Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0931-14T3
04-01-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ABDUL S. AZIZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Abdul S. Aziz, appellant pro se. Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer and Haas. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 11-12-1201. Abdul S. Aziz, appellant pro se. Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
After a suppression hearing, and with leave granted by the Supreme Court, defendant Abdul S. Aziz appeals from the February 24, 2014 Law Division order denying his motion to suppress a recorded statement he gave to the police. Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we reverse.
The Court also stayed the trial proceedings pending appeal.
I.
The suppression hearing revealed the following facts. At approximately 7:45 a.m. on July 12, 2011, some employees of a local business discovered the body of a woman who had been shot in the head from "[c]lose proximity." Detective Robert Henderson of the county prosecutor's office reported to the scene in response to the employees' call. He found a cell phone by the victim's body. Henderson obtained video footage from another business that showed a blue Ford Explorer entering the area at 7:07 p.m. the night before. A man and a woman were in the car. The video showed the car leaving four minutes later with only the man in it.
Henderson obtained a search warrant for the phone, examined the contacts listed in it, and began calling some of the victim's relatives. The victim's sister was able to identify the victim. After comparing the victim's photograph with the surveillance video, Henderson believed that the victim was the woman in the blue Ford Explorer.
In the phone, Henderson also found a photograph of a man, who was later identified as defendant. Henderson found text messages that the victim had exchanged with defendant in which "it seemed like they were arguing and they also had plans to meet on" July 11, 2011, the day before the victim's body was found.
Through further investigation, Henderson learned that defendant owned a blue Ford Explorer. He went to defendant's apartment in Elizabeth on July 15, 2011, but defendant was not at home. Henderson obtained search warrants for defendant's car and apartment. The police also set up surveillance outside defendant's apartment house in the hope of finding him. On July 16, 2011, however, defendant turned himself in to the Elizabeth Police Department.
After the police took defendant into custody, he complained that he had not taken "his medication in a couple [of] days[.]" Although defendant appeared to be fine, Henderson and his partner, Detective Michael Manochio, arranged for the fire department to transport defendant to the hospital. The detectives stayed with defendant at the hospital for two hours. Henderson testified that, during that period, defendant "had a lot of questions" about the charges he was facing. However, Henderson told him, "we can't talk to you here. We'll talk to you back at our office."
After hospital staff "cleared" defendant "medically[,]" Henderson and Manochio transported him to the prosecutor's office for questioning, which began at 1:45 p.m. The detectives removed defendant's handcuffs, gave defendant a blanket after he stated he was cold, and began talking to him in an interview room. Initially, the detectives asked defendant to confirm that they had spent the last two hours with him at the hospital; defendant had "tried" to ask them a number of questions there; and the detectives told defendant they would talk to him at the prosecutor's office. The detectives then began to review defendant's Miranda rights with him.
The interrogation was "video-taped[,]" and the State introduced the recording and a verbatim transcript in evidence at the suppression hearing.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Henderson gave defendant an "Advisement of Constitutional Rights" form and asked him to read it out loud. The form had a space where defendant could indicate whether he understood that (1) he had the right to remain silent; (2) what he said could be used against him in a court of law; (3) he had the right to talk to an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning; (4) an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one; and (5) he could decide at any time to exercise his Miranda rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. After he read each of his rights, defendant wrote "yes" on the form and initialed each answer, indicating that he understood his rights.
Henderson then asked defendant to read the portion of the form that asked defendant whether he agreed to waive his rights, make a statement, and answer questions. The form stated: "I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me."
When defendant finished reading this portion of the form aloud, Manochio and Henderson asked defendant if he understood the form. In response, defendant stated, "I understand it, but I, I don't agree with it." Manochio started to interject, but defendant continued by stating, "In, in, in, in total I don't agree with it."
Despite defendant's clear disagreement with the entire waiver of rights statement, including the sentence that read, "I am willing to make a statement and answer questions[,]" Henderson asked defendant, "Well[,] what don't you agree with?" Defendant replied, "Well[,] go ahead sir. I wanna hear you out." Manochio told defendant, "Well no, we're gonna read you, we're gonna advise you of why you're here . . . [a]nd you're gonna let us know if you want to talk to us or not. . . . And that's it. It's not brain surgery." Defendant replied, "No, no I know that but it's just the wording of it seems so," but Manochio interrupted by asking, "Do you understand it, you don't understand it or?" In response, defendant twice stated, "I understand it."
Manochio told defendant, "You could talk to us and mid-way through whenever you want, you could decide to stop or keep going, it's up to you. Those are your constitutional rights." At this point, Henderson again joined the conversation, and harkened back to defendant's previous desire to learn more about the pending charges. Henderson stated, "[Rem]ember you said you had questions you know and I told you, . . . we would answer all your questions." Manochio reinforced this theme by stating, "For us to talk to you, . . . you don't have to agree with us and again we could start talking to you[.]"
In response, defendant stated, "I mean what's done is done so." The detectives then proceeded to question defendant about the events of July 11, 2011. During the course of the interrogation, defendant admitted to shooting the victim in the head with a gun that he then discarded.
Just before the detectives began to question defendant, they discussed between themselves what date and time to put as the "finishing time" at the end of the form. Defendant's signature appears at the bottom of the Miranda rights form, following the waiver of rights statement. However, the transcript does not indicate when defendant affixed his signature to the form.
Thereafter, a Union County grand jury issued a three-count indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and/or (2) (count one); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count three). Defendant filed a motion to suppress his recorded statement, arguing that the police violated the Fifth Amendment by continuing to question him after he stated that he did not agree with the statement regarding the waiver of his Miranda rights. Henderson was the only witness at the suppression hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge issued a brief written opinion, denying defendant's motion. The judge found that Henderson was "a credible and believable witness." The judge noted that defendant told the detectives he "did not agree with it" after he read the waiver statement on the Miranda form. However, the judge stated that Henderson then "tried to find out what [defendant] didn't agree with." Because defendant subsequently told the detectives "that he did understand his rights[,]" the judge concluded that defendant "did not invoke his rights when he stated that he did not agree with the wording of the waiver portion" of the form. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, defendant contends that the "detectives failed to scrupulously honor [his] Miranda rights after he clearly, unambiguously[,] and unequivocally invoked them when he refused to consent to the waiver portion of the rights form." We agree.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress for an alleged violation of Miranda, we use a "searching and critical" standard of review to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (2016)). We defer to a trial court's fact findings on a Miranda motion, if supported by sufficient credible evidence. Hreha, supra, 217 N.J. at 381-82 (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We do not, however, defer to a trial judge's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013).
The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the interrogating officers have complied with Miranda. State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43, 59 (2010). The trial judge must examine the totality of the circumstances. State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447-48 (1992).
The familiar Miranda warnings are intended to combat the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation. State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101-02 (1997). Under Miranda, before commencing a police interrogation, the police must advise the suspect that
he [or she] has the right to remain silent, that anything he [or she] says can be used against him [or her] in a court of law, that he [or she] has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he [or she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him [or her] prior to any questioning if he [or she] so desires.The warnings are designed to assure that the waiver of the fundamental right to remain silent is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707.
[Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.]
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 473-74; 86 S. Ct. at 1627, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723. After it is invoked, the defendant's right to remain silent must be "scrupulously honored." State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 282 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03, 96 S. Ct. 321, 325-26, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320-21 (1975)). Otherwise, "any statement taken after the [defendant] invokes his [or her] privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." Miranda supra, 384 U.S. at 474; 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723.
"[A] request to terminate an interrogation must be honored 'however ambiguous.'" State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 64-65 (1988) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288 (1984)). In determining a suspect's meaning, "a minute parsing of the words used," in isolation, may lead to an inaccurate conclusion. State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 627 (2011). On the other hand, a court must be mindful that "suspects do not, and cannot be expected to, 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.'" Ibid. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1994)). Thus, a defendant is "not required to express his [or her] desire with the utmost of legal precision." Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 65.
As the Court noted in Bey, however, if a "defendant's conduct and remarks are . . . equivocal, and the police [are] reasonably . . . unsure of [the] defendant's wishes," they may ask the defendant "to [clarify] the meaning of his [or her] statements." Id. at 65 n.10. The officers' questions must be "narrowly restricted" to this purpose. Ibid.; see also Alston, supra, 204 N.J. at 623 (quoting Johnson, supra, 120 N.J. at 283) (holding that where a suspect's request for an attorney is ambiguous, the police may seek clarification so long as the clarifying questions do not "delay, confuse, or burden the suspect in his assertion of his rights").
III.
Applying these principles, and mindful of the demanding standard of proof imposed upon the State, we are convinced that the trial judge erred in concluding that defendant agreed to waive his Miranda rights. The "waiver of rights" portion of the form contained the statement, "I am willing to make a statement and answer questions." After he read this waiver statement, defendant unambiguously stated, "I understand it, but I, I don't agree with it." That statement was an unequivocal refusal to waive his right to be silent.
If there were any doubt about his intention, defendant immediately reasserted, "in total I don't agree with it." (emphasis added). Because defendant clearly advised the detectives that he did not agree with any part of the waiver provision, they were required to immediately honor his request and cease the interrogation. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723. Because they did not, defendant's statement must be suppressed.
Even if defendant's refusal to agree with the waiver statement was unclear, which it was not, the questions the detectives asked him went beyond "clarifying" whether defendant intended to invoke his right to remain silent. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 65 n.10. Although Manochio asked defendant if he understood his right to remain silent, which defendant repeatedly said he did, neither detective asked defendant whether, by saying he did not agree with the waiver statement, he intended to invoke his right to remain silent. Instead, Henderson told defendant that, if defendant spoke to the detectives, they would be able to answer the questions defendant had at the hospital about the pending charges. Manochio also advised defendant that "[f]or us to talk to you . . . you don't have to agree with us and again we could start talking to you[.]"
Thus, rather than clarifying defendant's intent, the detectives' statements were designed to induce him to give a statement in spite of his clear statement that he did not agree to do so. At the very least, Manochio's statement was confusing, because it could readily be understood to mean that even if defendant did not agree with the waiver, the detectives could still "start talking to" defendant.
As noted earlier, defendant asked the detectives a number of questions at the hospital about the pending charges, but the detectives told them that they could not talk about the charges until they got to their office. --------
Under the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not scrupulously honored. Therefore, defendant's motion to suppress his recorded statement should have been granted. Because it was not, we are constrained to reverse.
Reversed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION