Opinion
No. 3-381 / 02-0968
Filed September 24, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Dale E. Ruigh (pre-trial ruling) and William A. Pattinson (trial) Judges.
Baker appeals his judgment and sentence for third-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna and Angelina Thomas, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Stephen A. Owen, of Moothart, Owen Stonehocker, L.L.P., Ames, for appellant.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412 authorizes a court to exclude evidence of a victim's "past sexual behavior" and Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 authorizes a court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence, after weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect. Both rules are potentially implicated in this case.
This rule is commonly referred to as our rape shield law.
The State charged twenty-four-year-old Mark Baker with sexually abusing a thirteen-year-old girl. SeeIowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(2)(b) (2001). Baker notified the court of his intent to introduce the girl's statement that she previously had sex with another adult, as well as her subsequent denial of this statement. In his view, these assertions impugned the girl's credibility.
The State moved to exclude these statements and the district court granted the motion. A jury found Baker guilty as charged.
On appeal, Baker contends the court abused its discretion in excluding the girl's statements. He argues that "demonstrably false past allegations of sexual abuse made by the alleged victim" do not fall within the prohibitions of rule 5.412 or, in the alternative, admission of the statements is mandated by the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution and a subsection of rule 5.412. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(b)(1).
The district court declined to evaluate the evidence under rule 5.412, relying instead on rule 5.403. After finding the evidence relevant in assessing the girl's credibility, the court excluded it on the ground its "probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and confusion of the issues." The court reasoned:
Unlike the circumstances surrounding the victim's report of sexual abuse in this case, she made no reports to law enforcement officials of any sexual contact with an adult neighbor. Apparently, the victim made her claims of sex with a neighbor under circumstances suggesting that she was bragging or trying to impress someone. She was not making the claims under circumstances indicating any displeasure with the alleged sexual contact. Also, the evidence fails to show that her claims of sexual contact with a neighbor had any factual basis.
We find no abuse of discretion either in the court's decision to rely on rule 5.403 rather than rule 5.412 or in its ultimate conclusion. State v. Alvey, 458 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Iowa 1990) (noting that under either rule, test was one of relevancy and ruling was discretionary). In addition, we agree with the court's comment that admission of this evidence "would violate the spirit of the rape shield law." See State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 739-40 (Iowa 1995) (holding evidence victim had sexually transmitted disease was "the very type of evidence the rape shield law was intended to prevent"); State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1992) (concluding term "past sexual behavior" in rule 5.412 clearly encompassed prior sexual abuse perpetrated on the victim). We find it unnecessary to address the parties' remaining arguments concerning this issue.
Baker also raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. His attorney introduced evidence of past crimes. Baker now contends the attorney was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction "to ensure that the jury did not consider the prior crimes evidence for an improper purpose, such as propensity." We preserve this claim for postconviction relief proceedings. See State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 84 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).