Opinion
No. 1:05-cv-1106-GET.
September 12, 2006.
ORDER
The above-styled matter is presently before the court on the motion for summary judgment by W. Boyd Carlyle, Kathy C. Finley, Betty C. Rogers [docket no. 42].
Plaintiff filed this interpleader action to resolve potentially conflicting claims to the proceeds of life insurance policies issued by plaintiff and insuring decedent Walter Cecil Carlyle. Defendants filed counterclaims against the plaintiff and cross-claims against each other.
On December 27, 2005, defendants/cross-claimants/cross-defendants W. Boyd Carlyle, Kathy C. Finley, and Betty C. Rogers (collectively "Trustees") filed a motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim against State Farm Life Insurance Company ("State Farm") and their cross-claim against Laura Elaine Carlyle and Walter Clay Carlyle (collectively "Respondents"). Specifically, the Trustees seek a declaration and award as follows: (1) Walter Cecil Carlyle's beneficiary changes to the Policies on September 30, 2004 and October 1, 2004 are valid and binding, (2) $24,000.00, plus interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-25-10, under the First Policy to the Estate of Walter Cecil Carlyle with W. Boyd Carlyle and Betty C. Rogers as trustees under the policy and co-executors of the estate; (3) $150,000.00, plus interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-25-10, under the Second Policy to Lindsey Makayla Carlyle and Caden Christian Carlyle with Kathy C. Finley as trustee under the policy; (4) $100,000.00, plus interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-25-10, under the Third Policy to Lindsey Makayla Carlyle and Caden Christian Carlyle with W. Boyd Carlyle and Betty C. Rogers as trustees under the policy.
State Farm did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. Respondents filed their response on January 16, 2006.
Standard
Courts should grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must "always bear the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). That burden is `discharged by "showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325; see also U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991).Once the movant has met this burden, the opposing party must then present evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and submit evidence such as affidavits, depositions and admissions that are sufficient to demonstrate that if allowed to proceed to trial, a jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial. In making a determination of whether there is a material issue of fact, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 255; Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). However, an issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence or if it is created by evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Similarly, a fact is not material unless it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 248. Thus, to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, the party opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific evidence of every element essential to his case with respect to which (1) he has the burden of proof, and (2) the summary judgment movant has made a plausible showing of the absence of evidence of the necessary element. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Facts
In light of the foregoing standard, the court finds the following facts for the purpose of resolving this summary judgment motion only. Trustees are siblings of the deceased, Cecil Carlyle. Defendant/cross-claimant/cross-defendant Walter Clay Carlyle ("Clay") is the son of Cecil Carlyle and his first wife Elaine Carlyle. Defendant/cross-claimant/cross-defendant Laura Elaine Carlyle ("Laura") is the daughter of Cecil and Elaine Carlyle. Clay was born on October 14, 1980 and Laura was born on November 4, 1982.
After approximately 24 years of marriage, Cecil and Elaine Carlyle divorced in 1994. At the time of the divorce, Cecil and Elaine Carlyle had two children, Clay and Laura Carlyle ("Respondents"). As part of the divorce, the parties entered into a divorce agreement, dated July 10, 1994, which became final with the court on September 21, 1994. The Settlement Agreement incorporated into the Divorce Decree between Elaine and Cecil Carlyle states: "The parties shall have joint custody of the minor children of the parties, to wit: WALTER CLAY CARLYLE and LAURA ELAINE CARLYLE, with Plaintiff [Elaine Caxlyle] being the primary custodial parent. The parties shall consult with each other concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor children. If the parties are unable to agree on aspects concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor children, then the Plaintiff shall have the responsibility of making the decision."
The agreement further provides that Cecil Carlyle was to pay monthly child support payments in the amount of $600.00 each for Clay and Laura Carlyle. These payments were to begin on February 1994 and "continue on the first day of each month thereafter until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, marries, enters the armed services, becomes self-supporting or dies, whichever event shall first occur."
The Agreement required Cecil Carlyle to "maintain medical and hospitalization insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties." Cecil Carlyle also agreed to "pay sixty-five percent (65%) of the expenses incurred by each child under the age of 22.5 years of age to secure a four-year college education." Finally, the Agreement provides that "[t]he parties agree to maintain life insurance on their lives that is in place as of the date of this agreement. The parties agree that the beneficiary of said insurance policy(ies) on their lives shall be a trust for their minor children."
After the divorce from Elaine Carlyle, Cecil Carlyle married Lisa Samples Carlyle and they had two children — Lindsay and Caden Carlyle. Lindsay Carlyle is approximately nine years old and Caden Carlyle is approximately four years old. Lisa Samples Carlyle died in November 2001.
The original date on State Farm life insurance policy number LF-036303154 ("First Policy") in the amount of $24,000 was on or about January 8, 1976. On October 1, 2004, Cecil Carlyle changed the beneficiaries on the First Policy from "½ each or to the survivor of Walter Clay Carlyle and Laura Elaine Carlyle with Kathy Finley as informal trustee" to the "Estate of Walter Cecil Carlyle with Betty Rogers and Boyd Carlyle a Trustees." The October 1, 2004 change of beneficiary for the First Policy was recorded by State Farm on October 7, 2004.
The original date on State Farm life insurance policy LF-0732-7466 ("Second Policy"), in the amount of $150,000, was on or about September 7, 1984. On September 30, 2004, Cecil Carlyle changed the beneficiaries on the Second Policy from "½ to each or to the survivor of Walter Clay Carlyle and Laura Elaine Carlyle with Kathy Finley as informal trustee" to "Lindsey Makayla Carlyle and Caden 30, 2004 change of beneficiary for the Second Policy was recorded The original date on State Farm life insurance policy number ("Third Policy"), in the amount of $100,000.00 was on February 2, 1994 and was converted into Policy No. LF-1520-3860 on February 2, 1997. In 2001, Cecil Carlyle changed the beneficiaries change of beneficiary for the Third Policy was recorded by State Farm on October 6, 2004.
Boyd Carlyle and Betty Rogers, on behalf of Cecil Carlyle's estate and in their capacity as executors and trustees under the First Policy, made a claim for the proceeds under the First Policy on October 25, 2004. Kathy Finley, on behalf of Lindsey and Caden Carlyle and in her capacity as trustee under the Second Policy, made a claim for the proceeds under the Second Policy on October 25, 2004. Boyd Carlyle and Betty Rogers, on behalf of Lindsey and Laden Carlyle and in their capacity as co-trustees under the Third Policy, made a claim for the proceeds under the Third Policy on October 25, 2004. Clay and Laura Carlyle made a claim for the proceeds under the three policies on December 6, 2004.
Dr. Randall Thomas diagnosed Cecil Carlyle with gastric carcinoma, a type of cancer, in early duly 2004. Cecil Carlyle continued to see Dr. Thomas in the Summer and Fall of 2004 on an as-needed basis. Specifically, Cecil Carlyle saw Dr. Thomas on September 3, September 13, September 14 and September 24.
It was Dr. Thomas' custom and practice to assess his patients' mental condition throughout his treatment of them. Dr. Thomas would usually note if there was an instance in which he thought there was some mental incapacity. During those September 2004 visits, Dr. Thomas never noted that Cecil Carlyle was mentally incompetent.
Cecil Carlyle's siblings, who visited him during this time period, believed that Cecil Carlyle was alert and mentally competent prior to October 10, 2004. Each of the siblings observed Cecil Carlyle still running his trucking business, C L Trucking, prior to October 10, which included the dispatching of drivers, signing of company checks, and recall of names and phone numbers from memory.
According to Dr. Thomas, Cecil Carlyle was competent to make decisions regarding his own health and medical treatment on October 1, 2004. Cecil Carlyle signed a consent form for chemotherapy on October 1, 2004.
According to Dr. Thomas, none of the medications taken at the dosages prescribed for Mr. Carlyle were likely to decrease mental capacity. Dr. Thomas stated, however, that "[i]t's possible" that Lortab might affect mental capacity but on a relatively stable dose for a week or two weeks, it should not." Dr. Thomas also acknowledged that Compazine (a nausea medication) would not "typically" result in a mental deficit but that Ambien (a sleep medication) would affect mental capacity for six to eight hours after it was taken. Finally, Dr. Thomas testified that Klonopin (an anxiety medication) has the effect on mental capacity of about one beer but at the dose prescribed for Mr. Carlyle, it would not affect his mental capacity. Xanax (another anxiety medication) was "a little bit more sedating" than the Klonopin.
Prior to October 4, 2004, Dr. Thomas never reflected in the patient records or notes that Cecil Carlyle was incapable of making appropriate decisions. The first and only time during Cecil Carlyle's life that Dr. Thomas advised Cecil's family members that he did not believe that Cecil was capable of making personal or business decisions was on October 7, 2004.
At the time Cecil Carlyle changed beneficiaries prior to his death on October 14, 2005, and as of the date of Cecil Carlyle's death, Laura Carlyle remained a college student at the University of Georgia and was under the age of 22 years. While Laura Carlyle was in college, her father paid her medical insurance up until the time of his death, as well as assisting her with her day-to-day living expenses. Cecil Carlyle also helped with Clay Carlyle's car payments until his death, paid Clay's medical insurance while he was in school and further provided money to Clay on an as-needed basis.
Prior to his death in October 2004, Cecil Carlyle's alder children visited him on a regular basis and assisted him in his affairs. Starting in August 2004, Cecil Carlyle was not physically capable of caring for himself. Laura believes that her father became incapable of making decisions for himself in September 2004. Laura reached this belief "[b]ecause he was on a lot of medication. He was in a lot of pain. He was confused." Laura, however, was able to carry on conversations with her father about "normal stuff" during the time period of August through October 2004.
According to Clay, Cecil became more anxious and weaker around the middle of September 2004. He "started being confused about where he was" towards the end of September 2004. Towards the end of his life, Cecil Carlyle had difficulty understanding things, would say "off-the wall things," called his daughter "Kathy" and sometimes "didn't make a whole lot of sense." Elaine Carlyle estimates that this began to occur towards the end of September or first of October. Clay, however, was capable of carrying on a conversation with his father after mid-September 2004 regarding
According to Dr. Thomas, before October 4, the medical records reflect that Mr. Carlyle was "not himself" based upon the history given by family members. Dr. Thomas also stated that "any decisions, business or personal, made by Mr. Carlyle from mid-September until the time of his death must be questioned, as he was not in his usual state of mind." Dr. Thomas also stated, however, that he was not suggesting that Mr. Carlyle was mentally incompetent from the middle of September through the date of his death. In a letter written on February 28, 2005, Dr. Thomas stated that Mr. Carlyle's symptoms of agitation, insomnia and anxiety were all consistent with a diagnosis of terminal delirium. Dr. Thomas noted that "sometimes its hard to differentiate what's — what all is going on. In retrospect, you know, it sounded like he — you know, he had been having symptoms that was[sic] consistent with that for a couple of weeks."
Discussion
This is an interpleader action brought by State Farm Life Insurance against the Trustees and respondents who have made competing claims for the proceeds of three life insurance policies. Respondents challenge the changes in beneficiaries made by their father just before his death in October 2004 on two grounds: (1) the changes were made without legal authority because of obligations contained in the divorce agreement between Cecil Carlyle and Elaine Carlyle and (2) Cecil Carlyle lacked the necessary mental capacity at the time the changes were made.Legal Authority
Respondents argue that Cecil Carlyle lacked the legal authority to remove them as beneficiaries of the life insurance polices because the divorce agreement required him to "maintain life insurance on [his life] that is in place as of the date of this agreement. . . . the beneficiary of said insurance policy(ies) . . . shah be a trust for the minor children."
The divorce agreement at issue in this case is governed by Georgia law, which requires that such agreements be strictly construed. Anderson v. Anderson, 251 Ga. 508, 509 (1983). An intention to support a child into its majority will be found only if the agreement contains specific and unambiguous language to that effect. Id.
In the instant action, there is no provision indicating that Cecil Carlyle intended to keep the policies for the benefit of respondents after they reached the age of majority. The insurance provision specifically references the "minor children" and cannot be construed as "`evidencing a manifest intention that the father's contractual obligation to name [Clay and Laura Carlyle] as his [beneficiaries] was to survive [their] minority.'" See Davis v. Andrews, 265 Ga. App. 662, 662 (2004) (quotingAnderson, 251 Ga. at 510 in affirming lower court decision that provision of divorce decree requiring husband to "irrevocably" name his two "minor" children as beneficiaries of life insurance policies did not require husband to continue policies after children reached majority, absent specific language to that effect).
Respondents point to a provision of the agreement (the "college provision") requiring Cecil Carlyle to pay "sixty-five percent (65%) of the expenses incurred by each child under the age of 22.5 years of age to secure a four year college education . . ." to bolster their argument that the insurance provision required Cecil Carlyle to maintain the life insurance polices for their benefit even after they reached the age of majority. The insurance provision, however, lacks the specific language required to extend that obligation past the age of majority.See Anderson, at 510. Reading the agreement as a whole, the college provision requirement to provide support past the age of majority under certain circumstances does not permit the court to ignore the use of "minor children" in interpreting the insurance provision. Accordingly, the court finds that the requirements of the insurance provision expired when respondents reached the age of majority.
Mental Competency
Respondents contend that Cecil Carlyle was mentally incompetent at the time the Change in Beneficiary forms were executed. "Every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion but the presumption may be rebutted." O.C.G.A. § 16-2-3. "Every man is presumed to have all his mental faculties and to be of normal and ordinary intelligence, and where it is contended that one who executed a contract was not competent to execute it, the burden is upon him who asserts the incompetency. Mental or physical impairment is never presumed. It must be proved." Nelson v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 670, 672 (1986) "In order to void a contract on the ground of mental incapacity of the maker, he must have been non compos mends, that is, entirely without understanding, at the time the contract was executed."Id. "Even proof of a temporary loss of sanity or competency would create no presumption that it continued up to the time of execution of the contract and the burden remains on the party alleging incapacity to show such incapacity at the very time of the transaction." Id. Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents, the court finds that respondents have failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to Cecil Carlyle's mental competency at the time he executed the Change of Beneficiary forms. Respondents point the court to no evidence that they were present at the time the changes were made nor that they specifically observed Cecil Carlyle in an altered or confused state at or near the time the forms were executed. While there is some evidence that Mr. Carlyle had moments of confusion during the relevant period, this evidence would not support a finding of sustained and constant mental incapacity. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Dr. Thomas considered Mr. Carlyle mentally competent on October 1, 2004, the date that one of the Change of Beneficiary forms was executed.
Therefore, in light of all of the foregoing, the court hereby GRANTS the Trustees' motion for summary judgment [docket no. 42].
Summary
The motion for summary judgment by W. Boyd Carlyle, Kathy C. Finley, Betty C. Rogers ("Trustees") [docket no. 42] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.