Summary
holding that where a local government does not have final authority over a particular policy carried out by the sheriff, it cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for alleged constitutional violations committed by the sheriff or his deputies
Summary of this case from Capers v. Durham County Sheriff DepartmentOpinion
No. 1:01CV01088
December 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiffs David M. Wellington and Audrey Jean Wellington bring this action against Defendants Guilford County, the sheriff of Guilford County, and two deputy sheriffs, alleging constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law claim for infliction of emotional distress. The matter is before the court on Defendant Guilford County's motion so dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and on motion by all Defendants to dismiss any claim for punitive damages.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 10, 1998, Defendants L.F. Antonelli and A.W. Caliendo, deputies of Defendant Guilford County Sheriff B.J. Barnes, arrived at the home of Plaintiffs David M. Wellington and Audrey Jean Wellington. When Ms. Wellington stepped outside, the deputies told her that they had a warrant for Mr. Wellington's arrest because he had missed a hearing about his alleged failure to make child support payments. Although Mr. Wellington was hiding in the house, Ms. Wellington told Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo that he was not home. According to Plaintiffs, the deputies insisted on their need to search the house and instructed Ms. Wellington that she had no choice except to let them. Once inside, they searched the entire residence without finding Mr. Wellington. Deputy Caliendo called out Mr. Wellington's name and ordered him to come out with his hands up.
Mr. Wellington eventually emerged from hiding with both hands raised and covered by a towel, his palms facing forward. According to Plaintiffs' complaint, Mr. Wellington then "turned his hands with palms facing each other to demonstrate that he had no object in his hands." (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Deputy Caliendo shot Mr. Wellington in the left hand, causing damage to the bone structure. Mr. Wellington was arrested and charged with two counts of assaulting a sheriff's deputy and one count of delaying a deputy attempting to discharge his duty.
David Wellington pled guilty to assaulting Deputy Caliendo. The other two charges were dismissed. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.)
After the shooting, Deputy Antonelli arrested Ms. Wellington. She was handcuffed, left on the ground outside her home, and detained in a deputy's car until after midnight before being released. After both Plaintiffs had been arrested, the deputies continued to search the house, seizing several items of personal property.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 10, 2001. With leave of this court, the complaint was amended and refiled on October 22, 2002. Plaintiffs assert five causes of action. First, they aver § 1983 claims against Defendants Guilford County, Barnes, Antonelli, and Caliendo based on violations of Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, including allegations of inadequate training, encouraging the use of excessive force, and "condoning engaging in arbitrary and capricious methods of paying and denying claims while paying others." (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) Second, they assert a state law tort claim against Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo for infliction of emotional distress. In addition, Plaintiffs bring three causes of action against Guilford County based on its decision to assert governmental immunity: (1) a § 1983 claim, alleging that the county applied a facially neutral law in a discriminatory manner by waiving governmental immunity in previous lawsuits but invoking it against these Plaintiffs; (2) a substantive due process claim for the same immunity decision; and (3) a claim for applying immunity in a discriminatory manner in violation of the North Carolina Constitution's equal protection clause.
Plaintiffs seek damages from Sheriff Barnes only in his official capacity. They sue Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo in their official and individual capacities. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.)
The present motions apply to only some of these claims. Defendant Guilford County moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against it that arise from the deputies' conduct. Further, Defendants Barnes, Antonelli, and Caliendo, in their official capacities, join Guilford County in moving to dismiss any punitive damages claim against them. For the reasons set forth below, each motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants Barnes, Antonelli, and Caliendo move to dismiss only Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages. Because none of the pending motions challenges the substantive viability of Plaintiffs' claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the court need not address the merits of those claims at this time.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Defendant Guilford County moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6).
When a defendant's motion to dismiss challenges a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that such jurisdiction exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). A court should dismiss an action for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must evaluate the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking factual assertions as true. Buser v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 556, 559 (M.D.N.C. 1999). The court should dismiss a claim only when "`it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.'" Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969)).
B. Claims Against Guilford County Stemming From the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Defendant Guilford County moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against it under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to § 1983, on the grounds that conduct by the sheriff or his deputies may not be attributed to the County. Plaintiffs respond that because the sheriff may bind the County by his actions, their claims against the County are viable. The court's resolution of this issue, and Guilford County's potential liability under § 1983 for the conduct of Defendants Barnes, Antonelli, and Caliendo, turns on whether the County is responsible for the actions of the sheriff and his deputies.
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for those whose constitutional rights have been violated by state or local government actors. Banks v. Jefferson-Smurfit, 176 F. Supp.2d 499, 506 (M.D.N.C. 2001). The statute does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a means to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811 (1994); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000).
A county may be held liable under § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights over which the county has "final policymaking authority." Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723-24 (1989) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924 (1988) (plurality opinion)). A county is exposed to liability only if a sheriff's actions "represent official county policy." McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783-85, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1736 (1997); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978); Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a county is liable for its sheriff's acts, a court must examine how state law allocates power and responsibility in a specific area or on a particular issue of policy. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786, 117 S.Ct. at 1737; Knight, 214 F.3d at 552; Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 924 (4th Cir. 1991).
In North Carolina, sheriffs have substantial independence from county government. Sheriffs are elected directly, not employed by the Board of County Commissioners. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-1. A sheriff has final policymaking authority over personnel decisions in her office. Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 89, 450 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1994). Under this arrangement, a sheriff's deputy "is an employee of the sheriff, not the county," id., 117 N.C. App. at 89, 450 S.E.2d at 749, and "the control of employees hired by the sheriff is vested exclusively in the sheriff." Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 449, 368 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1988). County officials do not supervise or control a sheriff's deputies, who "are appointed by and act for the sheriff, who alone is responsible for their conduct." Little v. Smith, 114 F. Supp.2d 437, 446 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (quoting Styers v. Forsyth Cty., 212 N.C. 558, 561, 194 S.E. 305, 309 (1937)).
Here, Plaintiffs claim that Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo committed constitutional violations in arresting them, and that Sheriff Barnes condoned and encouraged these violations. The conduct occurred in law enforcement, a field in which the sheriff, not the county, has final decision-making authority. See Little, 114 F. Supp.2d at 446. Indeed, Plaintiffs' amended complaint admits that Sheriff Barnes "exercised exclusive control and supervision of all deputies . . . and exercised final policy making authority on law enforcement for Guilford County." (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) Where a local government does not have final authority over a particular policy carried out by a sheriff, it cannot be held liable under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations committed by the sheriff or his deputies. See, e.g., McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793, 117 S.Ct. at 1740 (holding that counties may not be held liable for investigatory misconduct of sheriffs vested with law enforcement authority); Knight, 214 F.3d at 552-53 (affirming summary judgment for a county sued for the sheriff's personnel decisions). Because Guilford County did not have final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement, it cannot be held liable for the conduct of Sheriff Barnes or Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo. Accordingly, the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against it based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments will be granted.
C. Claims Stemming From Guilford County's Assertion of Governmental Immunity
Defendant Guilford County asserts governmental immunity as a defense to Plaintiffs' state law claim for infliction of emotional distress. Governmental immunity generally protects North Carolina counties and county officers sued in their official capacities from tort liability in the performance of governmental functions. Dawes v. Nash County, 148 N.C. App. 641, 643, 559 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2002); McIver v. Smith, 134 N.C. App. 583, 585, 518 S.E.2d 522, 524 (1999). Governmental activities are those undertaken for "public purposes and for public good," Robinson v. Nash County, 43 N.C. App. 33, 36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 680 (1979), and North Carolina courts consistently hold that law enforcement fits this definition. See, e.g., Jones v. Kearns, 120 N.C. App. 301, 305, 462 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1995); Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1990).
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that Guilford County "waived its immunity by opting to pay damages to some claimants after asserting governmental immunity and denying payments to others in its unbridled discretion." (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) This assertion provides the foundation for Plaintiffs' second, third, and fourth causes of action. Citing Guilford County's assertion of governmental immunity against Plaintiffs in this case and its waiver of immunity in similar cases, Plaintiffs bring claims based on three legal theories: (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced by § 1983; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; and (3) the equal protection clause of Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Unlike supervision of law enforcement deputies, decisions to assert or waive immunity "are adopted and implemented" by the County's officers. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-435 (recognizing a county's authority to waive governmental immunity); Dobrowolska ex rel. Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 11, 530 S.E.2d 590, 597 (2000), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 355 N.C. 206, 558 S.E.2d 174 (2002) Because the County has "final policymaking authority" over such decisions, it is subject to suit under § 1983 by plaintiffs challenging those decisions. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 784-85, 117 S.Ct. at 1736-37. Defendant Guilford County identifies no reason why these claims should be dismissed. Therefore, the motion to dismiss as it pertains to these claims will be denied.
In making this assertion, Plaintiffs rely on Dobrowolska ex rel. Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 530 S.E.2d 590 (2000), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 355 N.C. 206, 558 S.E.2d 174 (2002). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Greensboro's "custom of waiving governmental immunity and paying claims for damages to tort claimants similar to plaintiffs while asserting immunity and refusing to pay plaintiffs' claims" violated constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Id. at 11, 530 S.E.2d at 597. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that summary judgment for the City was improper on this claim because the City qualified as a "person" for § 1983 purposes. Id. at 11, 530 S.E.2d at 597-98.
D. Punitive Damages
Guilford County, as well as Defendants Barnes, Antonelli, and Caliendo in their official capacities, move to dismiss any claim for punitive damages against them. (Mot. Dismiss at 2; Br. Support Mot. Dismiss at 7.) Under § 1983, Plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages from the County, nor from the sheriff and his deputies in their official capacities. See Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U. 5. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762 (1981). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs claim punitive damages from Guilford County, Sheriff Barnes, or the deputies in their official capacities, the Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims will be granted.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that they claim no punitive damages from Guilford County or Sheriff Barnes, and that they seek such damages from Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo only in their individual capacities. (Am. Compl. at 10; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 4.) Section 1983 authorizes punitive damages to address conduct that is "motivated by evil motive or intent" or "involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983). At this early stage of litigation, the court cannot ascertain the nature of Defendants' conduct as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages against Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo in their individual capacities will be denied.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Guilford County's Motion to Dismiss [9] is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is dismissed as to the County. Plaintiffs' second, third, and fourth causes of action, arising from the County's decision to assert governmental immunity in this case, remain intact.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion by all Defendants to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is granted as to Guilford County, Sheriff Barnes, and Deputies Antonelli and Caliendo in their official capacities. Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages from Antonelli and Caliendo in their individual capacities remains viable.