Although Missouri courts have not decided whether Rule 29.07(d) allows the state to unilaterally move for withdrawal of a defendant's plea, the rule is typically envisioned as a Mechanism providing relief for the defendant, and not the state. See, e.g., State ex rel Williams v. Wilson, 63 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Sayre, 420 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Mo. 1967) (analyzing Rule 27;25, the verbatim precursor to Rule 29.07(d)). The Supreme Court has stated, "By its plain terms, the rule protects a defendant from the potential hardship of an uninformed guilty plea."
And while the State may have been able to argue for imposing a sentence on possession instead of UUW-possession had those convictions occurred at the same time, once the trial court sentenced Defendant on the UUW-possession count, that argument would have been futile at any future sentencing on the possession count. See State ex rel. Williams v. Wilson, 63 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2002) ("Once judgment and sentencing occur in a criminal proceeding, the trial court has exhausted its jurisdiction and can take no further action except when otherwise expressly authorized by statute or rule"). The State's insistence on pursuing conviction on the possession count under these circumstances is overreaching.
Case law, however, provides that a court can take further action after judgment and sentencing "when otherwise expressly authorized by statute or rule." State ex rel. Williams v. Wilson, 63 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2002); State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1993). An analysis of section 211.073 shows that further court action is specifically contemplated by its provisions.