Opinion
086674/10.
Decided December 6, 2010.
The petitioner was represented by Jonathon H. Kaufman, Esq. of Serpe, Andree Kaufman, Huntington, NY.
The respondent was represented by Stacey Gorny, Esq. of Lewis Johns Avallone Aviles, LLP, Melville, NY.
Petitioner seeks to vacate an arbitration award rendered following mandatory arbitration because the arbitrator allegedly disregarded applicable law. Respondent opposes the application and contends that the arbitrator's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
William Salas, petitioner's insured, drove a loaner vehicle, while his own vehicle was being repaired at a car dealership. Salas' vehicle was insured by petitioner and the loaner vehicle was insured by respondent. While driving the loaner vehicle, Salas struck a pedestrian. Petitioner paid no-fault benefits to the pedestrian. Thereafter, it submitted a claim to arbitration and sought reimbursement from respondent for expenses and medical benefits paid to the pedestrian.
Salas signed a loaner/rental agreement before he took control of the loaner vehicle. Paragraph 6 of the agreement stated, in pertinent part:
You are responsible for all damage or loss You cause to others. You agree to provide auto liability, collision and comprehensive insurance covering You, Us and the Vehicle. Your personal auto insurance coverage is primary (emphasis added). If you have no auto liability insurance in effect on the date of loss, or if We are required by law to provide liability insurance, We provide auto liability insurance (the Policy") that is secondary to any other valid and collectible insurance, whether primary, secondary, excess or contingent. . . ."
Notice of Petition, Exhibit C. Based upon paragraph 6 of the agreement, the arbitrator determined that petitioner failed to prove its prima facie case. Thus, petitioner was deemed primarily responsible for no-fault payments and was not entitled to reimbursement for expenses and medical benefits paid to the pedestrian.
In the instant application, petitioner equates a loaner vehicle to a rental vehicle and asserts that as between a no-fault insurer of a rental vehicle and a no-fault insurer of a non-owner renter, the primary source of coverage for no-fault benefits is the no-fault insurer of the rental vehicle. In opposition, respondent contends that the award should stand because the arbitrator's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. It contends that the arbitrator based its decision upon credible evidence, namely paragraph 6 of the loaner/rental agreement.
"Courts are reluctant to disturb the decisions of arbitrators lest the value of this method of resolving controversies be undermined." Matter of Goldfinger v. Lisker, 68 NY2d 225, 508 NYS2d 159 (1986). Where arbitration is pursuant to a voluntary agreement of the parties, the award will be upheld unless it violates strong public policy, is totally irrational, or exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power. See Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 652 NYS2d 584 (1996) (Where arbitration is pursuant to voluntary agreement of parties, the arbitrator's determination on issues of law, such as application of statute of limitations as well as on issues of fact, is conclusive, in absence of proof of fraud, corruption, or other misconduct.); Teamsters Local 814 Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds v. County Van Lines, Inc., 56 AD3d 567, 867 NYS2d 190 (2 Dept. 2008). In the case of mandatory arbitration, as is the case here, due process imposes closer judicial scrutiny on the arbitrator's determination. RDK Medical P.C. v. General Assur. Co. , 8 Misc 3d 1025 (A), 806 NYS2d 448 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2005). Therefore, "[a]n arbitration award in a mandatory arbitration proceeding will be upheld if it is supported by the evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. City of Yonkers , 21 AD3d 1110 , 801 NYS2d 624 (2d Dept. 2005). See also Kemper Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Co. , 9 AD3d 431, 779 NYS2d 788 (2d Dept. 2004); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Transit Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 127(A), 906 NYS2d 783 (2d, 11th 13th Jud. Dists. 2009). This is a priority of payment claim. In order to determine the priority of payment, all relevant policies should be reviewed and considered. Petitioner never produced its policy. Thus, the arbitrator properly relied upon the respondent's policy to determine that petitioner was primarily responsible to make no-fault payments to the pedestrian. In addition, this Court is unpersuaded by petitioner's assertion that a loaner vehicle is akin to a rental vehicle and thus, respondent is primary for no-fault coverage. See M.N. Dental Diagnostics, P.C. v. Government Employees Ins. Co. , 24 Misc 3d 43 , 884 NYS2d 549 (App. Term. 1st Dept. 2009). It has been held that a loaner vehicle is a "temporary substitute vehicle", which ordinarily is covered under the insured's policy. See Lancer Ins. Co. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 304 AD2d 794, 759 NYS2d 734 (2d Dept. 2003); ELRAC, Inc. v. Mehlinger, 258 AD2d 500, 684 NYS2d 625 (2d Dept. 1999).
The application to vacate the arbitration award is denied. Thus, the award is confirmed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.