Opinion
No. 57608-9-I.
April 16, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-1-08495-9, Carol A. Schapira, J., entered December 23, 2005.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Public records, like business records, are not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause. Because the records at issue in this case are public records, the trial court did not err in admitting them. And even if the Supreme Court chooses to overturn the precedent of this court, and find the admission of similar evidence to be erroneous, any such error would be harmless because other evidence in the record establishes the same facts. We affirm.
FACTS
The substantive facts of this case are undisputed. On April 25, 2005, Calvin Barksdale was pulled over for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested and charged with possession of cocaine, second degree driving while license suspended or revoked, and operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device. The interlock charge was subsequently dismissed.
At the pretrial hearing, Barksdale argued that portions of documents from the Department of Licensing (DOL) were testimonial, and thus violated his confrontation rights as described in Crawford v. Washington. There were two letters in the record from DOL. The first letter is dated December 16, 2005 and was prepared by DOL in response to the prosecutor's request for information about Barksdale's driving record. The pertinent part of the letter states:
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
After a diligent search of the computer files, the official record indicates on April 21, 2005, the following statements apply to the status of the above-named person:
Had not reinstated his/her driving privilege. Was suspended/revoked in the second degree. Subject was not eligible to reinstate his/her driving privilege on the above date of arrest.
Had not been issued a valid Washington license.
Barksdale objected to the following statements as containing testimonial hearsay: "Had not reinstated his/her driving privilege," "Was suspended/revoked in the second degree," and "Subject was not eligible to reinstate his/her driving privilege on the above date of arrest." His counsel conceded, however, that the sentence, "Had not been issued a valid Washington license," was admissible without live testimony under this court's recent decision in State v. N.M.K. After hearing argument on the matter, the trial court agreed to exclude the sentence, "Was suspended/revoked in the second degree."
State v. N.M.K., 129 Wn. App. 155, 118 P.3d 368 (2005), review granted, State v. Kirkpatrick, 157 Wn.2d 1001, 136 P.3d 758 (2006).
The second DOL letter was dated May 9, 2003. This letter was sent directly to Barksdale and advises him that his right to drive was suspended as of July 2, 2003, that the suspension would continue until July 2, 2005, and that he would not be eligible for reinstatement until July 2, 2005. Barksdale did not object to the admissibility of this letter.
The day after the court made its admissibility rulings, Barksdale waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated the court could consider the police report and other documents, including DOL records. The trial court found Barksdale guilty on the remaining two counts and sentenced Barksdale to 6 months confinement for each count to be served concurrently. Barksdale appeals.
ANALYSIS
Barksdale contends that this court's recent decisions in State v. Kronich and State v. N.M.K. were wrongly decided and that we should overrule them, or at the very least stay this case pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Kronich and N.M.K. on appeal. In N.M.K., the defendant argued that the introduction of a certified copy of the absence of a driver's license violated his confrontation rights under Crawford. The certified copy was the same kind of document at issue in this litigation and declared "`that after a diligent search of computer files there is no document or other evidence . . . to indicate that . . . the [DOL] had issued a valid license to' N.M.K." This court rejected N.M.K.'s argument. First, this court reasoned that the statement at issue fell "squarely within the absence of a public record exception to hearsay." Furthermore, this court explained:
Kronich, 131 Wn. App. 537, 128 P.3d 119, review granted, 157 Wn.2d 1008 (2006).
N.M.K., 129 Wn. App. at 163.
N.M.K., 129 Wn. App. at 163.
Such an exception parallels the absence of a business record exception that ER 803(a)(7) describes. The express language of Crawford states that "business records" are not testimonial. But we see no reason in law or logic why the absence of a business or public record should be treated differently. In short, we conclude that such a record is the functional equivalent of a business record for purposes of the confrontation clause.
N.M.K., 129 Wn. App. at 163.
In State v. Kronich, the certification at issue stated that the defendant, "Had not reinstated his/her driving privilege. Was suspended/revoked." Relying on N.M.K., the Kronich court stated that these statements were analogous to business records that the Crawford Court held to be nontestimonial. Judge Pro Tempore Rebecca Baker dissented, arguing that the statements in Kronich were distinguishable from those in N.M.K., and in her view were testimonial. Importantly, Judge Pro Tempore Baker went on to state that absent the DOL statements, "there is no other evidence in the record to suggest that the defendant's privilege to drive was suspended on the date charged." Therefore, in her view the error in admitting the statements was not harmless.
Kronich, 131 Wn. App. at 542.
Kronich, 131 Wn. App. at 556.
The statements at issue in this case are of the same nature as those discussed in Kronich, and we do not intend to revisit the issue. Nor do we choose to stay this case pending the Supreme Court's review, because unlike Kronich, here there is other evidence in the record to establish what the DOL certified statement contends, that Barksdale had his driving privileges suspended, that he was not eligible to reinstate his privileges on the date of the arrest, and that he had not been issued a Washington license. The May 9, 2003 letter from DOL to Barksdale establishes that Barksdale's right to drive was suspended as of July 2, 2003, that the suspension would continue until July 2, 2005, and that he would not be eligible for reinstatement until July 2, 2005. Barksdale was arrested on April 25, 2005. As such, even if Kronich and N.M.K. were reversed, we hold that any error in admitting the DOL records would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the above reasons, we affirm.