Opinion
No. 3-886 / 02-1807
Filed February 11, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Larry J. Conmey, Judge.
Albertson appeals an order of the district court requiring her to pay restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.3B (2001). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Linda Paulson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Seventeen-year-old Brandy Albertson invited some friends, including eighteen-year-old Kevin Kieffer, to her apartment. Albertson offered the friends "morphine pills" which they all accepted. Kieffer also was consuming alcohol. He passed out and eventually died.
Albertson pled guilty to three counts of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance, dilaudid (hydromorphone). See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(8) and 124.206(2)(a)(11) (2001). The district court pronounced sentence. Then the court raised the applicability of Iowa Code section 910.3B. This statute authorizes restitution of at least $150,000 where "the offender is convicted of a felony in which the act or acts committed by the offender caused the death of another person." Following a restitution hearing, the court ruled that Albertson caused the death of Kieffer, entitling Kieffer's estate to $150,000 in restitution.
Albertson raises a single issue on appeal: "whether the district court erred in concluding that defendant's act of delivery of a controlled substance `caused' the death of Mr. Kieffer, within the meaning of Iowa Code section 910.3B." Our review is for errors of law. State v. Starkey, 437 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Iowa 1989). Findings of fact have the effect of a special verdict. State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Iowa 1998). They are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001).
Under Iowa Code section 910.3B, "commission of the offense must have been the proximate cause of the victim's death." State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Iowa 2000). A defendant's conduct is the proximate cause if "(1) [the] conduct is a `substantial factor' in bringing about the harm and (2) there is no other rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. . . ." State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992). Proximate cause often turns on the concept of foreseeability. State v. Ayers, 478 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Iowa 1991).
With respect to the first element, the district court determined that, But for the Defendant's act of suggesting that he take the pills, providing him the pills for consumption at a time when he was drinking alcohol, he would not have died. The Defendant's act was a substantial factor in bringing about his death, and the Court finds the Defendant certainly could foresee that combining alcohol and dilaudid could result in harm to the victim, even if she did not exactly foresee that he would die.
The record contains substantial evidence to support these findings. See Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d at 168 (stating district court "must find causal connection between the established criminal act and the injuries to the victim."). Albertson asked the youth if they wished to go to her apartment to drink. Once there, Albertson offered them prescription morphine pills. Kieffer took two. Later, he asked Albertson for more. Although Albertson initially refused, she eventually tired of resisting and threw the bottle of pills in Kieffer's direction. Kieffer took two more pills. Throughout the evening, he was also drinking beer. One friend estimated that he consumed an entire case. Eventually, Kieffer passed out on Albertson's couch. The next morning, Kieffer was still unconscious. Paramedics arrived and transported him to a hospital, where he died.
An autopsy revealed that Kieffer died from complications as a result of intoxicating substances in his body. The physician who performed the autopsy testified that Kieffer's blood alcohol content was .118 at the time he was admitted to the hospital. He opined that this level of alcohol was unlikely to cause death in an otherwise healthy person in the absence of "some other factor."
While there was evidence that Albertson warned the boys not to mix alcohol and pills and put the pill bottle into a medicine cabinet, a fact-finder was free to accept the State's version of events. See State v. Begey, 672 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Iowa 2003). Similarly, the fact-finder was free to reject Albertson's contention that Kieffer's own conduct caused his demise. Id. As our highest court recently reiterated, a victim's conduct must amount to the sole proximate cause of injury to relieve a defendant of liability. Id.; see also State v. Dalton, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2004). The district court reasonably could have found that this standard was not satisfied. Cf. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 2000) (finding evidence sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter conviction where mother supplied large amounts of alcohol to minors and knew it was being consumed by minors).
With respect to the second causation element, "no other rule of law relieves the defendant of liability," Albertson claims she cannot be held liable for restitution because injury or death was not an element of the crime with which she was charged and to which she pled guilty. However, our appellate courts have not imposed this rule of law in restitution cases.
In State v. Starkey, 437 N.W.2d 573, (Iowa 1989) the defendant was charged with leaving the scene of a personal injury accident. He was ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 573-74. On appeal, Starkey argued restitution was inappropriate because the victim's injuries were not caused or exacerbated by his act of leaving the scene, but by the accident itself. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed, finding "[t]he only inference supported by the record is that [the victim's] injuries occurred before Starkey committed the offense with which he was charged. . . ." Id. at 575. The Court did not state that harm to the victim had to be an element of the underlying offense.
In State v. Mai, 572 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and operating while intoxicated (OWI) following an accident that resulted in the death of another person. Mai, 572 N.W.2d at 169. A jury acquitted Mai of vehicular homicide, but found him guilty of OWI Id. Mai was ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 169-70. On the causation issue, our court said, "[i]n reaching its verdict, the jury implicitly found [the victim's] death was not caused by Mai's intoxication." Id. at 171. The court went on to conclude that, "[ w] ithout further proof, Mai's conviction of driving while intoxicated is not sufficient to meet the State's burden to establish [the victim] died as the result of Mai's criminal conduct and the resulting entitlements to the victim restitution." Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added). This language suggests that restitution may be imposed even if injury or death is not an element of the underlying crime.
We affirm the restitution award.