"[A] criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed the right to an effective cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses." State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 473 (R.I. 1998); see also State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1997); State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 923-24 (R.I. 1980). "However, the scope of cross-examination is subject to reasonable limitation by the trial justice's exercise of his or her sound discretion."

We agree that a criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed the right to an effective cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses. State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1997); State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 923-24 (R.I. 1980). However, the scope of cross-examination is subject to limitation by the trial justice's exercise of his or her sound discretion.

State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1359 (R.I.1984) (citing State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982) ). Only after the defendant has been permitted sufficient cross-examination, may the trial justice limit questioning, “as long as he or she does not ‘unduly restrict’ a defendant's cross-examination right.” Brown, 709 A.2d at 473 (quoting State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I.1980) ). Questions that “harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness, or questions that are irrelevant or offer no probative value,” are properly limited by the trial justice.

Questions of this type are subject to exclusion in the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980). The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of clear abuse, and then only when such abuse constitutes prejudicial error.

Numerous cases have time and again enunciated that the right of cross-examination is an essential element included within the rights conferred by the confrontation clause. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872 (R.I. 1987); State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367 (R.I. 1984); State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149 (R.I. 1984); State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549 (R.I. 1982); State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1980). State v. Benevides, 420 A.2d 65 (R.I. 1980).

However, the United States Supreme Court has memorably stated that "this principle cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony." Gordon v. United States , 344 U.S. 414, 423, 73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447 (1953) ; see also State v. Anthony , 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980) ("[Cross-examination] is the principal means by which the credibility of the witness and the truthfulness of his [or her] testimony can be tested."). Indeed, this Court has also stated that "it is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the crossexaminer."

The scope of cross-examination is subject to the exercise of the trial justice's sound discretion. State v. Anthony , 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980) ; see alsoState v. Husband , 162 A.3d 646, 655 (R.I. 2017) ("[I]t is well settled that [this Court] review[s] a trial justice's decision admitting or excluding evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the exercise of this discretion must not unduly restrict a defendant's right to cross-examine.

This latitude should include an opportunity for a defendant to establish or reveal possible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried." State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980) (emphasis added). Cf. State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707, 715 (R.I. 2006) (perceiving no abuse of discretion in a trial justice's limitations on the scope and extent of cross-examination in view of the fact that "[t]he record quite clearly indicates that defendant was afforded a genuinely meaningful and broad opportunity to use the potent tool of cross-examination").

Moreover, after allowing sufficient cross-examination to satisfy this constitutional threshold, the trial justice's decision to limit further cross-examination is reversible only upon a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980). Even then, however, under the harmless error rule, if the error or abuse of discretion is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the result at trial will not be reversed on appeal.

A trial justice's rulings on the scope and extent of cross-examination are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 736 (R.I. 1992); State v. Benevides, 420 A.2d 65, 69 (R.I. 1980), and the rulings will be overturned only when such abuse constitutes prejudicial error. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I. 1980). Rule 611 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence limits the scope of cross-examination to "the subject matter of the direct examination."