From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

State v. Akers

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jan 9, 2002
No. 1-865 / 01-0694 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2002)

Opinion

No. 1-865 / 01-0694.

Filed January 9, 2002.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, KRISTIN L. HIBBS Judge.

Danny Akers appeals from his judgment and sentence for burglary in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1, 713.6A, and 703.1 (1999). AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and David Tiffany, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.


Danny Akers appeals from his judgment and sentence for burglary in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1, 713.6A, and 703.1 (1999). We affirm.

On October 18, 2000, Akers and two companions broke into and stole various items from three vehicles in Iowa City. Akers was arrested and charged with three counts of burglary in the third degree and one count of possession of burglar's tools in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1, 713.6A, 703.1, and 713.7. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Akers entered a plea of guilty to one count of burglary in the third degree. The State dismissed the remaining charges. Akers was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years. The sentence was suspended and Akers was placed on supervised probation for three years. On appeal, Akers contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to defer judgment.

Our review of sentencing decisions is for the corrections of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4; State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). The determination of whether to grant a deferred judgment lies within the trial court's discretion. Iowa Code § 901.5. "We will not interfere unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors." State v. Kelley, 357 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984) (citing State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983)).

In deciding whether to enter a deferred judgment, a district court is required to balance the goal of a defendant's rehabilitation against the goal of community protection. Iowa Code § 907.5 (1999); accord Iowa Code § 901.5. The court did so here. The court stated in pertinent part:

The reason for the judgment and sentence is the crime itself, of course. Your age is a factor. I agree with your attorney insofar as there's some of this stuff on your juvenile record that is of no consequence, but I must say when I read [the pre-sentence investigation report] this morning, I was quite taken by the fact that we have got five adjudications within two, three years, plus one adult charge of a serious misdemeanor. In my opinion, given this track record, a deferred judgment is not appropriate, and I don't — obviously, I didn't defer the judgment.

This takes into account, as I mentioned, your past record of what I consider to be juvenile adjudications and convictions. I don't consider the other items. Takes into account your age; your present working situation; the nature of the offense; and, of course, the need to protect the community from other offenses.

We find the district court acted within its discretion and adequately balanced the twin goals set forth in our sentencing statutes. Accordingly, we affirm Akers's conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

State v. Akers

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jan 9, 2002
No. 1-865 / 01-0694 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2002)
Case details for

State v. Akers

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY ALEN AKERS, Defendant-Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Jan 9, 2002

Citations

No. 1-865 / 01-0694 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2002)