Opinion
Nos. 108,093 108,225 108,226.
2013-04-5
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Felix ALONSO, Appellant.
Appeal from Ford District Court; Daniel L. Love, Judge. Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Jaskamal P. Dhillon, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Ford District Court; Daniel L. Love, Judge.
Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Jaskamal P. Dhillon, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., HILL and LEBEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Felix Alonso claims the district court erred in the assessment of jail time credit among the various cases Alonso had pending. The three pending cases were 10CR557, 11CR125, and 11CR346. We will refer to them as # 557, # 125, and # 346 respectively.
On July 27, 2011, Alonso was arrested on warrants issued in # 125 and # 557. He was taken into custody in those two cases. Two days later, on July 29, 2011, charges were filed in # 346. Alonso remained in custody and was being held on all three cases.
On August 5, 2011, Alonso was sentenced to probation in # 125, and his probation in # 557 was revoked and reinstated. His bond was released in # 125 and # 557 and he was no longer in custody on those two cases, but he remained in jail because he had not posted the bond set in # 346. (He remained in custody in # 346 until he was sentenced on March 9, 2012.)
On January 12, 2012, Alonso entered into a plea agreement in all three cases: (1) Alonso was to receive a 27–month prison sentence in # 346; (2) his probation was to be revoked in # 557 and he would serve a consecutive 6–month sentence; and (3) his probation in # 125 was to be terminated as unsuccessful. There was no agreement regarding jail time credit.
On March 9, 2012, the court imposed sentences in all three cases in accordance with the plea agreement. But the court awarded 227 days jail credit in # 125 for the period from July 27, 2011 (when Alonso was arrested), through the day of sentencing. This was in spite of the fact that Alonso had been released from custody in # 125 on August 5, 2011, and since then had been held in custody only in # 346. The court provided for no jail time credit in # 346.
Alonso appeals, contending the district court erred in denying jail time credit in # 346. The right to jail time credit is statutory, so the issue for us is one of law for which our review is unlimited. See State v. Jolly, 291 Kan. 842, 845–46, 249 P.3d 421 (2011).
K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6615(a) provides:
“In any criminal action in which the defendant is convicted, the judge, if the judge sentences the defendant to confinement, shall direct for the purpose of computing defendant's sentence and parole eligibility and conditional release dates thereunder, that such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in the sentencing order of the journal entry of judgment. Such date shall be established to reflect and shall be computed as an allowance for the time which the defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case.”
A sentencing court must give a defendant credit for time spent in jail while awaiting the disposition of the defendant's case. See State v. Wheeler, 24 Kan.App.2d 616, 617–18, 949 P.2d 634 (1997), rev. denied 264 Kan. 824 (1998). Jail time credit is earned under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–6615(a) solely for jail time incurred on account of, or as a direct result of, the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced. See State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003); State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 98, 661 P.2d 781 (1983). A defendant is not entitled to credit on a sentence for time which he or she has spent in jail upon other distinct and wholly unrelated charges. Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 2, 575 P.2d 524 (1978).
Here, the district court erred by incorrectly crediting Alonzo's jail time credit for the time he spent in jail from August 5, 2011, to March 9, 2012, to his sentence in # 125 rather than to his sentence in # 346. The State concedes the issue. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.