Opinion
No. 109131
01-22-2020
STATE EX REL. ANGEL McPHERSON, Petitioner, v. ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, Respondent.
Appearances: Angel McPherson, pro se. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Daniel J. Benoit, Associate Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: PETITION DISMISSED Writ of Habeas Corpus
Motion No. 533815
Order No. 534353
Appearances:
Angel McPherson, pro se. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Daniel J. Benoit, Associate Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
{¶ 1} Petitioner, Angel McPherson, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming she has served her validly imposed sentence and is still being held in the custody of respondent, Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"). McPherson asserts that because respondent has not properly applied jail-time credit in her case, she has served the entirety of her sentences in two criminal cases and should be immediately released. Because McPherson has not served her validly imposed sentences, respondent's motion to dismiss is granted, and her petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
Procedural and Factual Background
{¶ 2} On October 22, 2019, McPherson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from which the following facts are gleaned. McPherson was convicted of drug trafficking in two cases, State v. McPherson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-625464-A and State v. McPherson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-630668-A. On January 10, 2019, McPherson received a two-year sentence in each case and the trial court ordered those sentences to be served concurrent to each other. After sentencing in each case, McPherson moved the trial court to calculate jail-time credit. The trial court entered orders granting McPherson 191 days of credit in each case.
{¶ 3} Subsequently, McPherson was transferred to Oriana House in Cuyahoga County, where she currently resides, for a period of transitional control. Respondent agrees that this period of transitional control still constitutes confinement in the custody of the ODRC in Cuyahoga County.
{¶ 4} In her complaint, McPherson claims she earned the equivalent of 25 days of participation credit under R.C. 2967.193(A)(1), 5 days of earned credit under R.C. 2967.193(F)(1), and 72 days of earned credit under programs included in H.B. 49. She claims that once this earned credit is added to the 191 days of jail-time credit the trial court ordered in each case, she has finished serving her sentences. She arrives at this conclusion because she claims that each period of jail-time credit counts toward her overall sentence such that 382 days of jail-time credit is actually subtracted from her two-year sentences.
{¶ 5} Respondent filed a motion to dismiss McPherson's petition on November 22, 2019, arguing that she failed to comply with Civ.R. 10 and that she has not served her validly imposed sentence because the ODRC has properly applied jail-time credit to her cases. McPherson filed a brief in opposition on December 6, 2019, again arguing that the ODRC is required to apply 382 days of jail-time credit.
Respondent argues that McPherson's petition does not comply with Civ.R. 10 because the addresses for the parties are not included in the caption of the petition. The addresses for the parties are set forth just below the caption. Therefore, this technical violation will not be the basis for dismissing the petition in this case. --------
Applicable Standards
{¶ 6} McPherson claims entitlement to a writ of habeas corpus. R.C. Chapter 2725 governs such actions. "To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a party must show that he [or she] is being unlawfully restrained of [their] liberty, R.C. 2725.01, and that he [or she] is entitled to immediate release from prison or confinement." State ex rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10, citing Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 8. A writ of habeas corpus is appropriate "in certain extraordinary circumstances 'where there is an unlawful restraint of a person's liberty and there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.'" Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001), quoting Pegan v. Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091 (1996).
{¶ 7} A court may only grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when it appears beyond doubt that the petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle relief. Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988); O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975). In determining the matter, this court must presume all factual allegations in the petition are true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the petitioner. Boles v. Knab, 130 Ohio St.3d 339, 2011-Ohio-5049, 958 N.E.2d 554, ¶ 2.
The Application of Jail-Time Credit
{¶ 8} Generally, relief in habeas corpus is not available for the miscalculation of jail-time credit because a petitioner may file a motion with the trial court to correct the amount of jail-time credit awarded or challenge the amount of credit awarded in a direct appeal from the conviction. State ex rel. Williams v. McGinty, 129 Ohio St.3d 275, 2011-Ohio-2641, 951 N.E.2d 755, ¶ 2; Johnson v. Crutchfield, 140 Ohio St.3d 485, 2014-Ohio-3653, 20 N.E.3d 676, ¶ 6. However, McPherson is not challenging the amount of jail-time credit awarded by the trial court. She is, instead, challenging how that credit has been applied to her sentences by the ODRC. This falls into a limited class of cases where relief in habeas may be appropriate.
{¶ 9} When the ODRC was alleged to have improperly and unilaterally changed some aspect of a sentence imposed by a trial court judge, relief in habeas was granted. State ex. rel. Dailey v. Morgan, 115 Ohio Misc.2d 44, 761 N.E.2d 140 (C.P.2001). When sentencing entries were found to create an ambiguity and the ODRC unilaterally interpreted those entries to the detriment of the petitioner, relief in habeas may be appropriate. Young v. Bunting, 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-13-46 and 9-13-47, 2014-Ohio-3671.
{¶ 10} Similarly, McPherson is claiming that the ODRC is misinterpreting and misapplying the jail-time credit properly awarded by the trial court. Therefore, relief in habeas may be appropriate because McPherson is not challenging the trial court's award of jail-time credit, but the way in which the ODRC is interpreting and applying those orders to her sentences.
{¶ 11} That said, this court only needs to examine the statute to reject McPherson's claim. R.C. 2967.191(A) provides,
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the prison term of a prisoner, as described in division (B) of this section, by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine the prisoner's competence to stand trial or sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner's prison term, as determined by the sentencing court under division (B)(2) (h)(i) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code, and confinement in a juvenile facility.(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 12} The trial court awarded 191 days of jail-time credit in each of McPherson's two cases. The award of jail-time credit is not added together to equal 382 of total jail-time credit because only one 191-day period "arises out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced" in each case. McPherson's two cases are unrelated. Time spent in confinement, either prison or jail, for unrelated cases or awaiting trial and sentencing on an unrelated case cannot be counted towards another case. The Ohio Supreme Court highlighted this point in State v. Cupp, 156 Ohio St.3d 207, 2018-Ohio-5211, 124 N.E.3d 811, ¶ 23. There, it ruled that "[a] defendant is not entitled to jail-time credit while held on bond if, at the same time, the defendant is serving a sentence on an unrelated case." Id. at the syllabus.
{¶ 13} McPherson did not spend 382 days in jail awaiting trial and sentencing. Therefore, she is not entitled to 382 days of jail-time credit. McPherson's reliance on State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856, 883 N.E.2d 440, for support is unavailing. McPherson's argument in support of her complaint relies heavily on her understanding of this case. Therefore, this court will quote heavily from that opinion to explain why McPherson's understanding of the holding in Fugate is incorrect.
{¶ 14} In Fugate, the Ohio Supreme Court began by setting forth the Constitutional bulwark that necessitates jail-time credit: The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court then went on:
Thus, in order to satisfy this objective, when concurrent prison terms are imposed, courts do not have the discretion to select only one term from those that are run concurrently against which to apply jail-time
credit. R.C. 2967.191 requires that jail-time credit be applied to all prison terms imposed for charges on which the offender has been held. If courts were permitted to apply jail-time credit to only one of the concurrent terms, the practical result would be, as in this case, to deny credit for time that an offender was confined while being held on pending charges. So long as an offender is held on a charge while awaiting trial or sentencing, the offender is entitled to jail-time credit for that sentence; a court cannot choose one of several concurrent terms against which to apply the credit.Id. at ¶ 12, 18, and 21.
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As the sentencing hearing transcript indicates, Fugate was indeed held in custody on the burglary and theft charges and for violation of community control and is therefore entitled to jail-time credit against each concurrent prison term.
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Applying jail-time credit toward all concurrent prison terms imposed for charges on which an offender was held does not have the effect of "multiply[ing] his single period of pretrial confinement by the number of convictions entered against him." [State v. Callender, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 91AP-713, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 485 (Feb. 4, 1992)]. Instead, applying the credit toward all concurrent terms simply ensures that the offender actually receives credit for that single period of confinement.
{¶ 15} The Fugate court determined that a person is entitled to jail-time credit applied to each offense in a case when a court imposes concurrent prison terms. Id. at ¶ 12. Here, the trial court complied with its obligation to award jail-time credit. McPherson was awarded 191 days in jail-time credit, applied to each separate case. She does not dispute that this was the correct amount of time she spent in jail awaiting trial. She argues that because she had two cases, she is entitled to combine the amount of jail-time credit and apply the combined time to her sentences. Such an argument ignores the statutory language cited above.
{¶ 16} R.C. 2967.191 only allows a person to receive jail-time credit for time the "prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced [.]" This statute "does not entitle a defendant to jail-time credit for any period of incarceration which arose from facts which are separate and apart from those on which his current sentence is based." State v. Smith, 71 Ohio App.3d 302, 304, 593 N.E.2d 402 (10th Dist.1992). Where a defendant has sought to have time spent incarcerated in an unrelated case as jail-time credit in a different case, courts have rejected those requests. State v. Morris, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2017AP080025, 2018-Ohio-830; State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92790, 2009-Ohio-5700; State ex rel. Larkins v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 89AP-1348, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 567 (Feb. 8, 1991); State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-98-013, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2860 (June 26, 1998).
{¶ 17} McPherson's own complaint demonstrates that her two-year sentences have not expired because the ODRC has not improperly applied the days of jail-time credit to her independent sentences from two cases. Therefore, McPherson is not being unlawfully detained because her maximum sentence has not expired, and she is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted and this court dismisses the petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner to pay costs. This court directs the clerk of courts to serve all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal as required by Civ.R. 58(B).
{¶ 18} Petition dismissed. /s/_________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR