See A.B.A Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, §§ 1.1 through 4.7, at 11-19 (approved draft, 1970). Although our designation of the type of information which must be disclosed has varied from "exculpatory evidence" (State v. Hall, supra, 235 N.W.2d at 731; State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42, 47 [Iowa 1973]) to "matters germane" (State v. Deanda, 218 N.W.2d 649, 652 [Iowa 1974]) to "important evidence" (State v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 184, 125 N.W.2d 764, 769 [1964]) to "materially exculpatory evidence" (State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36, 40 [Iowa 1975]; State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731, 734 [Iowa 1972], cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 [1973]), it is clear from both federal and Iowa decisions not all information in the prosecution's files must be turned over as a matter of constitutional due process. Some of the underlying policy considerations were discussed in State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 768-775 (Iowa 1969), and State v. White, 260 Iowa 1000, 1005-1008, 151 N.W.2d 552, 555-556 (1967).

Failure to do so may entitle defendant to a new trial. State v. King, 256 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 1977); State v. Van Rees, 246 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1976); State v. Hummell, 228 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Iowa 1975); State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665, 675 (Iowa 1974); State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Iowa 1973); State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa 1972). The State did not violate its duty in this case.

You will find enclosed a list of apparently exculpatory material which may aid you in the investigation and preparation of a defense. We believe this list is consistent with Moore and the dictates of State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36 ([Iowa] 1975), State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665 ([Iowa] 1974), and State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 ([Iowa] 1972). Exhibit 146.

We have yet to allow defendants to have copies of statements of witnesses before trial. State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972); State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1971); State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 773-74 (Iowa 1969). The Jencks procedure "does not afford defendant license to rummage through prosecution files before trial, but was intended to protect files from unwarranted disclosure and to only make available at trial those materials which might lead to impeachment."

See P. Herrick, Underhill's Criminal Evidence § 594, at 1450-51 (5th ed. 1957).E.g., State v. Butler, 82 Ariz. 25, 307 P.2d 916, 919 (1957); People v. Tijerna, 1 Cal.3d 41, 81 Cal.Rptr. 264, 459 P.2d 680, 682 (1969); Raullerson v. People, 159 Colo. 395, 412 P.2d 236, 238-9 (1966); People v. Tate, 45 Ill.2d 540, 259 N.E.2d 791, 794 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 944, 28 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971); State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 (1973); State v. Carlson, 304 A.2d 681, 683 (Me. 1973); State v. Webb, 423 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. 1968); State v. Simons, 187 Neb. 761, 193 N.W.2d 756, 757 (1972); Riley v. United States, 291 A.2d 190, 193 (D.C.App. 1972); Morton v. State, 205 So.2d 662, 666 (Fla.App. 1968); Reece v. State, 125 Ga. App. 49, 186 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1971); Davidson v. State, 330 P.2d 607, 620-21 (Okl.Cr. 1958). See VII Wigmore on Evidence § 2081, at 422 and § 2089, at 451-52 (3rd ed. 1940); P. Herrick, Underhill's Criminal Evidence § 594, at 1450-51 n. 89 and § 605, at 1478 n. 58 (5th ed. 1957).

The statements were produced at the time our cases have said due process demands they be produced. State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 (1973); State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969). Therefore we do not have a problem involving alleged suppression of materially exculpatory evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

We have consistently rejected such broad and sweeping demands as being both too vague and too general. We hold the trial court's ruling was consistent with and justified by State v. Lyons, 210 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Iowa 1973); State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Iowa 1973); State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971; State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815, 826-828 (Iowa 1971) and State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 773-774 (Iowa 1969). Several of defendant's complaints in this area concern the State's alleged failure to comply with the trial court's order to produce rather than the order itself.

The State may not suppress requested statements which are materially exculpatory. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972). The county attorney is charged with the responsibility of seeing important evidence is not suppressed so as to deny a fair trial.

We are not confronted here with the situation in State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969), where we held trial court should have rejected defendant's pre-trial demand for copies of police reports for use in trial preparation and to afford him better assistance of counsel. Pre-trial motions for claimed exculpatory statements in police files were denied in State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Niccum, 190 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1971). Nor is this case comparable to State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1969), on appeal after remand, 183 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1971), where demand was made for the written investigation report filed by the policeman being cross-examined and we held trial court should make an in camera determination, in presence of counsel, whether any part was germane to the direct examination of the witness.

This was larceny on his part. State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 (1973). Instruction on intent.