Opinion
I.D. No. 0002001016
Submitted: December 1, 2002
Decided: December 18, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 30th day of January, 2003, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On August 22, 2000, Defendant, Eric Amaro, pleaded guilty to Third Degree Rape. On October 27, 2000, the Court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after serving five years for ten years Level 4 incarceration, suspended after serving six months for probation. The first two years of Defendant's sentence is a statutory minimum mandatory term of incarceration.
(2) Defendant has now filed the above-captioned Motion for Postconviction Relief. In support of his motion, Defendant lists as grounds for relief claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, "failure to turn over exculpatory evidence," and "Constitution[al] violation USCA Cons. Amend. 5. 1 4." This is Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief and the Court has determined that none of the procedural bars listed in Rule 61 are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's motion.
(3) In support of his first ground for relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant alleges that his defense counsel failed investigate the State's case against him. Defendant argues that, had counsel adequately investigated the charges against him, Defendant would not have entered a guilty plea.
(4) Initially, the Court finds that, to the extent that Defendant challenges the evidence supporting his guilt as a ground for relief, that challenge is without merit. By pleading guilty, Defendant waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him. In addition, the Court cannot find that Defendant entered his guilty plea involuntarily or without adequate knowledge. On his guilty plea form, Defendant acknowledged that he understood, by pleading guilty, that he gave up the right to trial and the constitutional rights equated with that right, including the right to hear and question witnesses against him and to present evidence in his defense. Defendant averred that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation of him and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of the guilty plea. Review of the plea colloquy transcript also supports the Court's finding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea.
State v. Jones, 1990 WL 18267 (1990 Del. Supr.).
(5) A criminal defendant who raises an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that the attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards so that such conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. A defendant must be able to show that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to prove either that his counsel's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards or that any such alleged conduct was prejudicial. As a result, the Court finds that Defendant's first ground for relief is without merit.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 669.
(6) Defendant's second ground for relief alleges that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. As set forth above, by pleading guilty, Defendant waived his constitutional trial rights, including the right to present evidence in his defense. Therefore, the Court cannot find that Defendant's allegation, even if true, prejudiced him or caused his plea to be "involuntary and unintelligent," as Defendant alleges. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's second ground for relief also is without merit.
(7) Defendant's third ground for relief, "Constitution[al] violation USCA Cons. Amend. 5. 14," Defendant claims that his attorney "fail [sic] to protect me from privilege against self-incrimination [sic] statement, a clear violation of his 5th Amendment." In essence, Defendant seems to be arguing that his attorney should have attempted to suppress statements he made prior to his arrest to a disease intervention specialist at the Porter Center Clinic. Defendant seemingly argues that his statements were involuntary, protected by physician-patient privilege, and taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Again, as set forth above, Defendant gave up his Constitutional trial rights, which includes the right to challenge the State's case against him . Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's second ground for relief also is without merit.
(8) Finally, in his memorandum attached to his motion, Defendant asserts a fourth ground for relief "in the alternate [sic]." In his final ground for relief, Defendant attempts to assert his actual innocence to the crime of Third Degree Rape and asks that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. Again, Defendant has given up his right to assert his innocence to the charge for which he was convicted. The Court finds that Defendant's final ground for relief therefore is without merit.
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.