Opinion
No. CR95 0110587
April 29, 1998
MEMORANDUM ON MOTION TO DISMISS
By way of a motion to dismiss, dated February 26, 1998, the state moves that the defendants' motion to seal/erase be dismissed on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion. Subject matter jurisdiction implicates the authority of a court to hear a case or controversy. State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 304-05, 610 A.2d 1147 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 228 Conn. 487, 636 A.2d 840 (1994). "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.... Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause...." Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568. 572 _ A.2d _ (1998).
Procedurally, the defendants' motion;; seal/erase is superfluous, since the erasure and nondisclosure provisions of § 54-112a were at the time of their acquittal, and still are, to be applied automatically if an appeal is not taken. SeeLechner v. Holmberg, 165 Conn. 152, 153 n. 1, 328 A.2d 701 (1973) (interpreting former erasure statute General Statutes § 54-90).
The defendants were tried before this court and a verdict of acquittal was rendered on December 4, 1997. Unless the state expresses an intention to appeal, a defendant is entitled to a full discharge after a verdict of acquittal is returned by the jury. See State v. Lloyd, 185 Conn. 199, 206, 440 A.2d 867 (1981);State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 108, 384 A.2d 315 (1977); State v. Carabetta, 106 Conn. 114, 119, 137 A. 394 (1927). Neither party claims that the state is appealing the decision, nor that the defendants were not adequately discharged subsequent to their acquittals. Accordingly, the court does not have jurisdiction over the defendants or the present action.
Assuming, arguendo, that this court did have jurisdiction, the court could provide no relief to the defendants under General Statutes § 54-142a. There is no applicable provision under § 54-142a that creates a remedy upon which the court may act. The defendants are actually seeking a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment under the guise of a motion to seal/erase. In light of the fact that this court discharged the defendants, the defendants must bring a separate civil action seeking that type of judgment. See John Doe v. William Ward, Director Drug Enforcement Division, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 394691 (June 10, 1992. Burns, J.) (declaratory judgment sought by plaintiff to enforce § 54-142a after criminal case was dismissed); Marciano v. Piel, 22 Conn. App. 627, 629, 579 A.2d 539 (199O): Practice Book § 542, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 23-46 (holding pleadings in mandamus same as ordinary civil actions to which general rules of pleading apply). Therefore, even if the court could exercise jurisdiction over the present matter, the defendants' subsequent motion to enforce automatic statutory provisions is improper and need not be addressed.
General Statutes § 54-142a (a) states in pertinent part: "Whenever in any criminal case . . . the accused, by a final judgment is found not guilty of the charge . . . all police and court records and records of any state's attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased upon the expiration of the time to file a writ of error or take an appeal, if an appeal is not taken. or upon final determination of the appeal sustaining a finding of not guilty . . . if an appeal is taken. . . ."
For the foregoing reasons the state's motion to dismiss dated February 26, 1998 is granted.
STODOLINK, J.