.2d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Sharp, W., J., dissenting); State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); State v. Orozco, 607 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), rev. denied, 614 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1993). An alert by a properly trained police dog provides probable cause for a search.
AFFIRMED. See State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). COBB, GOSHORN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
AFFIRMED. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). DAUKSCH, SHARP, W., and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.