Opinion
No. CR4-080369138
May 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a Motion for New Trial. In support of the motion, the defendant asserts that he was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant on her proclivity to lie, specifically as to her admission that she lied to police and altered evidence in a complaint she made against another person who had allegedly threatened her.
The Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-6(b)(1) provides as follows: "A witness may be asked, in good faith, about specific instances of conduct of the witness, if probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness, . . . but the specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of impeaching the witness' credibility may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." § 6-6(b)(2).
In this case, the defendant through his attorney, conducted a cross-examination of the complainant. He questioned her extensively about the conduct and circumstances which formed the basis for the criminal charges. The defendant inquired whether she had lied in her testimony, lied to her parents about house rules, or lied to her friends.
The complainant denied lying in her testimony or to her parents. She admitted telling lies to her friends and described some of those lies. She also admitted that three years earlier she had lied about her age when she listed herself as being twenty-three years old on MYSpace. Her date of birth is May 2, 1993.
During the course of the cross-examination the defendant further inquired whether she had lied to her friends on line. The state objected. There was extensive argument over the on line communications and the area of inquiry. The state asked for an offer of proof.
The argument centered around a complaint that involved the complainant, another teenager, and an alleged threat. The defendant believed that the complainant had altered e-mails and lied in an attempt to have the other teenager arrested for threatening her. After hearing from both sides, the court ruled the matter collateral and sustained the state's objection.
When the jury returned, the defendant resumed cross-examination with a question directly about the e-mails between the complainant and the other teenage girl. The state again objected and asked for an offer of proof.
The court again excused the jury and the defendant and state questioned the complainant. The last question the defendant asked the complainant was "so you lied to the police because you told them you had been threatened and it really wasn't true, correct?" The complainant responded "yes." The defendant believes he should have been allowed to ask this question in front of the jury and take whatever answer the complainant gave.
Both the defendant and the state questioned the complainant. At the end of the questioning there was information that each girl had complained about a threat from the other, both had exchanged e-mails, and they both gave e-mails to the investigating officer. The complainant admitted to making changes in the e-mails but explained she had to print the information off MySpace, then copied and pasted it to Word Pad. She stated that the font changed and she had not included all of the information. She also inquired as to the meaning of the word "alteration." She was also emphatic that she had not made any changes to make it seem that she had been threatened because the other teenager had threatened her.
The officers brought both teenagers in with their parents, and after talking with everyone, neither party was arrested and the officer told the teenagers to stop e-mailing each other.
"In determining whether a defendant's right to cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues at trial . . ." State v. Jones, 60 Conn.App. 866, 869-70 (2000).
"A witness may be asked about his or her specific acts of misconduct . . . that are probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness." State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 60, 617 A.2d 323 (1996). "However, even if conduct does relate to veracity, the court still has the discretion to exclude it if the evidence . . . has a tendency to confuse or impede the litigation by injecting collateral issues." Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122 (1961).
"The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . This right, however, is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. The trial court, in its discretion, may impose limitations on the scope of the cross-examination . . . as long as the defendant has been permitted sufficient cross-examination to satisfy constitutional requirements . . . The defendant does not have a right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination." (Internal quotation marks omitted). State v. Liborio A., 93 Conn.App. 279, 286, 889 A.2d 821 (2006). State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 110, 994 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).
In this case, exploring the incident between the complainant and the other teenager, would have injected a collateral issue into the proceedings. On the other hand, the question alone, without context had the potential to confuse and mislead the jury.
At argument on the motion, both the defendant and the state represented that they had reviewed the reports about the incident and there was no information that the complainant had lied about the threat. Furthermore, the officer took no action and told both teenagers not to e-mail each other.
The defendant cited two cases in support of his motion, but those can be distinguished. In State v. Martin, 201 Conn. 74 (1986), the trial court failed to exercise its discretion. In Demers v. State, 209 Conn. 143 (1988), the state had failed to disclose information that the complainant had been arrested for prostitution. In that case, the complainant denied being a `hooker' and had never participated in sex for money. The defendant raised a defense of consent and stated that the complainant had agreed to sexual intercourse for money. That information was relevant to substantive or material issue in the case.
Here, the defendant had the opportunity to cross examine the complainant about lying and she admitted she had lied, it would have been inappropriate to allow a line of questioning into the conduct of the complainant and the other teenager about the alleged threats and the e-mails as that was collateral to the issues at hand and had the potential to confuse the jury. Furthermore, the defendant cross-examined the complainant about lying and she admitted she had lied. Therefore, the limitation on the question was insufficient to affect the complainant's credibility such that the outcome would have been different.
Accordingly, the Motion for a New Trial is denied.