Summary
In State Roads Commission v. Lassiter, 196 Md. 552, 77 A.2d 16, we held that the rule fixing the time of appeal, in general terms, did not repeal the statutory provision fixing a shorter time in condemnation cases.
Summary of this case from Renz v. Bonfield Holding Co.Opinion
[No. 100, October Term, 1950.]
Decided December 8, 1950.
Condemnation — Appeal from Judgment Must Be Entered Within 10 Days from Its Date and Record Must Be Filed Within 30 Days from Entry of Appeal — Repeal of Statutes By Implication, Never Favored — Court Exercises Special Statutory Jurisdiction In Condemnation Proceedings and No Appeal In Absence of Express Grant.
An appeal from a judgment in a condemnation suit must be entered within 10 days from the date of judgment as provided in Code (1939), Art. 33A, § 12, and the record must be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within 30 days from the date of the entry of such an appeal as provided in that act. pp. 553-554
Appeals Rule 2, adopted in 1945 and readopted in 1947, providing that all appeals from a judgment of a Court of law must be taken within 30 days from the date of the judgment, did not repeal Code (1939), Art. 33A, § 12. pp. 553-554
Repeals of statutes by implication are never favored. p. 554
In the field of eminent domain, the court exercises a special statutory jurisdiction and no appeal to the Court of Appeals lies, in the absence of express grant by the legislature. p. 554
Decided December 8, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County, (BOYLAN, C.J.).
Condemnation suit by State Roads Commission of Maryland against Carl L. Lassiter and others. From a judgment for the defendants, plaintiffs appealed and defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not entered, and the record was not filed, within the respective times therefor prescribed in the condemnation statute.
Appeal dismissed.
The cause was argued before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
J. Clarke Murphy, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Hall Hammond, Attorney General, Joseph D. Busher, Special Attorney General, and D. Eugene Walsh on the record, for appellants.
Theodore F. Brown, with whom were Brown Shipley on the brief, for appellees.
This appeal, from a judgment in a condemnation suit entered on July 5, 1950 was filed on July 27, 1950. The transcript was filed in this court on September 27, 1950. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was not taken within ten days, and that the record was not transmitted within thirty days, as required by Code, Article 33A, § 12. The appellants resist the motion on the ground that the time for taking the appeal was extended to thirty days and the time for transmitting the record to sixty days, by Rule 2 of the "Rules and Regulations Respecting Appeals", first adopted by this court in 1945, and readopted without change in 1947. We advanced the case to hear argument upon the motion.
Similar arguments were advanced in the cases of Robertson v. Dorsey, 195 Md. 274-275 73 A.2d 503, 504 and Grant v. Curtin, 194 Md. 368-369, 71 A.2d 304, 306. We held that Rule 2 did not supersede special statutory exceptions dealing with the time for appeal. We think those cases are controlling. We find no merit in the appellant's contention that these cases are distinguishable because the exceptions there considered were each included in Article 5 of the Code. Nor do we find a sufficient ground of distinction in the fact that we subsequently amended Rule 2, on February 17, 1950, to expressly modify the statutory exception dealt with in the Curtin case, or that the Robertson case was based, in part, upon the prior decision in Riggin v. Wyatt, 139 Md. 476, 115 A. 755.
It is true that the words of Rule 2, standing alone, are broad enough to include all appeals, and the provisions of section 18, or section 18A, Article IV of the Maryland Constitution, may properly be held to confer the power upon this court to modify or repeal existing statutory provisions as to the time of appeal. But repeals by implication are never favored, and it is significant that in the adoption of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure special provisions were included to indicate specifically the effect on existing laws and rules. Since the power to deal with the subject matter is presumably shared with the legislature, it is peculiarly appropriate that changes in this field should not be left to implication.
In adopting sections 12 and 13 of Article 33A (the latter section having been reenacted in 1945 subsequent to the adoption of Rule 2 containing the thirty day provision), the legislature evidently felt that time was of the essence. In the field of eminent domain the court exercises a special statutory jurisdiction and no appeal to this court lies, in the absence of express grant by the legislature. Pumphrey v. State Roads Comm., 175 Md. 498, 2 A.2d 668. It was held in that case that the statutory provision was not superseded by a local rule of court imposing a time limit upon signing bills of exception. There is even less reason in the instant case than in the Robertson case to spell out an implied repeal.
Whether it is desirable, as the appellant argues, that the time of appeal should be made uniform in all cases, or whether to avoid confusion any exceptions deemed necessary or advisable should be incorporated in the rule itself, are matters that cannot affect the result in the instant case. We may say that the Rules Committee has been requested to study the matter and make recommendations for the future.
Appeal dismissed, with costs.