Opinion
No. 89-359
Submitted November 14, 1989 —
Decided January 10, 1990.
Prohibition to prevent exercise of municipal court's jurisdiction not available, when — Adequate remedy of appeal available.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. CA 11211.
On September 14, 1988, relator-appellant, Roger Pearson, was arrested in the city of Centerville, Ohio, for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. A uniform traffic ticket charging him with that crime was subsequently filed in Kettering Municipal Court. Respondent-appellee, Larry Moore, is a judge of that court. Judge Moore scheduled a hearing for September 27 on the possible suspension of Pearson's driver's license.
On September 14, the Kettering Municipal Court had jurisdiction "within the municipal corporation of Moraine, and within Washington township, in Montgomery county." R.C. 1901.02(B). It is undisputed that Centerville was not "within" Washington Township as "within a township" was defined at that time by R.C. 1901.02(C)(1). However, on September 26, 1988, S.B. No. 319 took effect. This legislation amended R.C. 1901.02 so as to place Centerville within the jurisdiction of the Kettering Municipal Court.
Through counsel, Pearson twice advised Judge Moore of his opinion that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over his case, although it is not clear whether he filed a formal motion to dismiss. Judge Moore, at any rate, did not dismiss the case.
Pearson filed this original action in the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, seeking to prohibit Judge Moore from suspending Pearson's license. The court of appeals denied the writ, holding that the municipal court had jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and that Pearson had an adequate remedy at law.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.
Don A. Little, for appellant.
Robert N. Farquhar, for appellee.
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via appeal from the court's holding that it has jurisdiction. Middleburg Heights v. Brown (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 66, 68, 24 OBR 215, 216-217, 493 N.E.2d 547, 549; State, ex rel. Gilla, v. Fellerhoff (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 86, 73 O.O. 2d 328, 338 N.E.2d 522. We therefore agree with the court of appeals that prohibition will not lie.
Pearson argues that appeal is inadequate as a remedy because the municipal court may suspend his license pending trial. Such a suspension would not be a final appealable order. Columbus v. Adams (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 57, 60, 10 OBR 348, 350-351, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890. However, Pearson's situation is analogous to that of a litigant against whom a preliminary injunction has been granted. Such an injunction is not a final order, either. See State, ex rel. Add Venture, Inc., v. Gillie (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 164, 16 O.O. 3d 198, 404 N.E.2d 151. Yet, in Tilford v. Crush (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 174, 529 N.E.2d 1245, we denied prohibition in part because, "* * * while the preliminary injunction cannot now be appealed * * *, review may be had in the event that it becomes permanent." Id. at 177, 529 N.E.2d at 1247. Similarly, if Pearson is convicted, appeal will lie from any sanction, including suspension, that the municipal court may impose.
The judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.