Opinion
No. 71-337
Decided January 26, 1972.
Workmen's compensation — Permanent partial disability — Decision as to extent of disability — Abuse of discretion, when — Mandamus available remedy.
Where there is no evidence in the record to support or justify an order of the Industrial Commission awarding 15% permanent partial disability and where all the evidence in the record supports an extent of permanent partial disability equal to 40%, the action of the Industrial Commission in awarding only 15% disability constitutes an abuse of discretion, subject to correction by an action in mandamus. ( State, ex rel. Shewalter, v. Indus. Comm., 19 Ohio St.2d 12, followed.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
This action originated in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County wherein relator, appellant herein, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Industrial Commission of Ohio to increase its July 14, 1970, award to him of permanent partial disability, in claim No. PE 489065, from 15% to 40%.
The cause was heard by the Court of Appeals upon the complaint, the answer, the briefs of counsel and oral argument. Attached to the brief of respondent Industrial Commission were exhibits A through X, consisting of copies of pertinent portions of the Industrial Commission's claim file No. PE 489065. It appears from the entry of the Court of Appeals that exhibits A through X were "stipulated by the parties as to their authenticity, correctness and admissibility."
The complaint alleges:
"Relator sustained an injury to his low back on November 7, 1966 while in the course of his employment with the named respondent city of Cleveland; that said injury was assigned claim number PE 489065 by the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation; that said claim was allowed by the bureau and compensation for temporary total disability paid thereunder; and that thereafter relator duly filed an application for permanent partial disability.
The city of Cleveland, denominated as an additional "respondent" in the complaint, filed no pleadings and has taken no part in this case.
"Relator further says that pursuant to his application for permanent partial disability he was examined by the medical section of the Industrial Commission; that the examining doctor, F.M. Freimann, M.D., in his report dated 5/14/70, found the relator's permanent partial disability to be 40%; that relator's application for permanent partial disability was heard by the Industrial Commission on July 14, 1970; that said body awarded 15% permanent partial disability, 25% less than the disability flowing from this injury found by its own medical department.
"Relator further says that on August 21, 1959 he sustained an injury to his low back while in the employ of the city of Cleveland; that said injury was assigned claim number PE 334883; that on September 13, 1961, the Industrial Commission awarded relator 25% permanent partial disability.
"Relator further says that the 25% permanent partial disability awarded under claim number PE 334883 was deducted from the award of permanent partial disability due and owing to him in claim number PE 489065; that said deduction is contrary to law; that the respondent Industrial Commission is under a clear legal duty to award the additional 25% permanent partial disability compensation to relator; that its denial in this case is an abuse of discretion * * *."
Essentially, the answer of the Industrial Commission admits all the allegations of the complaint except that the award of 15% was computed by deducting the 1961 award of 25% in claim No. PE 334883. It admitted the finding of 40% disability by Dr. Freimann in May 1970 and alleged merely:
"* * * that relator's application for permanent partial disability was heard by the Industrial Commission on July 14, 1970; that said body awarded 15% permanent partial disability * * *."
The Court of Appeals denied the writ of mandamus, concluding that "this court has nothing before it to evidence that the Industrial Commission in fact deducted the prior award from the report of Dr. Freimann relating to the percentage of permanent partial disability"; that "we have no means of ascertaining the precise method as established by the commission in making its determination"; that "the Industrial Commission presumably had the relator's complete records and file before it, and in the process of reviewing the relator's application for permanent partial disability, had all of the pertinent facts and evidence pertinent thereto"; and that the findings of the examining physician, employed by the Industrial Commission "would not be binding upon the Industrial Commission, and such body may make its own independent determinations separate and apart from any conclusions as might be reached by the examining physician," citing State, ex rel. Coen, v. Indus. Comm. (1933), 126 Ohio St. 550.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Mr. Harold Ticktin and Mr. Kenneth S. Kabb, for appellant.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, Mr. R. Patrick Baughman and Mr. David J. Sherriff, for appellee.
At the outset, it should be noted that no claim is made by or on behalf of the Industrial Commission that it would have any authority to deduct, from the determination of relator's percentage of permanent partial disability, the percentage determined in making an award to the same person in a separate claim which predated the injury in question. In any event, our decision in State, ex rel. Shewalter, v. Indus. Comm. (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 12, would appear to preclude such authority, in the absence of a specific finding that a portion of a workman's present disability is unrelated to the claim under consideration.
Here, no claim is made by respondent that any of claimant's present disability is unrelated to the 1966 injury (PE 489065), or that it is in fact the result of the 1959 injury (PE 334883).
Instead of presenting the entire Industrial Commission file, as evidence, to the Court of Appeals, counsel for the commission attached to their brief some 24 exhibits, all being copies of pertinent portions of the file in No. PE 489065. The "authenticity, correctness and admissibility" of such exhibits were stipulated by the parties, and it does not appear that either party was asserting that any other relevant evidence was, in fact, considered by the commission when it, in effect, rejected the finding of its own doctor, and awarded permanent partial compensation based on a disability of 15%. With commendable candor, counsel for respondent conceded in oral argument before this court, that the 24 exhibits contain all of the pertinent evidence from file No. PE 489065. Since no claim is being made that any of relator's present disability results from the 1959 injury, one may not speculate that there might be evidence in file No. PE 334883 to support the commission's order of July 14, 1970.
It, of course, is true that the complaint alleges that the 15% was computed by deducting the 1961 award of 25% in No. PE 334883, and that there was no evidence before the Court of Appeals to support that specific allegation.
In essence, therefore, we are left with a record containing evidence, all of which leads to the conclusion that relator, as of May 1970, had a permanent partial disability of 40% and none of which indicates any possible reason for an award of 15%. On the record, there is no showing that an award of 15% would be other than arbitrary.
In State, ex rel. Szekely, v. Indus. Comm. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 237, we held, in paragraph four of the syllabus:
"Where there is substantial evidence to support the finding by the Industrial Commission on a question of fact, a court cannot, as an essential basis for awarding a writ of mandamus, substitute its finding on that question of fact for that finding by the Industrial Commission."
Where, however, there is no evidence in the record, either "substantial" or "insubstantial," to support or justify an order of the Industrial Commission awarding 15% permanent partial disability, and where all the evidence in the record supports an extent of permanent partial disability equal to 40%, the action of the Industrial Commission in awarding only 15% disability constitutes an abuse of discretion, subject to correction by an action in mandamus. See State, ex rel. Shewalter, v. Indus. Comm., supra ( 19 Ohio St.2d 12).
If, in fact, there was some reasonable basis for the commission's rejection of its own doctor's finding, such should not be left to mere speculation, but should have been placed in evidence and thus have become a part of the record of this case.
While the commission may, of course, reject the findings or recommendations of its staff, such simply cannot be done arbitrarily. State, ex rel. Coen, v. Indus. Comm., supra ( 126 Ohio St. 550), relied upon by respondent, does not hold that an arbitrary finding, unsupported by any evidence, may be made by the commission. In fact, the opinion concluded that the "commission's finding is a logical one and is within the terms of the application filed."
While a broad discretion may be vested in administrative officers, such discretion does not permit a mere arbitrary choice, and where the record indicates no possible basis for the choice adopted except an arbitrary rejection of all pertinent evidence relating to the subject under consideration, an abuse of discretion has been shown.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., SCHNEIDER, HERBERT, CORRIGAN and STERN, JJ., concur.
KERNS, J., concurs in the judgment.
KERNS, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for DUNCAN, J. JUDGE KERNS of the Court of Appeals was, pursuant to Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio, duly directed by the Chief Justice "to sit with the justices of the Supreme Court in the place and stead of" JUSTICE DUNCAN and JUDGE KERNS did so and heard and considered this cause prior to the resignation of JUSTICE DUNCAN on November 28, 1971.
I concur in the judgment in this case, but my adherence to the answer to the remedial question presented in the case of State, ex rel. Shewalter, v. Indus. Comm. (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 12, is predicated entirely upon the doctrine of stare decisis.