Opinion
No. 59579-2-I.
January 22, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-8-04779-8, Patricia H. Clark, J., entered February 20, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining jurisdiction over a 16-1/2 year old charged with second degree rape. It considered all eight of the factors required by Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966), and substantial evidence supports its findings.
A. M., 16-1/2 years old, was charged with second degree rape of a 17 year old girl. The juvenile court granted the State's motion to decline jurisdiction and transferred A.M. for adult criminal prosecution.
RCW 13.40.110 requires juvenile decline hearings when defendants are 15 years of age or older and charged with a class A felony.
A.M. contends the court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction. See State v. M.A., 106 Wn. App. 493, 498, 23 P.3d 508 (2001). A court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable grounds. Id.
To determine whether declination of jurisdiction is appropriate, the juvenile court must consider the following factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966):
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i. e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
See also State v. Holland, 98 Wn.2d 507, 515 n. 2, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983).
All eight Kent factors need not be proven. State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440, 447, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993). Rather, they serve "to focus and guide the juvenile court's discretion." Id.
A.M. challenges the court's determinations under factors number 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8. A review of the record reveals that the court properly took all of these into account.
The court, considering A.M.'s criminal history and drug use and the amount of supervision the juvenile system could provide, determined that the protection of the community required waiver. Provider reports and testimony supported the court's finding.
The alleged victim was held in a car, choked, threatened, and raped. Her screams were heard by people in nearby apartments, who summoned police. Officers found her driving away from the scene half naked. The court found the crime aggressive and violent. We agree.
The State presented statements from the victim, eyewitnesses, 911 calls and detailed police reports. The case had sufficient merit.
A.M.'s sophistication and maturity was a closer call. A.M. has a low IQ and is mostly illiterate. A juvenile probation counselor testified that A.M. is emotionally dependent on his mother. The court considered these characteristics, but observed that A.M. understood right from wrong, was dedicated to maintaining his gang membership until he was at least 30 years old, and did not regularly involve his family in his life, despite A.M.'s claims. The court weighed the evidence before it, and its decision that A.M. was sufficiently mature to be tried as an adult was not manifestly unreasonable.
The court considered A.M.'s history, which included crimes in California, Yakima, and King County, including a prior violent sex offense. It also observed that A.M. had failed to avail himself of the juvenile system's services. For example, he left drug treatment after only 9 days, had made no progress in sexual deviancy treatment at Green Hill School, and his parole was twice revoked for multiple violations.
Regarding the public's protection and the likelihood of rehabilitation, the court observed that although A.M. might benefit from some of the juvenile justice system's services, retaining juvenile court jurisdiction put the community at tremendous risk because A.M. needed to be highly supervised for an extended period of time and the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction once A.M. turned 21.
The court considered all eight Kent factors, and substantial evidence supports all of the court's findings. We see no abuse of discretion and affirm.